Problems of Communism

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1987



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Cover: General Secretary Zhao Ziyang delivers his report to the opening session of the 13th Chinese Communist Party Congress on October 25, 1987. Photo by Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

China's 13th Party Congress

Michel Oksenberg

The 13th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in October 1987 was not a watershed congress; its results did, however, constitute an important step en route to a more stable and reformed China. The acknowledgment of private plural interests, the extensive consultations, the greater openness, and the limited steps toward inner-party democracy manifested before and during the congress symbolize a gradual but significant evolution in relations between state and society in China.

How Far Can Soviet Reform Go?

William E. Odom

At first glance, Mikhail Gorbachev appears intent upon radically restructuring the Soviet economy so as to make it responsive to market forces. This process would require economic and political dislocations so extensive as to challenge the monopoly of economic power held by the CPSU and perhaps also its political control over the Soviet empire. A closer look at Gorbachev's tactics suggests, however, that he is conducting an administrative purge. It is a purge of a new type because he has recruited the Soviet intelligentsia as allies in his campaign against the entrenched Soviet bureaucracies. As a result, he has raised among the intelligentsia hopes for systemic change that he cannot afford to satisfy.

Soviet Cultural Politics

John B. Dunlop

The "restructuring" of the Soviet cultural sector has created an open schism in the ranks of the Soviet intelligentsia. The Westernizing "liberals" and liberal nationalists look to General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev for support as they try to extend the de-Stalinization process started under Nikita Khrushchev and to open Soviet society to Western influences. Their opponents are the more traditional nationalists and the Brezhnev-era cultural establishment figures who have begun to look to "Second Secretary" Yegor Ligachev for support as they try to fight off the "commercialization" of Soviet culture and the influences on Soviet society of what they see as the pernicious Western "mass culture."

Polish Trade Unions "Normalized"

Jerzy M. Kolankiewicz

The legalization of new trade unions in Poland has been a key ingredient in General Wojciech Jaruzelski's attempts to demonstrate his regime's continuity with the violently foreshortened Solidarity era. However, he has repeatedly rebuffed the new unions as they have taken timid steps to defend worker interests. Such rebuffs could further alienate an already distrustful society. Moreover, as the government tries to implement its current economic reform policies—which promise to exacerbate the difficult living situation of the Polish people—even the officially sanctioned unions might succumb to pressure from their members and strike out at the regime.

(Abstracts continued on reverse side)

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Notes

Glasnost': Roots and Practice

Natalie Gross

Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost'* has not brought about a break with the Russian-Soviet political tradition of state control over public criticism and political debate. The old view of public criticism as a manipulable political tool still prevails. Nevertheless, *glasnost'* has partially removed the cloak of secrecy that shrouded political and social events in the Soviet Union. It now remains to be seen whether the expected benefits of Gorbachev's policies—a modernized economy, a revitalized society, and restored international prestige—will outweigh the potential risks of internal instability and social turmoil.

Perestroyka and Soviet Agriculture

Roy D. Laird

Glasnost' has restored some order to Soviet statistical reporting on agriculture, and the first two Gorbachev years show substantial improvement in this critical sector. However, the General Secretary seems to lack the political backing to make the major shifts toward individual responsibility and incentives required to increase agricultural productivity and satisfy popular demand for a better diet. Gorbachev appears to be stumping the Soviet countryside à la Khrushchev in an attempt to gain such support.

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China's 13th Party Congress

Michel Oksenberg

As a rule, party congresses in communist countries are convened to perform three tasks. First, the top leaders arrive at a ranking of themselves and decide who among them should hold the highest positions in the party as well as the government. Second, especially in the resolutions of the party congress and in the speech by the party's preeminent leader, the leaders articulate the broad thrust of policy for the next three to five years. These documents seek to establish the spirit or tone of governance until the next congress. Third, they delineate the decisional authority of the various policy-making bodies at the apex of the party structure: the Politburo, the Standing Committee of the Politburo, the Secretariat, the Central Committee, and—in the Chinese case—the Military Affairs Commission (MAC) of the Central Committee. (Ideally, a party congress should leave in its wake orderly institutional mechanisms to govern the country during the coming few years.) In the main, these three tasks were performed before and during the 13th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held in October 1987.

Beyond these manifest functions, a congress is a gathering of the clan; it offers an opportunity for the nation's political elites to meet, form personal bonds, and solidify the network of human relations so essential to the running of a bureaucratic state. A party congress therefore combines the functions that in democratic countries are performed by the national conventions of *all* political parties, the inaugural address of the preeminent leader and the rituals surrounding his or her installation, and the periodic gatherings of a nation's business, trade union, military, and intellectual elites.

To foreign observers, the congresses of ruling communist parties therefore are important milestones. They illuminate the distribution of power among contending forces, the current agenda and policy preferences of the top leaders, the degree to which power rests with institutions rather than individuals, and hence the extent to which the communist country concerned has moved away from its revolutionary or totalitarian origins. In short, they provide clues concerning the current and future political state of play.

Yet, when analyzing a party congress, such as the recent one in China, observers must remember that these gatherings rarely have the programmatic significance that conveners claim for them. Using them to illuminate the political dynamics of a country is as pointless as trying to reconstruct a film from a single snapshot. Leaders, however, frequently are tempted to claim that party congresses are watershed events, to exaggerate their accomplishments, or to maintain that these accomplishments will be sustained. Unfortunately, analysts too often accept such assertions at face value.

Recalling the Past

A brief review of the six national congresses convened by the CCP since the People's Republic of China (PRC) was established in 1949 (the first seven CCP congresses met before the party achieved national rule) serves as a reminder of the importance of these gatherings, as well as of the analytical opportunities and limitations they afford. The Eighth Party Congress was convened by Chinese leaders in September 1956. It was intended to be a "victory" and "unity" meeting, to celebrate not only the CCP's attainment of power but its completion of the collectivization of agriculture and the nationalization of industry and commerce during the

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The opening of the 13th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party on October 25, 1987.

—Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos.

preceding years. The top leaders also sought to establish the basis for an orderly succession to Mao Zedong, and at the end of the congress, Liu Shaoqi seemed well ensconced as number two, with Zhou Enlai as number three. The overwhelming impression that the leaders conveyed was of their unity and common purpose. Collective leadership was the motto of the day, and great progress seemed to have been made in creating a rational division of labor among key policy-making bodies at the apex. Key policy documents gave clear priority to economic development. The policy guidelines established at this meeting were, however, short-lived.

Eighteen months later, at the second session of the Eighth Party Congress in May 1958 (no other congress has met twice), most of the leaders, with the exception of Zhou Enlai and the ever-cautious Chen Yun, were swept up by the euphoria of the Great Leap Forward. The strategy for economic and social development enunciated at the congress—the simultaneous transformation of China's economy and culture through mobilization of the populace—was nowhere to be found in the documents of the September 1956 congress. Yielding to Mao's charge, the top leaders had not maintained the institutional arrangements and collective leadership established at the September 1956 meeting.

In May 1958, it was impossible to foresee that the disasters of the Great Leap policy, the growing fissures among the leaders, and the launching of the Cultural Revolution would make the convening of a congress impossible for 11 years. Not until 1969 did the need to legitimate new top leaders and confirm a new succession arrangement, to bring the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution to an end, and to project an image of cohesiveness in the face of increasing Soviet military pressure lead to the convening of the Ninth Party Congress. At that congress, which took place in April, the party constitution explicitly named Lin Biao as Mao's successor. The congress also confirmed the central role then played by the military in Chinese politics, as commanders and commissars of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) gained a high proportion of the seats on the Politburo and Central Committee. Judging by the results of the congress, China had fallen under the sway of the military.

But once again, the party congress provided an inaccurate guide to the future. Within 16 months of the 1969 national gathering, at the Second Plenum of the Ninth

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Central Committee convened in September 1970, Mao indicated his disenchantment with Lin Biao. Soon thereafter, Mao ordered Zhou Enlai—who at the Ninth Party Congress was in a weak and exposed position—to criticize the top military commanders of the PLA. In the subsequent months, Mao undermined the succession arrangements he had endorsed in 1969.

The last three party congresses, convened in 1973, 1977, and 1982, have provided more reliable clues to the future. The 10th Party Congress of August 1973 revealed a clearly divided leadership unable to articulate a coherent set of policies. On one side were arrayed the enthusiasts of the Cultural Revolution, and on the other stood those who advocated political stability and economic growth. The meeting foreshadowed the looming factional strife of Mao's last years, which eventually culminated in the incarceration of the pro–Cultural Revolution faction.

Liu Shaoqi, designated Mao Zedong's heir apparent at the Eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, was purged at the outset of the Cultural Revolution.

—Magnum.

The 11th Party Congress, in August 1977, saw the political return of Deng Xiaoping, presaging his eventual emergence as China's preeminent leader, and the appointment of a top leadership divided between beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath—centered around Hua Guofeng—and those such as Deng who, to varying degrees and at different times, had suffered from it. The failure of this congress to settle a number of thorny issues in effect identified the key matters that would claim the attention of China's leaders during the coming several years. Most important among these were how to deal with the legacies of the Cultural Revolution and of Mao Zedong and how to handle the rehabilitation of officials and citizens who had been purged or disgraced during the Maoist years. The congress provided little indication of the policies of bold reform and the opening to outside which would be proclaimed at party plenums in December 1978, and December 1979.

The 12th Party Congress of September 1982 ratified the Hu Yaobang-Zhao Ziyang duumvirate to be the successors to Deng Xiaoping and endorsed the policies of reform and opening to the outside. It initiated the process of a generational change in leadership. But in retrospect, the keynote address by Hu Yaobang was a cautious document. Its ringing endorsement of a planned economy did not anticipate the late-1984 call for sweeping reforms in the urban industrial realm, nor did Hu's tough law-and-order rhetoric ("On no account will hostile, anti-socialist elements be given any freedom to carry out sabotage") and his call for a socialist spiritual civilization foreshadow Hu's commitment to political reform four years later.[1]

This cursory examination of the record yields several lessons. First, although the top leaders have made succession arrangements at each congress that probably would have been implemented if the preeminent leader had passed from the scene soon thereafter, in no instance has the established rank ordering in fact persisted until the next national congress. Second, the congresses usually have specified the institutional arrangements that are to prevail in the coming years, but these arrangements repeatedly have proven to be linked to the succession arrangement. Changes in the rank order of the top leaders are soon reflected in institutional changes at the top. Third, although party resolutions and speeches soon were disregarded in the Mao

[1]See Hu Yaobang "Create a New Situation in All Fields of Socialist Modernization—Report to the 12th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, September 1, 1982," *Beijing Review*, Sept. 13, 1982, pp. 11–40. The quote is from p. 27.

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era, largely due to the Chairman's mercurial style, congresses of the Deng era appear more effective in charting trends. Fourth, in every case, the *agenda* of issues that a congress addressed, if not the specific policies, did persist. In sum, party congresses usually convey the impression that policy and questions of succession have been settled, but in fact, they are subject to the subsequent vicissitudes of the Chinese scene. With these cautionary notes in mind, it is, nevertheless, important to review the results of the 13th Party Congress. The politics surrounding the congress—the cleavages, the decisional process in preparation for the congress, the amorphous public mood with respect to the congress—provide important clues about the essential qualities of the political system and the capacity of the leaders to respond to the inevitable challenges that lie ahead.

Personnel Matters

Deng Xiaoping and his chief associates responsible for preparing the congress faced three major tasks with respect to personnel: first, to secure the retirement of many aging party leaders and to promote younger leaders to the Central Committee and Politburo; second, to reestablish the outlines for an orderly succession to Deng Xiaoping; and third, to arrange for younger military officials to assume the top positions in the PLA. Informed Chinese officials state that personnel issues, rather than the policy issues and the political report, absorbed most of the attention of the delegates.

Retiring of the old guard. From the Seventh Party Congress in 1945 until the 13th Party Congress, the top leadership of the Chinese Communist Party was dominated by veterans of the epic Long March and by talented revolutionaries whom Mao had gathered under his wing during the years he was ensconced in his Yan'an guerrilla lair. Even at the height of the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath (1966–76), when Mao had purged many of his erstwhile associates, several of the top leaders—Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng, and even Mao's wife Jiang Qing—still could claim to have been part of the Yan'an experience. Deng Xiaoping's return to power in 1977–78 signaled the exoneration of those purged during the Cultural Revolution and hence a strengthening of the Yan'an generation's grip at the apex. In 1982, the 12th Party Congress confirmed many Yan'an-era leaders to the Politburo and Central Committee, while also electing many younger officials to the Central Committee.

From several vantages it can be said that the 13th Party Congress advanced the process of rejuvenating China's leadership that had been set in motion in the early 1980's. The turnover of Central Committee members was extensive. Of the 348 full and alternate members on the Central Committee prior to the congress, fully 150 (or 42 percent) lost their rank—the new Central Committee is comprised of 175 full members and 110

The new Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party poses for photographers on Nov. 2, 1987, in Beijing: from left to right are Zhao Ziyang, Li Peng, Qiao Shi, Hu Qili, and Yao Yilin.

—Wide World.

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alternate members. The Yan'an generation lost its dominance at the apex. The new Standing Committee of the Politburo—Zhao Ziyang (68), Li Peng (59), Hu Qili (58), Qiao Shi (63), and Yao Yilin (70)—contains no one of stature from the Yan'an era. Indeed, with the exception of Yao, the apex of the party is now at least formally in the hands of people whose careers fall almost entirely in the post-1949 period. On the Politburo, only two members—Yang Shangkun (80) and Hu Yaobang (72)—participated in the Long March.

The generational succession is revealed in other ways. The average age of the outgoing Standing Committee was 77; the new Standing Committee averages 63 years of age. The new Politburo has an average age of 68, compared to 71 years in the case of the outgoing Politburo. The figures for the 285 full and alternate members of the Central Committee are even more telling. Only 20 percent are 61 years of age or older, and 46 percent are 55 years old or younger. In 1963, Mao Zedong and his associates began to discuss the need to promote a generation of revolutionary successors. Twenty-five years later, after several abortive efforts under Mao and half-steps under Deng, it would appear that the generational change is really occurring.

A strong note of caution is still in order, however. Deng Xiaoping, the 83-year-old preeminent leader, only "semi-retired." He retained the key position of chairman of the pivotal Military Affairs Commission of the Party Central Committee. Although Zhao Ziyang acquired the position of MAC first vice-chairman and Yang Shangkun became permanent MAC vice-chairman, Deng remains the person ultimately in charge of the military establishment, the deployment of forces, and the use of strategic forces. Several other semi-retired elders from the Yan'an era also still have influence and authority, which they could employ to reenter the political arena, should they grow discontent with their successors. In particular, party stalwart Chen Yun (82) became head of the prestigious Central Advisory Committee (CAC), with Bo Yibo and Song Renqiong as the vice-chairmen. The CAC provides a forum from which such veteran leaders can launch critical analyses of current policies. Moreover, the 27 members of the CAC's Standing Committee—many of whom are Long March veterans—may participate in but not vote at Politburo meetings. The Yan'an generation can still be a potent force should it wish to do so.

Declining influence of the Cultural Revolution. Not only is the Yan'an era receding; so, too, is the Cultural Revolution. No one on the new Standing Committee or Politburo was a clear or major beneficiary of the Cultural Revolution era. The two noteworthy Politburo members who rose to prominence *during* the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath—Chen Muhua and Ni Zhifu—lost their position. But at the same time, it no longer appears necessary to have suffered during that era. For awhile in Chinese politics, during the late 1970's and early 1980's, to have been disgraced and subjected to some form of arrest or rustication during the upheavals of the Cultural Revolution was a requisite badge of honor for political acceptance. But the biographical resumés of the new Politburo and Secretariat members make no pretense of claiming that each new leader was a victim of the "Gang of Four."

Indeed, several of the biographies make clear the person involved advanced in steady fashion—not spectacularly, as that would be unseemly—but in ways that helped maintain islands of stability during that drastic era. It is said of Li Peng: "After 1966, he was Director of the Beijing Electricity Power Administration. Thanks partly to his efforts, Beijing and Tianjin were ensured of a normal supply of electricity despite the turmoil of the 'cultural revolution'."[2] In contrast, the official biographies pointedly note that "During the 'cultural revolution' Hu Qili was persecuted,"[3] and "Like many other veteran cadres in China, Yao Yilin was dismissed from office during the 'cultural revolution' which began in 1966."[4] General Secretary Zhao's portrait states: "During the chaotic 'cultural revolution,' he was persecuted and sent to work in a factory."[5] But Qiao Shi "was transferred to the International Liaison Department of the CCP Central Committee in 1963 and worked there until 1982. During this period, he served as deputy bureau chief, bureau chief, deputy head, and head of the department."[6] In addition, many of the new Politburo members, the biographies make clear, were fully active after 1970–71, that is, whatever troubles they had had came to an end well before the overthrow of the "Gang of Four."

The Cultural Revolution era is receding in another way. China's problems no longer are attributed to the legacy of those "ten tumultuous years." In fact, Zhao Ziyang's report to the congress made scant reference to that era. The last years of Mao's rule are no longer officially portrayed as the source of all of China's problems, nor does one's career during that time totally determine one's current opportunities. (Even Mao's immediate successor as party chairman, Hua Guofeng, remains on the Central Committee, and three of his principal asso-

[2]Ibid., Nov. 16–22, 1987, pp. 21–22.
[3]Ibid., p. 23.
[4]Ibid., p. 24.
[5]Ibid., p. 18.
[6]Ibid., p. 23.

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ciates—Wu De, Chen Xilian, and Wang Dongxing—are on the Central Advisory Commission.

As the Yan'an era, the Cultural Revolution is losing its immediate significance. It is the current qualities of the new guard that merit attention rather than their past accomplishments in making revolution.

Promoting the new guard. Judging by the family backgrounds, education, and bureaucratic experience of the new Politburo and Central Committee members, a combination of several attributes—with the salience of each varying from individual to individual—characterizes the new leaders. The majority are between 50 and 60 years of age, and a significant portion are college graduates. While the educational backgrounds of the entire Central Committee are not yet available, to judge by the Politburo, many have received extensive training in the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. The typical member of the new guard then gradually mounted in the hierarchy, holding positions demanding technical competence as well as those that were more bureaucratic or political-administrative in nature. In fact, some of the new guard appear to have climbed primarily through the party apparatus by means of a series of assignments at different levels as secretary of a party committee or as director of an organization department or a propaganda department, while others rose through the ranks of government ministries.

Taken as a whole, both the Politburo and the Central Committee have "bureaucratic reach." That is, when these bodies meet, the gathering brings together officials from the commanding heights of the government and the party, both in Beijing and in the provinces. As perhaps no Central Committee since the Eighth, the 13th CC is broadly representative of the various components of the Chinese political system. In fact, according to one participant at the party congress, political affiliation was a major concern in the nominating process, and ministries or provinces that did not have a representative on the early, tentative slate of nominees lobbied to place a nominee from their bailiwick on the list. In several instances, these pleas were accepted.

The new Politburo restored a regional perspective—which had been present in the Eighth through the 11th Politburos, but had been absent in the 12th. Whereas the 12th Politburo contained no official with provincial or municipal responsibilities, the new body contains a leading party official from the major municipalities of Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai, as well as one from Sichuan Province.

The only sector that seems, in some sense, underrepresented at the apex is the People's Liberation Army. Only one career "military" figure—Qin Jiwei—is on this Politburo. The other members of the Military Affairs Commission who sit on the Politburo (Zhao Ziyang, Deng Xiaoping, and Yang Shangkun) must be considered the top party civilians in charge of the military. This is the weakest PLA representation on the Politburo since the Red Army was founded in 1927. It will be interesting to see whether any of the new leaders of the military are eventually added to the Politburo.

In addition to education and bureaucratic career, personal connections and family background played a role in the rise of many in the new guard. The three most celebrated cases are Acting Premier Li Peng, who is the son of a well-known revolutionary, was orphaned at a young age, and received special attention from Zhou Enlai; 51-year-old Politburo member Li Tieying, the son of Zhou Enlai associate Li Weihan, the long-time head of the CCP United Front Department; and the new PLA Political Department chief, Yang Baibing, who is the younger brother of Yang Shangkun. If not blood relatives, then many of the new guard served as secretaries and administrative assistants to the retiring elders. Patronage and patrimony clearly are crucial dimensions of the current Chinese political system from the apex to the grass roots.

Biographical sketches of two new Politburo members illustrate these themes. Sixty-one-year-old Jiang Zemin typifies the technocrat who has held a wide range of managerial positions in the machine-tool and electronic industries. He graduated in 1947 from the Electrical Machinery Department of the prestigious Jiaotong University in Shanghai. He had joined the CCP in April 1946 and worked in the underground party apparatus. His early career after 1949 involved, successively, management of a foodstuffs factory, a soap factory, and an electric machinery design shop in Shanghai. After spending a year in Moscow in 1955 as a trainee in the Stalin Automobile Factory, he returned to China to work in the Changchun Number One Automobile Plant. This factory, built with Soviet assistance and the help of Soviet advisors, was the largest auto plant in China. While there, he was deputy chief of the power division and deputy chief engineer for dynamic mechanics. He subsequently became deputy director of the Shanghai Electrical Equipment Research Institute and then served as director and acting secretary of the party committee of the Wuhan Power Machinery Institute. All these assignments were in units under the jurisdiction of the First Ministry of Machine-Building Industry, the ministry responsible for production of such varied civilian machinery as motor vehicles, lathes, generators, and turbines. Apparently, these assignments were interspersed with positions in the Beijing headquarters of this huge and influential ministry, for during the late

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1950's, Jiang was identified as an assistant minister in the ministry, and at some point, he was deputy director and then director of the ministry's foreign affairs bureau. From mid-1980 until March 1982, Jiang was vice-chairman of the two overlapping commissions supervising import and export affairs and foreign investment, and in May of that year, he went to the Ministry of the Electronics Industry, where he was first vice-minister and then minister. Then, in 1985, he returned to Shanghai as mayor and deputy party secretary.[7]

New Politburo member Yang Rudai typifies a person who rose within the party apparatus. A native of Renshou county in Sichuan, he appears to have been a youth who responded to the opportunity to welcome the arriving Communist forces. Aged 24 in 1950, he became a functionary during land reform in a district of his native county. He has received an education "equivalent to" senior middle school. He joined the party in August 1952, and soon became a deputy secretary of the party committee in the same district in which he had helped guide land reform. After 1954, he worked in the party apparatus in the Renshou county seat, first in the organization department and then on the party committee, attaining the rank of secretary before the Cultural Revolution. Apparently he either survived the Cultural Revolution relatively unscathed or was rehabilitated rather early, for after 1970 he served as vice-chairman of the county's revolutionary committee—the institutional innovation of the Cultural Revolution that for awhile combined the previously separate party and government institutions—and he regained his party secretary post when the county party committee was reestablished in the early 1970's. After 1977, he was promoted to the prefecture (*dichu*) level, and after 1978, he was promoted to the provincial level, serving at both levels as a vice head of the government and secretary of the party committee. In April 1983, he became the top party official in the province.[8]

[7]Ibid., p. 35, and Wolfgang Bartke and Peter Schier, *China's New Party Leadership*, Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1985, p. 128.
[8]*Beijing Review*, Nov. 16–22, 1987, p. 37.

Chinese leaders Deng Xiaoping, left, and Zhao Ziyang survey the scene from the rostrum at the opening of the 13th CCP Congress.

—Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos.

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Although not strikingly different from the career patterns of Hua Guofeng, Ji Dengkui, and others who, in the 1970's, seemed poised to assume leadership positions upon Mao's death,[9] the new leaders do differ in several important respects. They are slightly younger and tend to have received far better formal education. They joined the revolution not during the anti-Japanese war (1937–45) but during the Chinese civil war (1945–49) and the immediate post-revolutionary period. Further, they did not rise rapidly during the Cultural Revolution or exhibit an unbridled streak of opportunism during those years. Finally, fewer have been immersed in agriculture, ideology, mobilization activities, and mass-organization work (the concerns of the Maoist era), and more have been involved in running the urban, industrial economy and managing the party bureaucracy. In short, the new guard tends to consist of technocrats or bureaucrats who rose through the ranks of the post-1949 system.

Establishing the outlines for an orderly succession. The second task confronting Deng and his associates was to repair the damage arising from the removal of Hu Yaobang from the position of general secretary in January 1987. Hu had been Deng's choice to succeed him as leader of the party, and since 1981, Deng had been helping Hu and Premier Zhao Ziyang consolidate their positions. Deng's prestige was invested in the viability of the duumvirate arrangement. Exactly what happened to make the plans go awry is still not known to outside observers. It may not even be evident to the participants, or at least each of the participants may have a different perception of the events. This much is clear, however: the student demonstrations of December 1986–January 1987 were but the culmination of a longer-term erosion of Deng's confidence in Hu and perhaps of some friction between Zhao and Hu. (Zhao apparently was upset by Hu's intrusions into the making of economic policy, often through the utterance of spontaneous remarks to the press that went beyond policy guidelines.)

As the end of 1986 approached, the list of grievances against Hu had grown long. His tolerance for innovation and experimentation in literature and the arts as well as his encouragement of liveliness in the academic realm had earned him the enmity of conservative ideologues. In mid-1986, Deng charged the General Secretary and the Premier to think about political reform, and Hu began to advocate the separation of the government from the party in ways that further raised the ire of some elder defenders of the party. Hu's support for expanding Sino-Japanese ties also apparently vexed a number of top leaders. His failure to win the confidence of the military also caused problems and prevented him from becoming Deng's acknowledged successor as chairman of the MAC. And finally, even though most Chinese intellectuals had come to appreciate Hu's support of their various causes, many intellectuals also apparently felt that in style, stature, and temperament, Hu did not possess the characteristics necessary to be China's preeminent leader. He exhibited a spontaneity, enthusiasm, and responsiveness that is not usually associated with China's top leaders. The student demonstrations further compounded his problems, and enabled his critics among the party elders to claim that Hu could not successfully orchestrate as complex an event as the convening of the 13th Party Congress, which was to have been his main task in 1987. A number of the elders called upon Deng's residence in late December 1986 to press for Hu's ouster, and Deng—who by then harbored his own reservations about Hu's viability—sacrificed his long-time protégé.[10]

The disaffection with Hu Yaobang underscored some of the qualities a viable successor to Deng must have: a deliberate, sober, disciplined, and reserved style; the ability to elicit respect and support from the party elders; the capacity to deal effectively with Deng; and the political agility to consult effectively and hold together a broad coalition. Although Hu Yaobang did not exhibit these qualities in sufficient measure, he possessed—and still possesses—other important attributes. Primary among these was his network of loyal, reliable, well-placed associates whose careers he had fostered during his long tenure as head of the Communist Youth League in the 1950's and early 1960's, his work at party headquarters from 1978 to 1986, and his wide travels throughout the country. Other than the elders—Deng, Chen Yun, Bo Yibo, Peng Zhen, and Yang Shangkun—no one knew better the party machinery through which the preeminent leader must rule than Hu did. But this was evidently not enough.

The burden then fell upon Zhao Ziyang to demonstrate that he is a credible successor to Deng. In the final analysis, of course, his viability cannot be determined until he no longer has the shield of Deng to protect him (unless, of course, Deng's spear should be

[9]For an analysis of leaders who seemed destined in the mid-1970's for leadership positions, see David M. Lampton, *Paths to Power: Elite Mobility in Contemporary China*, Ann Arbor, MI, Center for Chinese Studies, 1986.

[10]For a more detailed account of Hu's dismissal, see Parris Chang, "China After Deng: Toward the 13th CCP Congress," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May-June 1987, pp. 30–42.

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turned against him). But his performance in 1987 and during the 13th Congress was impressive.

The process of drafting his political report was akin to negotiating a political mine field; he did this deftly and moved on to dominate the congress proceedings—no other leader delivered a widely publicized speech to the meeting. He also demonstrated political toughness on several occasions in 1987, for example, in rebuffing attacks on his reform program and curtailing the campaign against "bourgeois liberalism." He appeared to combine a strong commitment to the vision of a reformed Chinese economic and political system with a pragmatic and flexible approach to the pursuit of the vision in the face of immediate economic and political pressures. He was named to the first vice-chairmanship of the MAC, a position that Hu never was able to secure. In short, although Deng Xiaoping remains the preeminent leader, the congress anointed Zhao Ziyang to take his place when the time comes. Although the historical record from previous congresses underscores that this is no firm guarantee (after all, Lin Biao emerged from the Ninth Congress as Mao's designated successor), Zhao's ability to succeed Deng appears now largely to be in his own hands, provided of course that he retains Deng's confidence.

Zhao did not emerge as a totally dominant and unconstrained heir-apparent, however. The central bureaucracies and provinces are not dominated by his long-time associates. Also, the announcement of the membership of the new Standing Committee and the naming of Li Peng as acting premier soon after the congress suggest that considerable maneuvering and political balancing surrounded Zhao's rise.

China's political balancing act. The underlying issues in Chinese politics for the past several years have involved a cluster of complex questions:

(1) How fast can and should the economic reforms proceed, particularly price reform and the expansion of the role of the market? Are the problems now being encountered—inflation, trade imbalances, government deficits, corruption—the products of the reforms, or an indication that the reforms have not proceeded rapidly enough?

(2) How important are political reforms that involve separating the functions of the party and government and improving the responsiveness of the bureaucracy to popular will? What is the relationship between economic and political reform? Is political reform a requisite for successful economic reform, or would political reform imperil successes in the economic realm?

(3) How rapidly should contact with the outside world be expanded? What are the risks from the open policy, in terms of the domestic disruptions that foreign influence might generate? What is the relationship between economic reform and the open policy? Should tight control continue to be exercised over the economy and polity precisely because the door to the outside must be opened wider and, therefore, the inevitable disruptions must be kept to a minimum? Or, should economic reform be pursued and state control be relaxed precisely in order to facilitate an increased Chinese involvement in world affairs?

Many analysts of China divide those responding to these questions into two contending opinion groups: those who want extensive economic and political reforms and a wider opening to the outside versus those who, while not opposed to reform, are more cautious on all three fronts. This author is not convinced that the actual contending positions lend themselves to such easy packaging. For example, knowledgeable Chinese officials privately state that some leaders who adopt cautious views on political reform (that is, on the loosening of authoritarian control) do so in order to protect economic reform. Such leaders are avid economic reformers but conservatives on the political front. Other leaders reportedly are hesitant about economic reform but quite supportive of the opening to the outside.

These issues are relevant to understanding the top appointments made at the 13th Party Congress. As his rhetoric and expressed policy preferences made clear prior to the congress, Zhao has staked out a strong position in favor of economic reform and the opening to the outside world. He has identified himself, for example, with reform of urban enterprises, and he supports China's involvement with the world economy and the international financial institutions. None of his new colleagues on the Politburo's Standing Committee had evidenced exactly the same set of policy commitments prior to their selection to the committee. One—Hu Qili—had identified himself with political reform. Reflecting their bureaucratic responsibilities, Yao Yilin was identified with the opening to the outside but appears more cautious on economic reform, while Qiao Shi had handled important aspects of administrative reforms in personnel management but is not identified with bolder political reform. Li Peng had been involved in efforts to improve the planning system but has not given ringing endorsements to more sweeping economic reforms. Particularly noteworthy, however, two other top leaders who supported Zhao's policies and whose stature just as easily warranted selection to the Standing Committee—Vice Premiers and Politburo members Wan Li and Tian Jiyun—did not make it. Here is evidence of a balancing act.

The clear campaigning that occurred for the position

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of premier is further evidence. Throughout 1987, many trial balloons were floated, and several discernible efforts were made via the Hong Kong press and the Beijing rumor mill to weaken Li Peng's chances or foster interest in alternative candidates. Not enough is known about the arcane world of high-level Chinese politics to know exactly who was pursuing what strategy, but it seems that Li's nomination caused uneasiness in some reform quarters. In some ways, Li's nomination as acting premier balances Zhao's emergence on the party side.

Western observers may have exaggerated the differences between Zhao and Li. They could very well work in harmony, particularly as each adjusts to his new roles and responsibilities. But if the reforms were to encounter severe and unanticipated difficulties and some irreconcilable cleavages were to develop among the leaders, it would not be surprising if the tensions found expression in a conflict between Zhao and Li over some aspect of the reforms or open door policy, given the present arrangement.

A part of the balancing, too, was the unexpected attention paid to Hu Yaobang at the congress. Not only did he retain his seat on the Politburo, but during the congress, he frequently appeared on Chinese television and in newspaper photo coverage. He suffered little humiliation, and the publicity he received conveyed the message that his personal network and supporters were not in disgrace and that his ideas—particularly his commitment to political reform—were accepted ones. As a result, it cannot be said that Hu Yaobang has been purged; he remains a political force, though of uncertain strength.

Changes in top military leadership. The third major task in personnel management was to change the top leadership of the military. Five positions constitute the commanding heights of the PLA: chairman of the MAC, secretary general of the MAC, chief-of-staff, head of the General Political Department of the PLA, and minister of defense. As of 1987, these positions had remained in the same hands for nearly five years, and all the individuals concerned—Deng, Yang Shangkun, Yang Dezhi, Yu Qiuli, and Zhang Aiping—were 73 years of age or older. A sweeping generational transformation had already occurred at all levels below the apex, from the deputy chiefs-of-staff to division commanders, and the apparent inability to change the guard at the top prior to the congress had led some foreign observers, including this one, to suspect opposition among senior PLA figures to some aspects of current policies or to the proposed leaders. These analysts believed that such military leaders at least had a veto power over proposed high-level personnel changes.



Li Peng, who emerged as a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party at the 13th Congress and became acting premier of China in November 1987.

—Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos.

Against this background, there were very significant personnel developments during and soon after the congress. Not only did Zhao and Yang Shangkun become MAC vice-chairmen, but Liu Huaqing joined Hong Xuezhi as a deputy secretary general of the MAC, Chi Haotian replaced Yang Dezhi as chief-of-staff, Yang Baibing replaced Yu Qiuli as head of the General Political Department, and Zhao Nanqi replaced Hong Xuezhi as head of the General Logistics Department. Save for a new minister of defense, a successor generation of PLA leaders at the top has now been named. As with the new guard in the party, the new military leaders—several of whom have risen quite rapidly and jumped over more logical candidates—now will have to prove their effectiveness in command and capacity to survive. However, one thing is certain: failure to have changed the military leaders at the apex when similar changes were occurring on the civilian side would have underscored that something was amiss—that senior military figures were, indeed, opposed to the reform program.

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Zhao's Report to the Congress

In addition to the personnel changes, the report of General Secretary Zhao was a major point on the congress agenda. It claimed to set the broad thrust of policy for the next three to five years thus performing the second task of a national party congress. The lengthy document analyzed the current situation in China and stipulated the basic line of the party, as such reports should. It then went on to outline the leaders' strategy for economic development, the program for restructuring the economy, and plans for political reform. Indeed, given the dismissal of Hu Yaobang and the campaign against "bourgeois liberalism" earlier in the year, the strong, long-term endorsement of political reform was a surprising and significant development.

The passages of the report on economic reform contain little new. Zhao's calls for assigning priority to science and technology, controlling inflation, expanding foreign trade and technological cooperation, invigorating enterprise management, encouraging different types of enterprise ownership, using diverse incentive systems, and improving macro-economic instruments for guiding the economy in order to allow for indirect control of enterprises, are all themes that he and other reform-oriented leaders have been enunciating for several years.

But several aspects of Zhao's speech merit more extensive review. These include the Marxist-Leninist rationale it establishes for the reforms, its discussion of the proposed political reform, the implications of its call to reconcile conflicting interests, and, finally, its placing of new issues on the national agenda.

Echoing a theme first enunciated in 1981, Zhao identified "the principal contradiction" in contemporary Chinese society as that "between the growing material and cultural needs of the people and backward production."[11] Resolving this tension, he noted, necessitates concentrating on raising productivity, modernizing industry and agriculture, and removing organizational and managerial constraints on growth.

The General Secretary summarized the basic line of the party as "one center and two basic points"—i.e., the pursuit of economic development with simultaneous adherence to the four cardinal principles and to reform and opening up—in a passage that no doubt has already been memorized by the party faithful throughout the country:

To lead the people of all our nationalities in a united, self-reliant, intensive, and pioneering effort to turn China into a prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and modern socialist country by making economic development our central task while adhering to the four cardinal principles [socialism, the people's democratic dictatorship, leadership by the CCP, and Marxism-Leninism–Mao Zedong Thought—M.O.] and preserving reform and the open policy.[12]

General Yang Shangkun, permanent vice-chairman of the Military Affairs Commission of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee.

—Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos.

[11]Zhao Ziyang, "Advance Along the Road of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics—Report Delivered at the 13th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on October 25, 1987" (hereafter cited as "Zhao Report"), *Beijing Review*, Nov. 9–15, 1987, pp. 23–49, at p. 27.

Such a formulation had actually been advanced at the 1956 Eighth Party Congress, but Mao had abandoned the notion in 1957. The 1956 formulation was approvingly recalled in 1981 in the Central Committee's "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the PRC" (ibid., July 6, 1981). In his report to the 12th CCP Congress, Hu asserted: "We have resolutely shifted the focus of work of the party and state to economic construction." ("Create a New Situation, . . ." loc. cit., p. 12). The "Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Reform of the Economic Structure (adopted by the 12th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China at its Third Plenary Session on October 20, 1984)" declared: "The essential task of socialism is to develop the forces of production, create ever more social wealth and meet the people's growing material and cultural needs." (ibid., Oct. 29, 1984, p. V)

[12]"Zhao Report," loc. cit., p. 28. This passage was printed in italics in *Beijing Review*.

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The primary stage of socialism. The report is likely to be remembered for its key ideological formulation: Chinese socialism is still in a primary stage. This idea is not totally new.[13] Recent party resolutions on creating a spiritual civilization, as well as speeches by Hu Yaobang, had begun to describe socialist China as in a primary or early stage of development. But Zhao's speech develops the idea more fully than had been done previously. And the concept is important, for it establishes a rationale or justification in Marxist terms for reform policies that might otherwise be interpreted as abandoning socialism.

Zhao described the "primary stage of socialism" (*shehui zhuyi chuji jieduan*) as follows:

. . . the specific stage China must necessarily go through while building socialism under conditions of backward productive forces and an underdeveloped commodity economy. It will be at least 100 years from the 1950's . . . to the time when socialist modernization will have been in the main accomplished, and all these years belong to the primary stage of socialism. . . . It is a stage in which an agricultural country . . . will gradually turn into a modern industrial country. . . .[14]

The idea of stages of development is hardly new to Marxist theory. But this formula stands in contrast to Mao Zedong's preference to skip stages or compress them. And it rebuts critics who put forth the argument that the communist-led revolution came prematurely and that socialism came too early to China. The idea that a capitalist stage should have occurred prior to the building of socialism and that strong remnant feudal influences in China exist because capitalism never flourished, which has been argued by Marxist theorists, did not find widespread support among CCP ideologues, who claimed that such ideas undermined the ideological basis of CCP rule. Even though some Chinese Marxists tentatively began to explore this theory in the early 1980's, the idea that capitalist practices should be allowed to flourish, with a return to socialism later, remained an anathema to committed Marxist-Leninists. The conceptualization that Zhao has offered is an intriguing alternative solution to the ideological dilemma. According to the theory of the primary stage of socialism, free markets, stock exchanges, and such practices as bankruptcy need not exist exclusively in capitalist societies; they can also exist in a society that has already entered a socialist era and is in the process of attaining a fully modern economy.

The essential attributes of a socialist society are the continued rule of the Communist Party, public ownership of the main means of production, a planned economy, and commitment to the ultimate, Marxist-Leninist goal of a classless society.[15] Zhao's report makes clear China will not abandon these qualities. But within these broad parameters, his formulation permits considerable flexibility, experimentation, and pragmatism.

Proposed political reforms. Zhao devoted a major section of his report to reforms in the political structure. Subsections dealt with separating the party and government, delegating powers to lower levels of the party, reforming government organs, revamping the personnel system, establishing a system of consultation and dialogue, enhancing the role of representative assemblies and elections, and strengthening the legal system. Many of these themes have appeared periodically in the Deng era, especially in 1980–81 and again in late 1986. However, inasmuch as advocacy of political reform helped bring on the student demonstrations in late 1986 and early 1987, few foreign observers had expected Zhao to resurrect these themes with such vigor.

To be sure, Zhao tempered his remarks by pointedly rejecting a genuine multi-party democracy or an institutionalized separation of powers. He championed the continued vanguard role of the Communist Party and the principle of democratic centralism. He also, however, made proposals which go beyond the established consensus. In the section on party and government, for example, the General Secretary announced that, "henceforth the party committee at a given level will not designate a full-time secretary or member of its standing committee, who holds no government post, to take charge of government work." He stated that "party departments that overlap their counterpart government departments should be abolished." Somewhat more timidly, he suggested that the leading party groups in government departments "should be *gradually* abolished." Seeking to circumscribe the CCP Discipline and Inspection Commission, he recommended that these bodies "at all levels should not deal with breaches of the law or infractions of administrative regulations but should concentrate on fostering a strong sense of discipline. . . ."[16] In other words, the General Secretary would

[13]The origins and evolution of the phrase are traced in *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing), Nov. 5, 1987, p. 4.

[14]"Zhao Report," loc. cit., p. 27.

[15]The planning, however, need not be through command or central allocation of material supplies. Instead, the state will seek to rely on other instruments for guiding the economy, such as fiscal and monetary policies.

[16]"Zhao Report," loc. cit., p. 38, emphasis added.

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look to the government and not to the party to apply sanctions against errant party members—a dramatic departure from current practice. In all these areas, as in his innovative proposals for personnel management, it would be premature to conclude that party norms have already changed to accord with Zhao's wishes.

Articulation of private interests. Zhao's report broke new ground in yet another area. He bestowed legitimacy upon the expression of interests by noting: "Different groups of people may have different interests and views, and they too need opportunities and channels for the exchange of ideas."[17] On the eve of the party congress, Zhao elaborated on the same idea to the Seventh Plenum of the 12th Party Central Committee:

Socialist society is not a monolith. In this society, people of all kinds, of course, share common interests, but their special interests should not be overlooked. The conflicting interests should be reconciled. The government should work to coordinate various kinds of interests and contradictions; the party committees must be even better at the coordinating work.[18]

The implications of Zhao's remarks are profound. They run counter to both Leninism and the mainstream of traditional Chinese intellectual thought, neither of which acknowledges the virtues of pluralism or bestows legitimacy on the pursuit of individual interest. These passages tacitly accept both ideas. The natural next step in this thinking is to accept the notion of interest groups and to study the alternative institutional means through which diverse interests can be expressed and reconciled, a topic Zhao addressed very briefly in his report to the 12th Congress. The issues at stake here are those explored in the *Federalist Papers* rather than in the *Communist Manifesto*.

Zhao's remarks have stimulated public discussion of interest groups and how they might properly express their views in a socialist society. For example, Li Jun of the Economic Reform Research Institute, a leading Chinese "think tank," reportedly has stated: "It would be meaningful progress for us to recognize and understand that different interest groups do exist in our society. We would also have to make efforts to coordinate and sort out the contradictions that spring from this." Li's remarks were quoted approvingly in an article entitled "Different Interest Groups under Socialism," published in *Beijing Review*.[19] Elaborating upon a theme that Zhao's speeches has now made safe, the article complained that in the Cultural Revolution era, the inevitable divergence of interests between different groups in the community was distortedly viewed as "class struggle." According to the article, comprehensive social surveys reveal that different interest groups make different demands on the reform, and that support for reform policies varies among different sectors of the populace. The article concludes: "We must recognize the existence of different interest groups which conflict and converge, and realize that in the end that very multitude of interests constitutes the general societal interest."

To be sure, "interest groups" for Zhao and the contributors to the *Beijing Review* do not refer to organized, purposeful political action organizations; rather, they refer to unorganized but varied expressions of opinion. But the next predictable question in the evolution of this debate will certainly be: Should organized pressure groups be encouraged to form, so that interests can be more effectively and equitably expressed and reconciled in the nation's provincial and national capitals?

New issues on the agenda. The report also placed a number of new issues on the nation's highest agenda. Many of these recognize that China is still a developing country, which also is confronting many problems associated with modernity. Thus, Zhao sought to turn his countrymen's attention to such issues as:

- establishing a social welfare system for farmers;
- checking the shrinkage of farmland and focusing on land use;
- giving proper guidance to the population on consumer habits, the consumption of a balanced diet in particular;
- ensuring improved prenatal care;
- paying attention to the rapid aging of the population;
- protecting the environment and the ecological balance;
- improving the investment environment for foreign firms;
- borrowing prudent amounts in foreign loans and keeping a rational debt structure.

This list of issues probably will remain on the agenda well into the next century, and future historians are likely to pinpoint Zhao's speech as the first time a party congress report devoted so much attention to the emerging problems that will accompany economic development.

[17]Ibid., p. 41.

[18]Zhao Ziyang, "On Separating Party from Government," *Beijing Review*, Dec. 14–20, 1987, p. 20.

[19]See article by Luo Rongxing, Zhu Huaxin, and Cao Huanrong in *Beijing Review*, Nov. 30–Dec. 6, 1987, pp. 18–19.

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Omissions from Zhao's report. The report was not comprehensive. In particular, foreign affairs are mentioned in two brief passages and national security policy received no mention at all. Chinese officials explain that Zhao addressed foreign policy issues earlier, in his March 1987 speech to the National People's Congress, that no changes had occurred since then, and that he did not wish to add to the length of an already extensive address. Still, lack of reference to foreign affairs represents a departure from previous congress reports.

The report also referred only in passing to the military. Indeed, Zhao offered an explanation for this omission: "In the army, the reform has already achieved important results. Since things are different there, plans on further reform will be studied and decided upon separately by the Military Commission of the Central Committee."[20] This fascinating passage appears to acknowledge the autonomy of the military in its sphere of competence.

It is also significant that neither the report nor the ancillary dispatches said very much about the actual condition of the party. A breakdown of its membership by gender, educational level, age distribution, and occupational category was not published, for example, nor was a hard-headed assessment provided of the vitality of the primary organizations at the grass-roots level. One might have expected in the current era of greater openness a return to the reporting practices of the 1950's, and the failure to do so suggests perhaps that the top leaders do not have a very clear idea of the state of play among party branches at the lowest level.

Finally, for all the rhetorical commitment to reform, the report was remarkably quiet on the issue of timing. Precisely when the various contemplated changes are actually to take effect remain issues to be debated and decided in the months and years ahead. From this vantage, the report does not provide a blueprint for the future. Rather, it charts the long-term direction of policy; it establishes the orientation for the next five years. The dates and details are to be supplied later.

Unfinished Business and Institutional Arrangements

The third main task of the top leaders was to use the congress to clarify the decisional authority of the various policy-making bodies at the apex of the party structure and to identify or elaborate a style of governance. From 1982 through 1987, the party Secretariat had become the chief week-to-week decision-making body of the party, always threatening to usurp the roles of the less active, less frequently convened Politburo or Politburo Standing Committee. Containing many top government officials, the Secretariat also was hard to distinguish from the Standing Committee of the State Council. The congress terminated this ambiguity by stripping the Secretariat of many of its influential members and reducing its membership to four. A change in the party constitution made the Secretariat clearly subordinate to the Politburo, instead of being directly under the Central Committee.[21] The Politburo and its Standing Committee are now the supreme decision-making bodies in China.

Civil-military relations, in a formal or legal sense, however, remain unresolved after the congress. Though Zhao called for separation of the government and party, the congress made no explicit move to shift command of the military from the party to the government. The Central Military Commission (CMC) and the Ministry of National Defense (MND)—bodies that exist within the government's formal table of organization—have little organizational substance to them. The real chain of command goes from the chairman of the MAC (a party

Politburo member Hu Qili, left, confers with General Yu Qiuli at the 13th CCP Congress, where Yu lost his position as head of the General Political Department of the People's Liberation Army.

—Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos.

[20]"Zhao Report," loc. cit., p. 43.

[21]See account of comments by 13th Congress spokesman Zhu Muzhi, *Beijing Review*, Nov. 9–15, 1987, p. 10.

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post) to the MAC vice-chairmen to the chief-of-staff. It is hard to see how a meaningful separation of party and government can occur until the single largest recipient of the state budget—the military—falls under government, and not party control. This author suspects—and some Chinese officials privately confirm—that redefining the command structure of the PLA at the apex and strengthening the CMC and MND may soon be on the agenda of institutional reforms. Other unfinished business awaits the March 1988 National People's Congress. Major personnel decisions to be made at that time include the confirmation of Li Peng as premier and the selection of a head of state and of a chairman of the National People's Congress Standing Committee. The latter two posts are now held by elders Li Xiannian and Peng Zhen.

Drafting the Central Committee report. The process of drafting Zhao's report confirms what a number of analysts of Chinese politics have stressed in recent years—namely, that the policy process in China involves extensive consultation and consensus-building. The process also serves as an example of how China's leaders are attempting to elaborate a new style of governance.

The report took a year to write and went through seven drafts. The conceptual framework for the congress agenda began to be formulated in October 1986. At that time, the basic themes were set forth. It was envisioned that Hu Yaobang would deliver the political report and Zhao would deliver a report on the economy, and two drafting groups were established to collect ideas and hammer out rough outlines. Hu's dismissal forced a rethinking of the division of labor, and in February 1987, a reconstituted 19-member group began its work. The group subdivided its work into three sections: economic, political, and ideological. Zhao decided to include in the group some of the staff from Hu's drafting team. According to knowledgeable Chinese, one of Hu's closest aides assumed a pivotal role in the drafting of the section on political reform.

By March 18, Zhao felt prepared to gather together a number of responsible officials to summarize and discuss the contents. Their response was supportive, and on March 21, Zhao outlined the general design, and transmitted it in a letter to Deng Xiaoping. The letter contained the "initial thoughts" concerning a seven-section report (a format that continued to pertain to the end). Four days later, on March 25, Deng returned the letter with the notation "the design is good."

By May, the first draft was ready and Zhao discussed it with some leading associates of the party center. This process was repeated in June and July, by which time the document was in its third draft. In July, at the coastal

Former CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang applauds the speech of his successor Zhao Ziyang from his seat on the leader rostrum at the opening of the 13th CCP Congress, October 25, 1987.

—Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos.

retreat of Beidaihe, Zhao presented the third draft to a more formal meeting convened by the party Secretariat and attended by members of the Politburo and Secretariat. Many suggestions for revisions were made at that time; it was also decided to disseminate the draft more widely for comment.

In August, the party's Central Office (*zhongyang bangong ting*) distributed 5,000 copies of the fourth draft to the newly selected delegates to the 13th Congress, to the leading officials elected at the 12th Congress, and to top party officials in the provinces and prefectures, army, and government organs. At the same time, the draft was distributed outside the party to economists, political observers, and intellectuals, as well as to some county officials. This fourth draft was also the topic of a week-long discussion in Beijing among some 100 officials, social scientists, natural scientists, and propagandists. The Central Office aggregated the numerous suggestions that emanated from this process and conveyed them to the drafting group. Zhao convened a meeting of the Secretariat in early September to hear the results of this wide consultation and to address the issues that had arisen. Decisions were made on which suggestions to accept, which to reject, and on September 30, a fifth draft was ready for presentation to the Politburo. The Politburo requested further refinements and

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endorsed the draft for formal presentation to the Central Committee. This presentation was made in the middle of October to the Seventh Plenum of the 12th Central Committee, which endorsed the report without changes. At the congress itself the delegates were assigned to groups which further discussed the report. These discussions led to new revisions, resulting in the final or seventh draft.

This is not a new process in the annals of party document drafting, though it appears to be the first congress report subjected to such widespread prior scrutiny. The process not only improves the document and unearths the contentious issues, but also mobilizes support and builds a consensus.

Greater openness. Compared to congresses of the past, the 13th Party Congress demonstrated a greater "transparency." The top leaders showed an increased willingness to reveal information about themselves and about the procedures of the congress itself. Foreign correspondents were able to attend the opening and closing sessions and to hear Zhao deliver his report. Several leaders held press conferences, and the members of the new Standing Committee appeared together for photographs, with Zhao answering a few questions. Soon after the congress, biographical sketches describing each of the new leaders were made available, and unlike in the past, these often contained some brief description of the leader's personal life. Articles appeared in Chinese newspapers describing the process for selecting the Central Committee and for drafting Zhao's report. Clearly, some of the secrecy surrounding the Chinese system has lifted, and pledges were made that henceforth the activities of the Politburo would be more regular and publicized. These are not trivial developments; if they become a habit, they would represent an incremental step toward a more institutionalized political system.

Electing the Central Committee. The election of full and alternate members to the Central Committee departed from past practice, moving toward inner-party democracy. The congress delegates were not simply given a slate of candidates from among their number, with no choice. This time around, after prior consultation, the congress organizers distributed a slate containing 10 more names than the number of full members to be elected. The 10 candidates receiving the lowest vote totals were then added to the list of nominees for alternate membership, which already had six more nominees than were to be elected. Hence, 16 nominees for alternate status did not get elected.

The opportunity to express a preference turned out to be quite meaningful, for one of the nominees for full CC membership, Deng Liqun—a leading architect of the campaign against "bourgeois liberalism" who was rumored to have been slated for Politburo membership—failed to be elected to the Central Committee, thereby eliminating any chance of his achieving Politburo status. He responded by withdrawing his name from the list of candidates for alternate CC membership and joined the Central Advisory Committee.

Pi Chieh-hsing, a journalist from Taiwan, asks a question during a press conference in Beijing's Great Hall of the People on October 27, 1987, the third day of the 13th CCP Congress.

—Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos.

Conclusion

These steps toward widespread consultation and inner-party democracy are important. But one must also note that vexing anomalies remain. No single meeting, whether in China or elsewhere, can terminate one era and initiate another. This party congress was no exception to that rule. It nominally completed a generational

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change in the leadership, but the older generation has the ability to interfere if it dislikes what it sees. The congress reestablished the outline for an orderly succession to Deng, but it did not emplace Zhao so firmly that he is now guaranteed to be China's next preeminent leader. Deng—not Zhao—remains the current top leader.

The congress identified the policy guidelines, some quite innovative, for the coming time period, but left specifics unanswered. It set new precedents in matters of procedure and style of rule, but in the final analysis, power remains vested more in individuals than in institutions. Although Deng Xiaoping remains the ultimate leader of the country, he is not on the country's top policy-making institution, the Politburo, or its Standing Committee.

The congress left at least as many issues unsettled as it resolved. Although it thus was not a watershed congress, its results constituted an important step en route to a more stable and reformed China. More than that, the acknowledgment of pluralism, the consultations, the greater openness, and the limited steps toward inner-party democracy symbolize a gradual but significant evolution in relations between state and society. The available instruments of totalitarian control have not been dismantled and the top leaders can still crack down harshly on society if they wish, but the leaders clearly feel increasingly impelled to take public opinion into account. The reforms have unleashed economic and social forces that the leaders cannot control. And in these circumstances, it is even more difficult for a party congress to play a decisive role in the affairs of the nation than in the past.

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How Far Can Soviet Reform Go?

William E. Odom

A few years ago, only the most serious specialists and scholars of Russian and Soviet affairs speculated about the prospects of internal reform in the Soviet Union. Today, Western policy-makers in government and business, journalists, commentators, and the public at large are interested in the incessant Soviet discussions of imminent domestic reform. Although the change is largely being attributed to General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, the new course in the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was actually initiated under his predecessor, Yuriy Andropov, temporarily set aside by Konstantin Chernenko, and reasserted by Gorbachev. Andropov's anti-corruption and anti-alcoholism campaigns, however, did not signal so clearly the extent of the intended transformation as have Gorbachev's *glasnost'* (speaking out publicly), *perestroyka* (restructuring), and *novoye myshleniye* (new thinking).[1] These slogans have prompted unprecedented public criticism and debate about the present state of the Soviet economy and party leadership. At the same time, the turnover in the senior party leadership has been greater than at any time since the early 1960's.[2] Because these are not ordinary events in the history of the Soviet Union, the question of economic and social reform has to be taken seriously and urgently if we in the West are to comprehend the contemporary course of Soviet political and economic affairs.

The question itself, however, is fraught with ambiguity and potential for confusion. The greatest ambiguity is found in the word "reform." Reform for what purpose? In pursuit of whose goals? Whose preferences is a "restructured" economy to serve—those of central planners or of consumers? If consumers, then all consumers or only special groups? In short, whose reform?

Gorbachev has not made clear his own answer to these questions; nor has any Central Committee resolution defined what the party leadership intends. Observers are left with speeches, proposals, some new laws, and articles—both in the official press and circulated as samizdat—from which to infer what is actually intended by the slogans *glasnost', perestroyka,* and *novoye myshleniye*.

From these sources, Westerners (as well as Soviet citizens) draw different inferences—some of them incompatible—about the aims and methods of reform. This is not surprising. If one takes Tatyana Zaslavskaya's criticism of the Soviet economy as the starting point for defining the policy for *perestroyka,* dramatic and systemic reform is to be expected.[3] Zaslavskaya's tie to Abel Aganbegyan and the latter's views, which reportedly are shared by Gorbachev, promote this radical inference. When one reads the blistering criticism of the unreliability of economic accounting data, one is encouraged in the belief that someone at the Politburo level recognizes the information logjam created by central

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[1] *Glasnost'* literally is the substantive of the verb *glasit'*, meaning "to say," and as a noun it connotes speaking out publicly, making known. *Perestroyka,* meaning "restructuring," is less ambiguous in translation but has a more complex connotation in Russian. *Novoye myshleniye* translates literally as "new thinking," a responsibility to abandon the old work style in favor of a new effective style that Gorbachev places on the leading party and state cadres.

Western observers had tended accurately to dismiss Andropov as a phony "liberal," but they had underestimated his commitment to dramatic change in the USSR.

[2] Thane Gustafson and Dawn Mann provide excellent data on this turnover. See their "Andropov's First Year," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC) May-June 1986, pp. 1–18.

[3] T. Zaslavskaya, "Essay on the Need for a Thorough Study in the USSR of the Social Mechanism in Economic Development" Arkhiv Samizdata (Radio Liberty—Munich), AS No. 5042, Aug. 26, 1987.

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planning and centrally determined prices.[4] A recent essay by Nikolay Shmelev removes any doubt about the inadequacies of the centrally planned economic system. He declares that all the pricing decisions made since the late 1920's are a "terrible legacy" that must be discarded if the present reform is to have any prospect of success.[5] These and many other articles suggest that minor repairs in the present economic system will not suffice; systemic change is imperative.

When Gorbachev himself chides the leadership of Gosplan and Gossnab, the central planning and supply organs,[6] it seems that the General Secretary is endorsing sweeping changes. This impression is confirmed when he insists: "We urgently need a fundamental breakthrough on the theoretical front, based on the aggregate facts of social life, on a scientific foundation of the goals and perspectives of our movement."[7] This call from above for a comprehensive, new economic theory sounds like proof that Aganbegyan, Zaslavskaya, and others are succeeding in convincing Gorbachev and the Politburo that economic progress cannot occur without a free play of market forces to set prices based on supply and demand.

But, as one reads further, one finds that Gorbachev wants a theoretical advance similar to that achieved by Karl Marx from his examination of the Paris Commune and to Lenin's advances in the early years of Soviet rule. There is no hint of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, or other classical liberal economists who might have inspired the Aganbegyan school of Soviet economists to esteem the market as a means of overcoming the stagnant bureaucracies in charge of Soviet central planning.

On the contrary, Gorbachev's June 1987 plenum report is reminiscent of Lenin calling for worker discipline and Stalin's lectures, "Fundamentals of Leninism." Gorbachev envisions *perestroyka* as occurring in several "waves." What is happening now is only the first

[4]Vasiliy Selyunin and Grigoriy Khanin, "The Cunning Figure," *Novyy Mir* (Moscow), No. 2, February 1987, pp. 181–201.

[5]Nikolay Shmelev, "Advances and Debts," *Novyy Mir*, No. 6, June 1987, pp. 142–58.

[6]*Pravda* (Moscow), June 26, 1987.

[7]Ibid.

Tatyana Zaslavskaya and Abel Aganbegyan at an October 26, 1987, press conference on the economic and social policy of the Soviet Union, attended by Soviet and foreign journalists.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

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one, demanded by the "masses." *Perestroyka* is not to be achieved quickly but through a long-term policy: "The Soviet people understand that the attainment of the many goals of *perestroyka* demands a long time."[8] Yet, the people are anxious to see progress. Gorbachev reported that the "toilers" with whom he spoke in one town asked: "When will *perestroyka* reach us?" The officials accompanying Gorbachev were directed to draw the proper lesson from such questions and to move ahead with restructuring. His June plenum report emphasizes again and again that the "waves" of *perestroyka* are stimulated from below. How do the masses generate a "wave" of reform? Through *glasnost'*, apparently, through openly voicing their complaints about the present state of affairs, through making their criticisms and desires publicly known.

Who is to respond to these demands from below? Market forces? Entrepreneurs? Hardly! Gorbachev places the task squarely on the economic bureaucracy. Moreover, he even asserts a stronger role for the Central Committee Secretariat:

In this new circumstance, the departments of the CC CPSU are called upon to act in a new way, having a much deeper influence on the state of affairs in republic, kray, and oblast party organizations, ensuring control over the execution of the decisions of the CC CPSU.[9]

In discussing the need to modernize the Soviet machine-building industry, Gorbachev calls for more aggressive ministerial action in designing a large-scale program and seeing it through from the top. This is not the rhetoric of decentralization and systemic change; it sounds more like the language of the Soviet leadership that was implementing the first Five-Year Plan in the late 1920's than a voice for systemic change.

Gorbachev's image of the completion of *perestroyka* is characterized by vagueness. Indeed, while it is difficult to discern where he believes he is going, it is easier to glean Gorbachev's proposed method for getting there. *Glasnost'* is the impulse for movement. It comes from the "masses." It expresses the whole people's interests. *Perestroyka* is the response. It comes from the party's central organs which must develop *novoye myshleniye* about how to make the system work better, new programs to overcome the old shortcomings. Whether the "quantity" or extent of restructuring will bring "qualitative" change in the system of the kind suggested by *glasnost'* voices like Zaslavskaya's is a question that ought to occur to Gorbachev, schooled as he is in the laws of dialectical materialism. Perhaps he will soon give his answer to it, but to date he has not.

There are, therefore, two questions, not one, about change in the Soviet Union. First, how far can economic and social reform go if the aim is qualitative change, giving consumer preferences the major role in driving economic allocations? Second, how far can such reform go if the allocation system remains centralized, essentially driven by "planners' preferences"? Such a sharp dichotomy may seem overdrawn. Indeed, reality usually does not break so neatly into the analytical categories of economic and political theorists, but this fuzziness does not diminish the utility of tidy categories for purposes of analysis. Rather, it suggests that one must be careful to apply these categories where they are conceptually appropriate. The experience of all Soviet-style centrally planned economies in many failed efforts at reform suggests that the choices may indeed be sharp dichotomies.[10] Is there a half-way point between central planning and market economy which allows planners to ignore consumer demands as expressed in scarcity prices? In Western Europe, the ruling social democrats have long ago made large theoretical and political concessions to the market at the expense of central planning. Can modern Bolsheviks get the advantages of the marketplace without paying the same price?

Gorbachev's call for change, in any event, has offered an opportunity for presenting many economic alternatives. We can be sure that several alternative development policies for Russia articulated by the revolutionaries before 1917, and by parties and factions after 1917, will surface anew, finding contemporary proponents for the "might have beens" of history. Some will remember the New Economic Policy of the 1920's. Some will argue that Nikolay Bukharin offered a way to industrialize Russia without ending the NEP.

Surviving Mensheviks, or their heirs, may feel vindicated in their original conviction that Russia could not skip over a lengthy period of capitalist development. The spate of open criticism of the central planning and pricing system appearing in the Soviet press today seems to prove their point. Others will look at the last decades of the tsarist regime and find renewed interest in the ideas of the Constitutional Democrats. Constitutionalism, a greater role for private property, but yet a strong state led by like-minded liberals brooking no breaking away by non-Russian national regions—these ideas appeal to some Soviet émigrés who reject Marxism outright, and possibly to some of the economists in the Soviet Union who so ably indict the present state planning system. Conceivably, one may even hear from rejuve-

[8]Ibid.
[9]Ibid.
[10]See Jan Prybyla, *Market and Plan Under Socialism*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1987.

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nated Social Revolutionaries about populism and agrarian socialism. Nor should the possibilities for "national socialism" be overlooked. Variants of fascism were appearing in Russia in the last years of the empire—the Black Hundreds, for example—and *Pamyat'*, an organization in Moscow ostensibly dedicated to preservation of the Russian past, sounds remarkably like that earlier tendency, one that took Russian nationalism as its inspiration and blamed the Jews, Free Masons, and others for contaminating Russian culture. Its economic program, if it can be said to have one, is anticapitalist.[11]

The alternatives for economic development in Russia advanced over the past century and a half are numerous. Yet, the chances that any or most of them will be seriously considered today are small if one examines the first question, the prospect for qualitative change in the Soviet economic system.

The analytical procedure for this examination requires three steps. First, the features of the Soviet economic system that prevent it from functioning efficiently must be described. Second, the criteria—objective conditions—which have to be met in order to establish that systemic change has indeed occurred must be stated. Third, the forces and pressures that systemic change would bring to bear on the economy and the political system must be anticipated. The latter will give us some idea of the risks Gorbachev would face if he chose to implement systemic change.

The Soviet Economic Problem

The essence of Leninism is the primacy of politics over economics. Lenin's quarrel with the Russian trade unions at the turn of the century revealed this vividly. He accused Russian Social Democrats of "the heresy of economism," as he called it, because they were willing to support the trade unions in their efforts to get better economic conditions for workers while ignoring, even subordinating, the development of the workers' revolutionary consciousness, that is, their determination to overthrow the tsarist political system. Better wages were nothing without political revolution.

The same spirit is apparent in Lenin's essay "What Is to Be Done." He demanded a party that can lead a revolution, not one that predicts a revolution and then sits back and waits for it. Certainly, revolution in Russia was inevitable in the view of all Marxists, but Leninists believed they could make it come earlier by political action as the vanguard of the revolutionary classes. "Democratic centralism," Lenin's organizational maxim for the party, really meant party dictatorship. The party leadership would make the choices. One can debate whether Lenin would have gone as far as Stalin in centralizing economic choice-making, but it is difficult to dispute the Leninist spirit of a system that places the party elite in charge of all economic decision-making.

This is the essence of the Soviet economic system. It was designed to reduce the impact of market forces on the allocation and use of the factors of production to the minimum practicable. Land and capital were brought almost wholly under central control. Labor proved more difficult to manage centrally. Trotsky's "labor armies" were short-lived, but the requirement for a passport to live in an urban area provided an administrative mechanism for slowing the flight of labor from the collective farms. Private farm plots, of course, are an instance of land being left in the free market. Otherwise, land remains in either the state or the "cooperative" or collective domain, and the state is able to direct production, price, and exchange. All industrial enterprises are under state control. The state tells each enterprise what to produce, where to get its supplies, and to whom and at what price to deliver its product.

For any economy to work, two functions must be performed. First, authority over the factors of production must be designated. Who controls what land, labor, and capital? Private property and a currency medium of exchange perform the authority function in Western economies. Second, information must be supplied about what productive activity to undertake with the factors at one's disposal. Market-determined prices generally perform the information function in Western economies, even in those where the public sector is quite large. Government directed programs—both defense and welfare—are exceptions to be sure, but they are executed with the advantage of considerable market pricing knowledge, reflecting both domestic and international market demand. Billions of market exchanges contribute to the information and authority functions in market economies. Distortions disturb the efficient execution of these functions, but this is not the subject of this article; rather, it is to note how these functions are performed in the Soviet economy.

The simple answer is that these functions are performed administratively by a central planning organ which acts on the authority of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In other words, in every sector of the economy the center must specify who has what authority over what land, labor, and capital. Private ownership is disallowed. State administrative fiat allocates such authority and directs its use. The financial plan of a firm is not the

[11]See my "Soviet Politics and the Dustbin of History," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles, CA), Spring/Summer, 1976, pp. 187–208, for more on the "might have beens" of Soviet history.

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Nikolay Talyzin, First Vice-Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and Chairman of the State Planning Committee, delivers a report on the 1988 USSR State Plan for Economic and Social Development and results of the 1987 plan to an October 19, 1987, session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

determinant of authority and action; the production plan is. The financial plan is designed to make the production plan work. To dispose over more resources in the Soviet system, one does not seek a bigger budget but a bigger plan, one whose execution requires more supplies and resources. The finances will follow administratively.

Ponder for a moment the administrative task of compiling annually plans for every enterprise in the Soviet Union and ensuring that they are mutually consistent. The information-handling requirement for Gosplan, the state planning agency, is simply staggering. Prices are of little help because they have become little more than accounting devices instead of a source of information about scarcity and demand. This task, however, is only the first of many intractable tasks facing central planners. Let us suppose that by some miracle Gosplan worked out a mutually consistent plan and got the economic managers to implement it accurately, a most unlikely event. How is new factor productivity introduced by technological change to be reflected in the prices? In a context of dynamic growth, where new technologies and new products appear in large quantities, the rational planned prices become the source of planning confusion and dysfunction. At present, new prices are determined by commissions that try to apply the "labor theory of value." These commissions have not the slightest chance of keeping abreast, let alone of providing adequate information in pricing to allow efficient central allocation of capital.

The most incredible thing about the Soviet economic system is that it works at all. The informal procedures and illegal activities it gives rise to are legion. Without them, the system would probably collapse. If there is a key to understanding why the system succeeds in some respects, it probably can be found in central control over priorities for the supply of resources. Gossnab, the state supply system, can give priority to some sectors. All the others must do with what is left—usually not much, the wrong things, and of poor quality. The military and certain technical sectors do reasonably well because they enjoy top priority. The military is especially distinctive because it has a system of "military representatives," the *voyenpredy*, which puts it in a buyer's position, unlike all other sectors. The *voyenpredy* watch every step of production for quality control and do not accept products that fail to meet their standards. All other sectors in the factor market and in retail markets must take what they are delivered, quality and kind notwithstanding.

As the Soviet economy has grown, the absurdity of the situation has grown. So too has the opportunity for illegal and irregular transactions, a phenomenon usually called the "second economy." The second economy in a sense keeps the system moving, but it also allocates resources quite at odds with the planners' preferences at the center. Cycle after cycle of plan preparation and issuance of production goals has been accompanied by intense pressures from above on firms to meet these goals. Short on resources, confronted with irrational and inadequate allocations of supplies, managers have devised increasingly ingenious ways of creating the impression, but not the reality, of plan fulfillment. The history of Soviet economic development has been a struggle between the preferences of the central planners (i.e., the desires of the party leadership) and the unsatisfactory response to those preferences by management at all lower levels.

In Stalin's day, periodic blood purges of the party quickened the sense of formal responsiveness. Successful cheating occurred, sometimes on a fairly large scale, but purges and transfers of party cadres tended to break up the informal cliques that allocated according to their own, not the planners' interests. Under Nikita Khrushchev, blood purges ceased, but administrative

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turnover of cadres and frequent economic and party reorganizations were used as substitute means of struggle against localism.

Under Leonid Brezhnev, cadre stability became the rule. Reorganization was tried less frequently. The consequences were quite predictable. Informal techniques of cheating the center became more numerous, more sophisticated, and greater in their overall significance for plan fulfillment. What had once been a system conspicuous for its ability to direct resources massively from one sector to another, for its ability to limit consumption, to keep investment high, and to generate the structural change desired by the party elite, has now become a lethargic bureaucratic structure presiding over local cliques that easily deceive the center and prevent major shifts in allocations.

In many cases, these local cliques have become intertwined with national minority interests. Republics get their fair share of new construction, factories, and so on, even if the state planning aims suffer as a result.[12]

This is the situation Gorbachev faces today. Increasing stagnation, inefficiency, and a mammoth planning task confront him even as rapid strides in technology are causing structural changes in the other industrialized economies.

Criteria for Systemic Change

Let us assume for a moment that the Politburo wants systemic change that promises dynamic growth, exploitation of new technologies, increasing factor productivity, and renewal of the aging capital infrastructure. Let us also set aside the question of "whose preferences?" by answering "anybody's preferences if this means dynamic growth and re-capitalization."

The system's weakness clearly lies in the way it handles the two functions—authority over factors of production and information about how to use those factors. The information overload at the center is attested to by many witnesses in the Soviet press today. Western analysts have known it for a long time. Therefore, talk about incentives for managers and workers means little until the administrative approach to authority and information is largely abandoned.

What is the alternative? Market forces. Systemic change must begin with a major relaxation of central planning and central price formation. How much is "major" relaxation? Enough to provide "relative scarcity" information about most of the factors of production. This means that the market sector must have greater influence than the planned sector. It cannot be a marginal relaxation, and it probably must be sufficient to make the ruble a convertible currency.

The first criterion, therefore, is a major shift to market pricing and allocation, one that lets the market exceed central planning in its impact on aggregate economic activity, and one that creates valid scarcity information in prices of most goods and services.

Such a shift to a market economy is not possible without a free flow of information in the media, in banking, in

Lev Voronin, Vice-Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and Chairman of the USSR State Committee on Material and Technical Procurement.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

[12]Konstantin Simis, *USSR: The Corrupt Society*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1982, gives an excellent first-hand account of the way local and regional leaders cheat the center. Walter D. Connor, "Social Policy under Gorbachev," *Problems of Communism* July-August, 1986, pp. 31–46, provides a good insight into recent social and economic dynamics confronting the center. Abram Bergson, "Toward a New Growth Model," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1973, pp. 1–9, offers one of the best early assessments of the troubles confronting the Soviet economy. Nikolay Shmelev's essay, loc. cit., is the best Soviet assessment of the overall predicament of the Soviet economy and the gross dysfunctions it imposes.

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science and technology. Censorship as it has been exercised—and continues to be even under *glasnost'*—makes such an information flow impossible. Vast amounts of information are considered state secrets. The criticality of censorship as an impediment to market activity became clear to the reformers in Prague in 1968. Once they started down the road to genuine relaxation of central planning, once they took systemic economic reform seriously, they found that they had to suspend most censorship.

The second criterion, therefore, is the free flow of information to the degree required for effective market activity, including not only domestic economic activity but also international trade. Without it, domestic economic activity cannot be based on competitive prices, and the ruble is unlikely to become convertible.

Finally, party authority, not only at the center but particularly at the local level, blocks effective market activity. The role of the party in economic affairs has always been supreme—the party has the leading role in all social affairs, as every party general secretary likes to remind Soviet citizens. The party has always been above the law. In fact, one recent Western study of the role of law in the Soviet Union concludes that law primarily serves to help the party discipline society, to get society to do what the party dictates.[13] The party, however, is not constrained by law if it chooses not to be.

From the Western viewpoint, where law is generally accepted as a limit on political authority, where law guarantees individual rights, where law is proscriptive—anything not forbidden is permitted—the Soviet view of law is the converse. It takes "prescription" as its premise: do what the law dictates; all else is forbidden. Perhaps this is an overstatement but not by much.

This tradition long antedates Soviet power. The crown was never subject to legal restraints in Russia, although the October Manifesto of 1905 came close to imposing limits on it. The deeply embedded spirit of law as prescriptive is captured by Anton Chekhov in his story, "Sergeant Prishibeyev," when the retired sergeant is explaining at his own trial how he dispersed a crowd of villagers. "By what full right have the people gathered here? I ask, 'Why'? Is it said in the law that people should gather like herds of horses? Where is it written in the law that people are given their will?" To be sure, after the Great Reforms in the 1860's, law took on a large role in regulating economic affairs. Private property in the Western sense came to have meaning, and a merchant or landowner could be sure that his authority over land and capital was generally protected by law. Not so, of course, in the Soviet Union. No legal claim, especially on property, is above party power, above the power of the revolution.

The third criterion, therefore, is that legal rights over the factors of production, particularly land and capital, must be assured. Local party authorities cannot be allowed to interfere arbitrarily in how a factory manager uses or allocates his resources. Otherwise, the "authority function" for market activity is confused and made uncertain as it relates to seeking economic efficiency. Economic decision-makers cannot be sure what resources they have or how long they will have them. Therefore, contracts must be enforceable. Individuals and firms, including state firms, must be accountable before tort law, and the party has to be restricted to appropriation of capital and land only through legally established means, for example, through taxes and eminent domain.

These three criteria suggest fundamental change, a change that would mark a break not only with Soviet tradition but with traditions having deep Russian historical roots. Anything less, however, is unlikely to address the fundamental economic predicament in the USSR. And some of the rhetoric emanating from Soviet policy and specialist circles suggests basic change.

Implications of Systemic Change

Joseph Schumpeter's characterization of capitalism as a dynamic and revolutionary force, perhaps more distinctive for its destructive effects precisely because it thrives on innovation, certainly springs to mind when one contemplates letting market forces drive the Soviet economy. Growth and gains in efficiency are unlikely to be the first consequences. Perhaps the most frightening consequence for the party leadership would be the loss of political power to non-party groups, especially to regional and national minority groups. Already, in the name of *glasnost'*, some ethnic groups and regions have raised the issue of their sovereignty. Keeping the union of nationalities together under such new political and legal conditions could prove a great challenge indeed, requiring more military and police power. The specter of losing political control would probably make the expected economic gains too risky to seek through systemic change. Let us set political concerns aside for the moment, nevertheless, and turn to the probable economic behavior.

Initially, at least, small-scale enterprises would be those most likely to prosper. Their managers could adapt to market demands more quickly. The scale of

[13]Olimpiad S. Ioffe and Peter B. Maggs, "The Soviet System: A Legal Analysis," National Council for Soviet and East European Research (Washington, DC), No. 800-21, October 1986.

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change they would require should prove manageable. The size and proximity of the markets they would supply should tax their information-gathering capacity less.

But such efficiency has its limits. Concerned about agriculture in his June 1987 plenum report, Gorbachev noted that letting people engage in the kind of production they want would lead to many small operations, too small to make modern technology attractive or usable. The same disadvantage is likely to apply to much of industry. There are already the examples in Eastern Europe, including Yugoslavia, where economic reforms have left large factories idle, factories celebrated only a few years earlier as monuments on the road to socialism. Now they are monuments to party incompetence in economic development.

A concomitant consequence of small-scale enterprises is the one Gorbachev recognized in agriculture: new technology would be unattractive if not impossible to apply. Rather than taking advantage of new families of technology that are revolutionizing Western economies, "restructured" Soviet firms could well prove more resistant to such advances than are the present state-run large firms and industrial branches. To be sure, there would be exceptions and in time the trend could reverse, but at the outset, resistance is almost certain to predominate.

Wide unemployment is also likely to accompany the decline of inefficient firms. Hidden unemployment already exists in the form of poorly used manpower and labor padding. Trying to make a profit, managers surely would also try to cut labor costs. The results would inexorably include large labor lay-offs.

Two more adverse developments in the labor market are likely. Economic restructuring would require radical shifts of labor in a society where immobility has been the prevailing tendency. Will Muslims from Central Asia readily move to Russia and Ukraine to find work? They and many other ethnic, social, and religious groups are more likely to resist movement. The quality of labor will also become a larger problem. Market activity will require new skills. While labor may be available, it will not have the requisite skills for the most abundant jobs. Although the technical-cultural level of the work force has long been a problem, mass literacy and elementary education have dramatically changed the nature of the Soviet labor force since World War II. Nonetheless, automation and a more widespread use of Western production technology based on computers will require significant additional improvements in labor training and basic education.

Another potentially troubling aspect of labor mobility is migration from rural to urban areas. Some collective farm workers might well take the opportunity to move to the cities to which, a few decades ago, they would certainly have swarmed. The Soviet leadership, of course, has controlled the urbanization process through internal passport requirements, thereby moderating the flow to manageable levels. Although the old pressure has been reduced by a major demographic shift to the cities over 70 years, a free market agricultural economy might still push villagers toward urban employment. This would certainly be the case if the technology introduced in farming had the intended effect of greatly improving productivity. Surplus labor would accumulate in the countryside. Depending on when this occurred and at what rate, this situation could prove manageable, even desirable, if industry is eventually restructured by market forces and begins to prosper, requiring more labor.

At present, the white-collar work force in the USSR is composed largely of bureaucrats and production engineers. Production-oriented skills will be even more in demand than they are already if a market economy is allowed to exist in the industrial sectors. The planners and clerks in the planning and management hierarchies—the economic ministries, Gosplan, Gossnab, and the Central Statistical Administration—will have no jobs because their roles will disappear. At the same time, the need for a different white-collar and professional class will grow critical. Marketing specialists, salesmen, advertisers, and sales researchers—in short, people with skills not widely needed or taught in the centrally planned Soviet economy, will be in high demand. Yet, there is no educational infrastructure to train them.

The same would be true of management skills for directors of firms competing in a market environment. The old Soviet manager, his "bookkeeper," his other colleagues in the management system—party official, "special section" (KGB), trade union chief—are not the kind of people who will easily make the shift to market-economy requirements at the enterprise level.

Another but similar problem confronts the financial sector. Banks and those who look after "financial plans" would face a wholly new task. Financial accounting and planning in the USSR does not drive decisions about resource allocations. It follows production planning, making sure that money relations expressed in contracts and labor costs are coordinated with the requirements of the production plans.

As market forces come into play, those in the financial sector would have to fill the key role in major capital allocations. Their investment decisions would become the determinants of production planning, not vice versa. Investment banking is an alien activity in the Soviet Union. Yet, financial institutions would have to assume this function. Gorbachev spoke at the June plenum about the major modernization effort required in the machine-

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building sector, and about the importance of the ministries in coordinating and leading this effort. If this process were to take place under market conditions, financial institutions—not the ministries—would be key in raising and loaning capital.

A sense of the intractability of this financial planning problem for an economy trying to shift from a dominant state planning role to a market system was evident in Egypt in the last decade. An American consultant to the Egyptian government told me in considerable detail about the extent to which many Egyptian officials seem to have internalized Soviet planning techniques. Whether they did not like the anticipated consequences of market-oriented analysis for investment decisions or simply could not understand such analysis, they resisted it strongly even though they had agreed to accept it in principle. Again and again the consultant was confronted by non sequitur reactions to analysis based on market forces and scarcity prices as the Egyptian officials resorted to concepts of "material balances" and similar Soviet categories. One can only assume that the problem in the Soviet Union would be many times more difficult. Gorbachev's "new thinking," if it means this kind of change, will indeed take a long time.

Inflation, another adverse development, is certain to occur during a shift to a market system. A great deal of pent-up inflation already exists. Letting consumer demand drive production would, of course, create initially a large demand at the very time of transition when production is likely to fall. The old Bolshevik description of this phenomenon in the NEP period, a "goods famine," would once again apply. The party's reaction to it then was fright.

A Soviet market economy might be maintained in isolation from the world economy, but this does not seem to be Gorbachev's intent. On the contrary, the new laws for joint ventures with Western entrepreneurs suggest that he believes more, not less, economic interaction with the West is necessary.

What are the likely consequences of expanding economic dealings with the West? Traditionally, students of economic development have said that developing countries should borrow from the advanced economies in order to import modern technology for industrialization, and pay back the loans with exports from their commodity sectors—agricultural and mineral. Russia had adopted this approach in the past, exporting grain and oil, as well as some furs, timber, minerals, and commodities. Today, however, commodity prices have fallen in relation to industrial prices, and few show convincing signs of going back to former levels. Much of the large Third World debt is evidence of this phenomenon.

The Soviet Union has not been able to avoid all the effects of this "uncoupling" of industrial and commodity prices.[14] Its hard-currency reserves have dropped as oil prices have dropped. Moreover, the Soviet Union has long ago ceased to be a significant exporter of agricultural products and has become dependent on grain imports. The Soviet Union is therefore not likely to fare well if it enters the world economy now and also opens its doors to world market forces. There was not much prospect for large, mutually beneficial East-West trade even in the heyday of the early 1970's. Today the prospect is dim indeed.

Many more purely economic disorders and pressures could be listed, but the above set should suffice to illustrate the magnitude and variety of the forces that a shift to a market system would unleash. It might be possible, given a sustained and broad political consensus behind such a shift, to schedule some of the changes so that all the disorders would not occur in full force simultaneously. In other words, in spite of the dysfunctions, a strong argument could be made in favor of the shift. The costs would be worth paying for the future advantages in efficiency brought by an equilibrium of market forces achieved after several years of serious disequilibria. Nikolay Shmelev, who seems fully aware of the probable disequilibria, comes down firmly on the side of accepting them. But other consequences are perhaps more serious in the minds of Soviet leaders because a sustained and broad political consensus would not be easy to maintain. The most fundamental consequence would be the inherent shift of political power. The party, especially its *nomenklatura* elite, would be, by and large, disenfranchised.

The present system allows or ensures that for the most part the "preferences" of the *nomenklatura* drive economic activity. The party elite has preferred heavy industry, military spending, and a system of privileged consumer product distribution for its own restricted circles. It has clung to these preferences in the face of great inefficiencies, and even economic stagnation. It has preferred the political stability that central control over the economy affords in a highly fragmented polity, one in which national minorities and dissatisfied social groups create strong centrifugal forces. It has preferred the control that the present political system affords over client states, especially in Eastern Europe. The elite must now be assessing some of the possible consequences of letting market forces loose where command economies have ruled.

There has always been concern in Moscow about

[14]See Peter Drucker, "The Changed World Economy," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), Spring 1986, pp. 768–91, for the concept of "uncoupling."

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centrifugal political forces among the national minorities. A shift to the rule of law would give some of those minorities the legal option, granted under the constitution of the USSR, to secede from the union. If the Baltic republics, for example, were economically more successful in market circumstances, which is probable, would they not seek to go their own political way? Why would the republics of the Caucasus not do the same? Under the present system, inefficient though it is, party elites from several of the non-Russian republics have learned to take advantage of the central planning structure and its flaws.[15] One of the curious developments under Brezhnev has been the allegiance of minority national bureaucratic elites to Soviet rule. The pressure for national separatism comes almost entirely from the national literary intelligentsia, from writers and artists interested in cultural identity. They pose little political threat to Moscow, although they are an irritant that the party does not ignore. The effect of market forces might well bring an alliance of these politically feckless groups with the more powerful political and economic apparatchiki in the Baltic and the Caucasus, and possibly in the Ukrainian and Central Asian republics. Vladimir Shlapentokh, a Soviet émigré sociologist, has already noted the incipient fragmentation along national lines that Gorbachev will find troublesome to control.[16] Not only the minority nationalities but also the Russians are showing an uncharacteristic articulateness on ethnic issues. Centrifugal forces along national and ethnic lines, it seems, are increasing even without a major shift to a market economy.

Another issue that is bound to confront the leadership would concern the large allocations traditionally granted to the military. In the long run, an economy restructured systemically to respond to market forces should provide a better scientific and technical base for military production. In the short run, however, consumer demand would make it impossible for the regime to maintain the old priority for military spending.

The party has been able to cut allocations for the military sharply in the past. In 1921–23, a radical reduction of the Red Army occurred, forced through by the party despite the resistance of the rank and file in the military who did not want to return to the villages. After World War II, Stalin forced another large cut in manpower in the military. But these cuts were made under special circumstances—the army was exhausted and needed new and modern equipment. The military leadership could agree with the party that sacrificing immediate military power for greater military power in the future made good sense.

Perhaps a cut could be made again, but the circumstances are different today. A large modern force is extant. Military commitments are extensive. Would not a dramatic cut carry unacceptable risks? Could the Warsaw Pact states be kept under control if Soviet standing forces were greatly reduced? Real savings would not come from the strategic forces and the sectors producing advanced weapons. The major, unproductive, resources are tied up in the large ground forces, air defense forces, and naval forces. But the current arms control negotiations do not address these categories. They are concerned with high-technology categories, those sectors that military industrial support has made the most modern part of the Soviet economy.

The "military question" has always figured centrally in Soviet policy—economic, social, and political. It remains no less central today, and in many respects it is more difficult to change military-industrial policy today than in the past, even though the state of the economy seems to warrant a different answer. Military "demand" on the economy has probably done more to promote modernization in the Soviet Union than any other factor, and central planning has been the key to this process. Dismantling central planning would not only raise the question of military security risks but also the issue of whether the advanced military-industrial sector would stagnate and slip backwards. The facile argument that military spending hurts economic growth in all economies is simply not born out in the Soviet experience, or in the case of many other states. In some cases, it seems to hurt; in others, economic growth and high rates of military spending have gone hand in hand.

Finally, the regional political elites, both party and economic apparatchiki, would risk major disenfranchisement if market forces were unleashed in the Soviet Union. How would they react? Certainly, they would not surrender their privileges quietly. A strong and consolidated super-elite—the Politburo, the Central Committee apparatus, and the KGB—would have to contain them and defeat them politically. This is not unprecedented; Stalin defeated the regional political elites in the 1920's and the 1930's. His aim in those instances was, however, centralization of economic controls, not decentralization. One cannot say, a priori, that such a major disenfranchisement of the bureaucracy is impossible. In fact, it would be essential if reform is to succeed. But one can say that it would involve a fundamental political revolution imposed from above.

Gorbachev's effort to build a coalition in support of his

[15]See Simis, op. cit., for examples of the corruption among minority national elites and the stake they have developed in the system under Brezhnev.

[16]See V. Shlapentokh, "An End of Affirmative Action in Russia?," unpublished manuscript, April 16, 1987.

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program of *perestroyka* is instructive on this point. He has drawn much of the intelligentsia into an alliance with him. He has encouraged it to express compelling arguments for dramatic change, to demonstrate that the present economic crisis cannot be overcome with old ways of thinking. He has even made efforts to gain support from the Western press and Western opinion makers for his *perestroyka*, an unprecedented step for a general secretary. Heretofore, Soviet dissidents have drawn on Western public opinion to support their cause against the regime. Today, we are witnessing the curious spectacle of Gorbachev appropriating their tactics in his own struggle against the entrenched bureaucracy in the Soviet Union.

Nonetheless, the paradox remains that great central control is required to achieve a major decentralization of economic control and power. If Gorbachev succeeds, he will lose his centralized power to forces that could undercut the political authority of the regime to a degree that could lead to the breakup of the empire. The risks and uncertainties of such a course make one wonder if Gorbachev really has this in mind. He must, if he wants truly systemic change. If he does not, he cannot get systemic change. This paradox must be clear to Gorbachev; if it is, either he believes he can ride out the danger or, in fact, he does not intend systemic change. Either way, with the party's power retained, he faces the second question: how far can reform go if the allocation system remains centralized, essentially driven by "planners' preferences."

Possibilities Short of Systemic Change

Periodically it is suggested that the Soviet Union should take a lesson from the experience of the East European economies in order to remedy the failures of the highly centralized Soviet planning system. The Hungarian and the East German models are often cited in this regard without examining how these models work in practice. The good press these Soviet allies have enjoyed in the West is somewhat surprising in light of what they have actually achieved. Furthermore, the makeup of their economies is so different from the Soviet economy that their advantages in performance would be difficult, if not impossible, to replicate in the Soviet Union.

In the East German case, bureaucratic and worker discipline is easier to sustain at fairly high levels for cultural and structural reasons. The German work ethic is quite different from the Russian work ethic. But even if all Soviet bureaucrats and workers could be imbued with the German work ethic and better economic performance indeed emerged in the Soviet system, it would be a one-time gain, not a basis for economic and technological change. A work ethic cannot substitute for private property and market prices in the authority and information functions if an economy is to be dynamic, adapting to new technology, new demands, and structural change. This reality becomes abundantly clear when one compares the East German and West German economies.

Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that the East German New Economic Model owes much to the trade between the two German states, which assures a large subsidy for the East German economy. This source of capital is as important to East Germany's relative success as any feature of East German planning technique. The Soviet economy simply has no equivalent to this sustained subsidy.

Since the late 1960's, the Hungarian system has released control over small parts of the economy, but in most cases central authorities have set severe limits, often taking back much of the latitude they appeared to give. Jan Prybyla's review of the Hungarian economic model demonstrates that decentralization in Hungary has been quite modest and the measures for ensuring central control have remained intact.[17] As declining Western loans and unfavorable export markets have come to bear on Hungary, so has the cost of central controls. The outlook for the Hungarian model can hardly inspire Soviet planners to emulate it.

Perhaps the most significant reason for doubting that East European experiences can show the way for reform is to be found in a comment by a Soviet official a number of years ago in the course of a lengthy discussion about his country's economic predicament. Asked why the Soviet Union does not borrow from the East European experience, he explained that the East European economies are small; they do not carry the Soviet responsibility for bailing out a client state in the event of an economic reform failure. The East Europeans can experiment, get into trouble, and, if necessary, the Soviet army can invade them to restore socialism. Who will rescue socialism in the USSR if an economic experiment gets out of control, the official asked. The political and security context of reform in the USSR is qualitatively different from that in any Soviet client state.

What about previous Soviet experience? Does it have any lessons for the Soviet reformers today? The New Economic Policy of the 1920's, of course, is the single example that might have relevance. Some Western scholars have suggested that a return to NEP is a viable choice for the Soviet Union. Private agriculture could be

[17]Prybyla, op. cit., pp. 211–45.

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introduced along with small private enterprises in the service and consumer goods sectors. The heavy-industrial sectors could be kept under central control, keeping the party in charge of what Lenin called the "commanding heights" of the economy.

Gorbachev has already had an unfortunate experience with the agrarian sector when, as chief of Soviet agriculture, he let the private sector grow. As he noted in his June plenum report, that experiment posed a dilemma. Small plots do not encourage the introduction of new technology on the scale needed for major improvements. Furthermore, the industrial sectors are today in serious trouble. In the 1920's, industrial growth came largely through reconstruction of the war-torn economy, and as reconstruction came to completion, the prospect for continued growth looked bleak. Today the problem is not reconstruction, but overconstruction and inefficient construction in a very large economy with an industrial sector many times larger than it was in the 1920's. A NEP II simply does not offer a happy solution to the macro-industrial problem. It might boost the consumer sector for services and small-unit production much as it did in the 1920's. It could legitimize and expand the present "second economy." But, given the industrial modernization that Gorbachev seems to demand, a NEP II would ameliorate some problems, but at best this would be only a partial or temporary solution.

Anthony Sutton has traced an interesting correlation between influxes of Western technology and spurts of growth in the Soviet economy.[18] Trade with the West during the 1920's was followed by growth in the 1930's; help from the West during World War II and the transfer of capital stock from defeated Germany after the war provided the second influx, which was again followed by growth in the 1950's. The slowdown in growth in the 1960's was followed by détente and renewed East-West economic interaction in the early 1970's. The expected economic growth has been less certain, although performance in the military-industrial sector has been significant, even spectacular. A correlation, admittedly, is by itself not sufficient evidence to infer a causal relationship, but the sustained Soviet interest in keeping as high as possible economic interaction with the West that brings large technology transfers suggests that Soviet planners believe the causal relationship exists.

Against this historical background, the new Soviet law on joint economic ventures with the West looks like one more attempt to salvage central planning with a new influx of Western aid. Let us set aside the issue of the probable effectiveness of new joint ventures—although initial examination of the rules for such enterprises invites pessimism—and consider them as a way to shore up the existing system. If they lead to large Western investments on the scale of the Kama River project in a number of key industrial sectors, joint ventures could create pockets of improved manufacturing capabilities. They might give the Soviet computer industry a boost. They might help in communications technologies. And they might introduce a different production organization and new management techniques. They will not, however, ameliorate major problems in energy, transportation, and labor allocations. They will not reduce the problems of information reliability and overload in planning and price setting.

Nikolay Bukharin, advocate of the NEP and long a purged and discredited figure in Soviet history, has recently been rehabilitated; the photo shows him in 1931 when he was in London for a Congress on the History of Science.

—Sovfoto.

[18]Anthony C. Sutton, *Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development*, Vols. I, II, III, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1971, 1971, 1973.

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In addition to joint ventures, of course, a political climate conducive to stimulating large Western credits would also be required for any significant benefit to the Soviet economy to result from renewed economic relations with the West. To be sure, such a climate may come about, and much enthusiasm in Western economic circles may help generate another influx of Western aid. If the flow is large enough, for a time Gorbachev might see moderate improvement in the present system's performance. In a few years, however, the inherent inefficiencies of the system would again appear in their old nagging forms, revealing that no real solution had been found.

Such a day of reckoning can be postponed, nevertheless, if the bureaucracies in the ministries and firms can be made more responsive. But how can greater responsiveness be achieved? In the past this was done through personnel purges, through turnovers in cadres that broke up informal groups and cliques which had grown up to resist and cope with economic directions from the center. Such rejuvenation, however, had not occurred recently. The nearly two decades of Brezhnev's rule allowed thousands of such cliques and circles to flourish. They produced statistics for the center and allocated an increasing part of the state's resources to their own interests. The "second economy" reached a scale probably much larger than Western analysts grasped, probably greater than Soviet central planners have been able to measure.

The new factor in the Soviet political and economic equation today is a fairly broad recognition within elite circles, especially the intelligentsia, but also in higher party circles, in the military, and in the KGB, of the overall predicament of the system. These elites know that the economy has to be improved if it is to be directed away from its present course. They are a source of support and enthusiasm for change; but, how can they be harnessed for this purpose without giving them too much leeway in defining the aims of reform?

As suggested earlier, Gorbachev's answer to the question is apparent in his three slogans *glasnost'*, *perestroyka*, and *novoye myshleniye*. *Glasnost'* is a call for these elites to express the political demand for change. As their criticisms more and more lay blame on obstinate bureaucrats and officials at the middle and lower levels, even at high levels in some cases, the public also joins the chorus. The public discourse cannot be carried on at the level of comprehension of economics of an Aganbegyan or Zaslavskaya and quite predictably, it already is turning to questions of persons, spotlighting individuals, unresponsive officials and party leaders, as the cause of problems. In this climate, Gorbachev and his aides offer "restructuring" as the solution, retaining the discretion to define this ambiguous term as they choose and to make the definition include changing cadres throughout the bureaucracy. Although "restructuring" can also include reorganization and new processes, its most conspicuous manifestation to date is turnover in cadres. In other words, it is a purge, a purge of a new type, a renewal of cadres, a revitalization of *apparatchiki* and party officials.

Why, one may ask, should Soviet elites and the public believe new *apparatchiki* will behave any differently than their predecessors? Gorbachev's answer is clear: they will practice "new thinking." They will abandon the old ways, that is, corruption, second-economy activities, and abuse of privileges. Again, one is reminded of Stalin's lectures, "The Fundamentals of Leninism," in which he defined the "style of party work" as a new combination of "Russian revolutionary sweep" and "American efficiency."

If this is Gorbachev's scheme, how far will economic and social reform go? How far can it go? Here again one confronts the questions: "Whose reforms? Whose image of the future? Whose economic preferences?" It seems more and more clear that Gorbachev himself does not intend systemic change. He is exercising with remarkable energy and cunning the system bequeathed him by previous general secretaries. He is struggling to regain the vitality once possessed by the system, and which especially Brezhnev, but also Khrushchev, let slip into decay. If what one means by reform is a significant improvement in the standard of living for Soviet citizens and increased protection of their individual rights under law, that kind of reform cannot go very far without bringing about systemic change—the kind of change that Gorbachev cannot want.

What seems to be shaping up, therefore, is a political contest initially between Gorbachev and his allies on the one hand and the entrenched bureaucracy on the other. To the extent that Gorbachev wins this contest and installs a new set of bureaucrats with new energy and more responsiveness to central direction, he will slow the decline of the economy, perhaps even bring limited improvement in some sectors. To win, he must also be able to attract resources from the West on a large scale. At the same time, another contest is shaping up between Gorbachev and his allies, the intelligentsia, as well as others who are taking advantage of *glasnost'* to register their own preferences about change, about what *perestroyka* will encompass.

Outside observers must not overlook the first contest although the second may prove more exciting to watch. Gorbachev has certainly managed to renew the Politburo and the Central Committee as well as a number of regional party organizations. He has not, however, had

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much success against the Ukrainian party, the one he must crack if he is to succeed in a genuine renewal of cadres. The second contest, however, could turn out to be more significant, particularly in its unintended consequences.

Unintended Effects of *Glasnost'*

Glasnost' as a policy has generated behavior in the Soviet Union most Western analysts would never have believed possible. The kinds of criticism voiced in the press, on the stage, in films, and in public demonstrations are truly remarkable. Proposed "restructuring" by the party has touched on all three of the criteria cited above as tests for truly systemic change in the USSR. The central planning and pricing problem, a wider role for law, and greater freedom from censorship have been key issues in the public debate and in some new policies.[19] Thus far they have remained largely in the domain of *glasnost'*, only foreshadowing *perestroyka*. The mere fact that they have gained attention, however, tells us that these are not ordinary times in the Soviet Union. Fundamental tensions are near the surface, tensions that go to the very heart of the system's viability.

Can the leadership silence those voices of *glasnost'* that do not accord with Gorbachev's image of *perestroyka*? Probably, but it is difficult to see how the lid can be put back as securely as before. Certainly, it can and most likely will be put back on the broad masses, but the intelligentsia is another matter. Gorbachev has gone quite far in attracting the intelligentsia as an ally in his campaign for system revitalization. The act of bringing Andrey Sakharov back from exile and allowing him to appear on American television is a measure of the distance the General Secretary has proved willing to go. He is telling the Soviet intelligentsia, both in the USSR and abroad, that they can join his campaign—a de facto purge of the bureaucracy. Many, but not all, have accepted the invitation. If the campaign does not yield results congenial to those who have joined, how will they react? Can they simply be silenced?

Without returning to another period of Great Terror, Gorbachev will find it virtually impossible to close down the activity of a disenchanted intelligentsia. In light of the limited prospects for systemic change, the intelligentsia will almost inevitably turn sour and give up on *perestroyka*, confronting Gorbachev with the choice of resorting to comprehensive repression or tolerating unprecedented levels of dissident activity.

Not all of the intelligentsia will abandon the regime in the event of disillusionment. Many will remain with the regime; they will understand the risks of political instability that would go with a bold move to systemic change. They will see the dangers of fragmentation along ethnic lines. They will share the party's fears of losing control of the empire in Eastern Europe. They will accept order and severe curtailment of individual freedom as preferable to the uncertainties accompanying a genuine political transformation.

Thus, a major but unintended consequence of Gorbachev's policies will be both the disillusionment of the intelligentsia and its polarization into two camps. One camp will stay with the regime, making cogent arguments that there is no practical alternative to maintaining the old system. The other camp will give up all hope of evolutionary change within the regime and turn to radical opposition, articulating counter-ideologies calling for a dismantling of the regime.

Some observers might argue that this polarization has already occurred. The generation that witnessed the thaw in the 1950's under Khrushchev has been through a period of hope that ended with the Daniel-Sinyavsky trial and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Vasiliy Aksyonov, the émigré novelist who was a leader in the 1979 publication of *Metropol*, which was intended as one last try at bringing the regime around, propounds this thesis in his occasional lectures. Other recent émigrés seem to share his view: they see *glasnost'* as merely a ruse to gain their support, not as a serious new opportunity. As Sakharov and others still in the Soviet Union find themselves manipulated by Gorbachev without significant gains for their own aims, they are likely to join the ranks of the wholly alienated.

Polarization of the intelligentsia in Russia is not a new phenomenon. It happened in the 19th century during

[19]Three recently promulgated laws are particularly noteworthy. The "USSR Law on State Enterprises" sets forth the legal basis for economic accountability of enterprises, giving them remarkably wide latitude in hiring and firing labor, in setting wages based on performance with no ceiling on earnings, in contracting with suppliers and buyers, in accumulating savings, in setting prices within centrally determined guidelines, and in rejecting goods from suppliers when the quality is below standard. Enterprises that prove unprofitable, i.e., unable to meet their debts, can be declared insolvent by the banking authorities. Enterprises may also establish ties with foreign firms, accumulate foreign currency, and execute contracts with foreigners. Precisely which enterprises will operate under this law is to be determined by the USSR Council of Ministers. Central reporting of performance data, and planning within the state annual and five-year plans remain obligatory, however. The second law, "USSR Law on the Procedure of Appeal to the Courts Against Illegal Actions by Officials Encroaching on Citizens' Rights," gives citizens a means for holding Soviet officialdom to account when their rights are abused. It does not, however, touch the matter of private property rights in the Western economic sense. Finally, the "USSR Law on Nationwide Discussion of Important State Issues" makes it imperative for draft laws at the union, republic, and local soviet levels to be submitted for public discussion. It is too early to assess the likely impact of these laws, but they are of great potential significance, especially the law on enterprises. Nevertheless, as noted, the latter does not do away with central planning. These three laws were published in *Izvestiya* (Moscow), on July 1, July 2, and July 1, 1987, respectively

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General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev visits with industrial, office, and scientific workers in Zelenograd, a major center of the electronics industry near Moscow in July 1987.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

the reign of Nicholas I. When genuine reform was tried by his successor Alexander II, the radical intelligentsia made use of the relaxation of police oppression to widen its activities against the regime, giving the autocracy many good reasons for resorting to periodic crackdowns, to vicious police oppression. The radicals did not join the *zemstvo* movement for local government. They did not support the incipient industrialization that was showing promise in the last decades before World War I. Their counterparts inside the regime came to use their intellectual talents in support of repression. Thus, at the very point in the early 20th century when constitutionalism had prospects for success, both wings of the Russian intelligentsia worked against it.

If this prognostication for the future of political and economic reforms in the Soviet Union is correct, one might be tempted to say that history is repeating itself. In some respects the analogy holds, but there are significant differences. The ethnic minorities are more articulate today. They too have intelligentsias that will participate in the polarization. The East European states are entangled in Soviet domestic developments in a way that has no 19th-century parallel. To be sure, there was a Polish problem then, but there was no Polish state, and the various East European nationalities were struggling against other imperial regimes as well. There is mass literacy today and the social structure is quite different—in the size of both the industrial working class and the scientific elites, and in the character of rural life.

The potential role of today's Soviet military should not be forgotten. A large, well-educated officer corps exists, with a technical-cultural level unprecedented in both Russian and Soviet history. Will it be unaffected by a split in the non-military circles of the intelligentsia? Less is known about the military in this regard than about any other group in Soviet society, but the implications of a polarization in the military would be truly profound. Disaffected officers are a qualitatively different kind of problem from disaffected scientists, writers, or students. Their leadership and organizational skills could give a radical movement explosive potential.

Gorbachev has set in motion many forces in the Soviet Union. A few signs of drawing them back are apparent, but if they are abruptly stopped, the prospects of success for *perestroyka* will be destroyed. Yet, giving them vent carries all the dangers identified above.

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Conclusion

The real aims of the present steps toward reform in the USSR remain uncertain. Is Gorbachev bent upon a fundamental change in the system? If he is, the chances that he can control it are small, virtually nil. In a fragmented polity, a half-way house between a centrally planned and a market economy does not seem to be a real option. Czechoslovakia in 1968 showed this. Once the system of central controls began to dissolve, it proved impossible to retain censorship, party control, and the arbitrary use of the law. Poland represents a similar case, although there the game is still being played out. The regime has not vanquished the opposition, but neither has the opposition brought about systemic change. Without the shadow of Soviet military power over Poland, it is doubtful that the regime could survive. In the Soviet Union, letting the forces for change have full sway might call into serious question the territorial viability of the union. Gorbachev surely does not share Solzhenitsyn's view that the nationalities should be let go.

One is forced, therefore, to infer a more limited aim on Gorbachev's part, namely, a revitalization of the old system. And one can discern in his formula—*glasnost', perestroyka,* and *novoye myshleniye*—an old political strategy with roots in the Stalin and Khrushchev eras. It does not envision the abandonment of socialism and international class struggle. Rather, it seems to be a new variant of "peaceful coexistence," an effort to continue to build socialism within the Soviet camp through greater economic interaction with the developed states of the West, even as the international class struggle in the Third World and the cultivation of "progressive" social forces in the West continue. Gorbachev can achieve some improvements in the economy, particularly in the service and agricultural sectors. He may even realize some industrial gains through Western credits and technology transfers. But he cannot overcome the basic structural problems of the economy.

Even the modest economic gains are not assured. Political resistance to his party revitalization could confront him with the choice of returning to the policies of the Brezhnev era or of losing his post. The Yel'tsin affair in the Moscow party organization and Gorbachev's moderate address on November 2, 1987, on the eve of the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution, indicate that political resistance is great and that he is willing to compromise on the speed of his restructuring. A gradual petering out of *perestroyka,* therefore, is not to be discounted. In either eventuality—success in Gorbachev's endeavor or a return to Brezhnevism—Gorbachev's allies among the intelligentsia at home and abroad are bound to face eventual disillusionment.

The most interesting, and perhaps the most significant, outcome of Gorbachev's new variant on an old policy is likely to be the further polarization of the intelligentsia when disillusionment sets in. Russian history can be instructive in helping us anticipate this development, but it will have new dimensions, new consequences, and new dangers. As we watch it, we can only be saddened by the tragedies and hardships it may bring to great peoples on whom history has already heaped many painful burdens, not least the Russians.

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Soviet Cultural Politics

John B. Dunlop

In July 1987, in the course of one of his periodic meetings with editors of Soviet literary journals and the mass media, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev reminded those present: "We have been and remain in the same boat; we have been and remain on the same side of the barricades . . . . Ours is not a class struggle . . . ."[1] These are unusual words for the head of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to be directing to the leaders of the Soviet media. Yet, there is a real schism in the ranks of the Soviet elite, a schism intentionally brought about by Gorbachev himself. As a member of the editorial board of *Novyy Mir* put it: "Today in the party itself, under the signboard 'CPSU' there exist two parties."[2]

This essay will examine the course of the politics of culture under Gorbachev from the time of his accession in early 1985 to the end of 1987. A second aim will be to trace how Soviet writers, filmmakers, and cultural intellectuals came to be divided into two warring camps. It should be noted that the focus will be exclusively on the debate among influential establishment figures; the views found among informal, grass-roots groups will not be treated.

[1]"To Deepen *Perestroyka* through Practical Actions," *Sovetskaya Kul'tura* (Moscow), July 16, 1987, pp. 1–2.

[2]Anatoliy Strelyanyy, "Gradualness Will Destroy the Revolution," *Strana i Mir* (Munich), No. 4, 1987, p. 36. This is a samizdat document. Strelyanyy is reported to have resigned from the editorial board of *Novyy Mir* in early October 1987.

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I. "Revolution"

We are in a spiritual revolution, a fight to the death between the "new thinking" and the still very powerful reactionary system that defines our society . . . . We are undergoing not a cultural revolution but a revolution by culture.[3]

The tumult in the sphere of Soviet culture over the past two and one-half years has, to a considerable extent, been the result of the actions of two men—General Secretary Gorbachev and his overseer of culture, Aleksandr Yakovlev. Western analysts have postulated Yakovlev's pivotal role in conceptualizing and orchestrating the campaigns of *perestroyka* (restructuring), *demokratizatsiya* (democratization), *glasnost'* (openness), and *novoye myshleniye* (new thinking). Formerly an economist, propagandist, journalist, and diplomat, Yakovlev has become Gorbachev's right hand in the Politburo on cultural affairs. While Gorbachev has concentrated his energies on rejuvenating the Soviet economy, Yakovlev has looked after the cultural sphere, whose influence in Soviet politics is considerable. Roy Medvedev has recently reminded us that changes in the area of culture can take on an importance that is not confined to cultural matters: "They reflect political moods and currents and, in turn, influence the development of political currents, and even movements."[4]

[3]Andrey Voznesenskiy, "A Poet's View of Glasnost," *The Nation* (New York), June 13, 1987, p. 811.

[4]Roy Medvedev, "Bits of Light in a Gray World," *Dissent* (New York), Winter, 1987, p. 46.

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Gorbachev and Yakovlev met, as has been widely reported, during Gorbachev's visit to Canada in 1983. Yakovlev found himself in "exile" as Soviet ambassador to Ottawa because of his sharp attack on Russian nationalist writers and critics, published in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* in late 1972, when he was acting head of the Central Committee's Propaganda Department.[5] Sent abroad in 1973 by Leonid Brezhnev, Mikhail Suslov, and their Politburo colleagues, he was brought back to Moscow under Yuriy Andropov in 1983 to direct the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO). In the summer of 1985, shortly after Gorbachev came to power, Yakovlev was given back his post as head of the Central Committee Propaganda Department. At the 27th CPSU Congress (held in February-March 1986), he was made a Central Committee secretary. His political ascent became meteoric when he was made a candidate member of the Politburo in January 1987, and, six months later, a full member of the Politburo and a "senior" Central Committee secretary overseeing culture, propaganda affairs, and scientific associations.[6]

Thanks to the relaxation of Soviet censorship under the policy of *glasnost'*, it has become possible to discern the broad outlines of what Gorbachev and Yakovlev are seeking to accomplish. Like Peter the Great 300 years ago, they have embarked on a bold and sweeping campaign of Westernization, not because they are unqualified admirers of the West—in fact, Yakovlev has published several polemical studies on the United States and its role in world politics[7]—but because, like Peter, they believe that an appropriation of Western technology and, in a certain sense, of Western mentality is essential for the future prosperity, indeed perhaps the survival, of the Soviet Union. Changes in the cultural leadership were deemed essential in order to ensure the backing of the Soviet intelligentsia for Gorbachev's program of rapid restructuring. In addition, a revitalized culture is seen as providing an important bridge to the alienated Soviet youth. As Vladimir Maslov, a Central Committee lecturer and strong Gorbachev supporter, put it: "We have lost those who are now between the ages of fifteen and thirty. We have to win them back, because there is no one besides them to carry out *perestroyka*."[8] Westernization in the cultural sphere can also help promote good relations with the West, which has become one of Gorbachev's priorities.

The writer Aleksandr Prokhanov, who seems to be attempting to play a role in Soviet cultural politics similar to that played by Vsevolod Kochetov during the Khrushchev years,[9] recently made some acid comments about what Gorbachev and Yakovlev are seeking to achieve:

> *There is a view, a rather widespread one, that* perestroyka *is supposedly required by the USSR's strategic lagging behind the civilization of the West . . . . Both its meaning and its task are to catch up with the West. Following the West's lead,* perestroyka *is to close up the gap. This view of a "catching-up* perestroyka*" forces us to copy the West's models, be they scientific apparatuses, rock groups, methods of conducting interviews in the press, or administrative and scientific models. Such a copying deprives us of a sovereign path and gives birth to an inferiority complex . . . .*[10]

Prokhanov's view of what Gorbachev is seeking to accomplish strikes this observer as generally accurate, though it should be pointed out that Gorbachev, unlike Prokhanov, obviously believes that he can Westernize aggressively without losing the Soviet Union's distinct identity.

Allies and Tactics

Before launching a "revolution" in the cultural sphere, Gorbachev and Yakovlev had to identify allies among the cultural elite. The most suitable appeared to be "Western-style liberals" and liberal Marxists, that is, the same or like-minded people who had championed the Khrushchev cultural thaw in the late 1950's and early 1960's. This group (whose members I shall call "liberals") immediately became the motor force of Gorbachev's cultural program. A number of liberal activists—for example, poets Andrey Voznesenskiy and Yevgeniy

[5]On this episode, see John B. Dunlop, *The Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1983, pp. 227–33.

[6]Alexander Rahr, "Turnover in the Central Party Apparatus," Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL 256/87, July 9, 1987, p. 7.

[7]See, for example, A.N. Yakovlev, *Ot Trumena do Reygana* (From Truman to Reagan), Moscow, "Molodaya Gvardiya," 1984. Anatoliy Strelyanyy, loc. cit., p. 37, has said that both the Petrine and early 20th-century Stolypin reforms were studied as examples of "revolution from above."

[8]See the samizdat document, "The January 1987 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU," *Strana i Mir*, No. 4, 1987, p. 40.

[9]Vsevolod Kochetov (1912–1973) served as chief editor of both *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (1955–1959) and *Oktyabr'* (1961–1973). He was perhaps the leading spokeman for the Stalinist tendency in Soviet society and was a fierce opponent of Aleksandr Tvardovskiy and the journal *Novyy Mir*. Aleksandr Prokhanov (b. 1938), who has been a secretary of the RSFSR Union of Writers since 1985, is an outspoken neo-Stalinist and defender of the Soviet "empire." He has published several works praising the heroism of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. On Prokhanov, see "Aleksandr Prokhanov: Soldier's Novelist," *Soviet Analyst* (Richmond, England), May 20, 1987.

[10]Prokhanov's speech was published in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Moscow) May 6, 1987.

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Yevtushenko, playwright Viktor Rozov, and critic Vladimir Lakshin—had played major roles during the Khrushchev period. Their aim, and this deserves to be stressed, was to return to the unfinished agenda of the earlier thaw. Above all, they wanted to continue the interrupted process of de-Stalinization—the uncovering and publicizing of Stalin's crimes—and the publication of works suppressed under Stalin or in subsequent periods of "re-Stalinization." In confronting and attacking the specter of Stalin, the "liberals" sought to ensure once and for all that a return to a Stalinist system would become impossible.

It was clear from the outset, however, that the "liberals" alone constituted a rather narrow base. "Liberal nationalists" (mostly Russian but also non-Russian) had to be recruited, and recruited they soon were. Thus, Academician Dmitriy Likhachev, the eminent literary historian and cultural polymath, was launched in 1985 by the General Secretary's wife Raisa.[11] Likhachev's 80th birthday, which was celebrated in 1986, became a major event in the Soviet media, to the point of eclipsing, for example, the jubilee of the outstanding 18th-century scientific and cultural figure, Mikhail Lomonosov. The major "village prose" writer, Sergey Zalygin, received permission in 1985 to publish the second part of his novel, *After the Storm,* whose publication had been held up under Konstantin Chernenko. Also in 1985, Yelem Klimov, a filmmaker who had been persecuted under Brezhnev, saw the release of his film *Agony* (English title: *Rasputin*), which had been shelved for a decade. Klimov was also awarded the first prize at the 1985 Moscow International Film Festival for his anti-militarist film *Come and See,* made in cooperation with Belorussian writer Ales' Adamovich.[12]

The agenda of the liberal nationalists differed in both emphasis and content from that of the "liberals." Preservation of the environment and of historical monuments stood at the top of their list of concerns, and they tended to press for a recovery of the prerevolutionary, as opposed to Soviet, legacy of their particular nations. Some held anti-militarist convictions. Many expressed an interest in religious subject matter.

Having enlisted the support of liberals and liberal nationalists, Gorbachev and Yakovlev appear to have taken stock and concluded that they remained, at least potentially, outnumbered by opponents in the cultural sphere. To make up for this perceived weakness, blitzkrieg speed would be employed. In instances where opposition reared its head, the opponents would be swiftly "restructured" out of power. "Democracy" would be used, where possible, to vote opponents and fence-sitters out of office. The Gorbachev revolution in culture was conceived as a massive preemptive strike against such elements as entrenched Brezhnev-era officials, conservative nationalists, and neo-Stalinists. It was hoped that blinding speed and rapid-fire restructuring would make up for a numerical weakness in supporters. And the lessons of the Khrushchev period were assimilated: there would be no "flip-flopping" between the positions of liberals and hard-liners, though there might be occasional tactical retreats (as in July and November 1987); support for the "liberal" agenda would be firm and consistent.

Cinematography. The dramatic takeover of the filmmakers' union in May 1986 remains the most spectacular success of Gorbachev and his followers in the cultural sphere so far. Fortunately for Gorbachev, this union was overripe for change; under Brezhnev, the Soviet film industry had become incredibly bureaucratized and hobbled. The head of Goskino, Filip Yermash (appointed in 1972), ruled with an iron hand in cooperation with a small number of self-appointed "generals" in the cinematographers' union, such as first secretary Lev Kulidzhanov and Sergey Bondarchuk, director of *War and Peace* and other Soviet spectaculars.[13] The revolt in the union was prepared in advance of that body's fifth congress, held in May 1986. For example, undoubtedly as a result of preliminary caucusing, Bondarchuk was not elected a delegate to the congress.

Due in part to the preliminary work, a sweeping purge of the union's leadership was carried out at the congress. Aleksandr Yakovlev nominated Klimov for the post of union first secretary, and, by a hand vote, this nomination was confirmed. Two-thirds of the union directorate (*pravleniye*) were voted out of office.

In Klimov, Gorbachev has found a man as committed to change as himself. "We have to act" is a frequent refrain in Klimov's speeches. Klimov's desire to effect a "revolution" (another favorite term of his) in the film in-

[11]See *Le Nouvel Observateur* (Paris), May 8–14, 1987, p. 35.

[12]The film *Come and See* depicts the complete destruction of over 600 Belorussian villages by the German army as a foretaste of a nuclear holocaust. The horror of the Nazi genocide is shown through the eyes of a young boy. Val S. Golovskoy, a 1981 émigré from the Soviet Union and a film specialist, has told me that the scenario of *Come and See* was sharply criticized in the USSR for perceived pacifist tendencies.

[13]For a useful study of the Soviet film industry before its recent restructuring, see Val S. Golovskoy with John Rimberg, *Behind the Soviet Screen*, Ann Arbor, MI, Ardis, 1986. Under Brezhnev, the State Committee for the Cinema (Goskino) effectively controlled the entire film industry, even though the Union of Soviet Filmmakers, which was organized in 1965, was on paper an independent entity. The All-Union State Institute of Cinematography (VGIK), a professional school for script-writing and film direction located in Moscow, was closely supervised by Goskino.

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dustry is undoubtedly fueled by his own unfortunate experiences during what is now called the "period of stagnation" under Brezhnev. Klimov's film *The Adventures of a Dentist* (1967) was given only a conditional release under Brezhnev, while *Agony*, as has been mentioned, was held up for ten years. His most recent film, *Come and See* (1985), was initially blocked by Goskino in 1977.[14] Here was a man with sufficient motivation to carry out the restructuring of the film industry.

The decisions of the fifth congress of filmmakers, which have been published in the journal *Iskusstvo Kino*, were indeed revolutionary.[15] The "authors' rights" of directors were bolstered against interference by Goskino. Improvements were called for in the commission working with young filmmakers, and it was decreed that workshops for young filmmakers should be organized in the various constituent republics of the USSR. This reflected Gorbachev's emphasis on bringing in new cadres of young people.

The congress resolved that the All-Union State Institute of Cinematography (VGIK) should be reorganized and turned into a "studio-institute oriented toward the individual preparation of masters of the cinema." The Soviet Union's two principal film publications—the highbrow *Iskusstvo Kino* and the mass *Sovetskiy Ekran*—should, it was said, be "restructured" at the editorial level. The congress deemed it "especially important" that measures be taken to ensure in the future a selection of Soviet films for international film festivals that would "assist the further growth of the influence and prestige of Soviet film on the world screen." Last, it was resolved that the new directorate should prepare changes in the union's statutes to facilitate the regular renewal of the ranks of both the directorate and the secretariat.

Iskusstvo Kino publishd the stenogram of the speeches delivered at the congress.[16] In their speeches, Gorbachev's supporters sounded themes which were to re-echo in coming months. Thus, Goskino was roundly criticized. Y. A. Grigor'yev, for example, maintained that Goskino had intentionally suppressed good films, while V. A. Tolstykh said that Goskino often "duplicated" the work of the film studios and that such redundancy should cease. O. V. Uralov asserted that the entire film "collective" should be involved in decisions affecting a film. Critic Andrey Plakhov warned that the quality of Soviet film was in decline and singled out the Russian nationalist film *Lermontov* as an example.[17]

Only a small number of speakers had the temerity to question the wisdom of the "revolution" being advocated in the film industry. One who did was the internationally known director Nikita Mikhalkov, who said that while he approved of *glasnost'* and of the removal of "taboos," he felt that "not only healthy and constructive forces" were at work in the area of Soviet film. He attacked as "childishness" the failure to elect Sergey Bondarchuk a delegate to the congress, and he warned against the dangers of settling accounts and of creating a "schism" in the ranks of Soviet cinematographers.[18]

Another dissenter was Vladimir Naumov, who wondered whether Soviet filmmakers were in fact ready for democracy and *glasnost'*. "Do we have respect for one



Yelem Klimov, First Secretary of the Board of the USSR Cinematographers Union.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

[14]On Klimov, see *Iskusstvo Kino* (Moscow), No. 12, 1985, p. 37; and *Sovetskaya Kul'tura*, May 22, 1986, p. 2, and Aug. 30, 1986, p. 4.

[15]See *Iskusstvo Kino*, No. 10, 1986, pp. 121–25.

[16]Ibid., pp. 4–120.

[17]The film *Lermontov* has not, to my knowledge, been shown in the West. The film's numerous Soviet critics claim that it uses the figure of the major 19th-century poet, Mikhail Lermontov, and the circumstances surrounding his death in a duel, as a vehicle for the expression of strong anti-Western and anti-Semitic views. As history, the film is said to be pure fantasy.

[18]The director and actor Sergey Bondarchuk (b. 1920) was one of the leading figures in the cultural establishment during the Brezhnev period. He was responsible for the harassment of experimental filmmakers like Andrey Tarkovskiy. He is said to have been a close associate of Goskino chairman Filip Yermash.

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another?" he asked. "Is there sincerity and honesty in our relations? Is there a culture of democracy?" He termed the fifth congress "a congress of accusers" and maintained that the reason there were not many young directors in the union was that, sadly, there were simply not many talented younger directors.[19]

Not only were Mikhalkov and Naumov not elected to the union's directorate or secretariat, but they were also sharply attacked by other speakers at the congress. Vladimir Menshov singled out Naumov for criticism and rebutted Mikhalkov's attempt to defend Bondarchuk. There was no "childishness," he said, in not electing Bondarchuk as a delegate to the congress, since Bondarchuk was engaged in making bad films. Ukrainian filmmaker Yuriy Ilenko followed with a personal attack on Mikhalkov and his father, Sergey Mikhalkov, comparing them to the septuagenarian Timofey Levchuk, head of the Ukrainian filmmakers' union.[20]

After their dramatic takeover, Klimov and his colleagues on the new secretariat moved immediately into high gear. A commission to handle disputes—composed of directors, scenarists, critics, and Goskino representatives—was formed to look into the fate of films and film scenarios that had been shelved during the period 1966–86. Some 30 films were subsequently cleared for release, including such controversial works as Kira Muratova's *The Long Goodbye* (1971), Aleksey German's *Road Checks* (1971) and *My Friend, Ivan Lapshin* (1984), Gleb Panfilov's *Theme* (1979), Sergey Paradzhanov's *The Legend of Suram Fortress* (1984), and Tengiz Abuladze's *Repentance* (1984).[21]

Three months after the congress, in August 1986, Klimov gave interviews to *Pravda* and *Sovetskaya Kul'tura* that indicated that he and his colleagues were accelerating the pace of change.[22] The secretariat of the filmmakers' union, he reported, was meeting every week. He sharply criticized Goskino, which was headed by his nemesis Filip Yermash, for "not agreeing with the decisions" of the recent fifth congress on many issues. Klimov revealed that, in cooperation with economists, jurists, sociologists, and art critics, the union was hard at work on a "new model" for the film industry. "The productive and creative process in film," he said, "is traumatized by bureaucratic organization." In addition to reviewing suppressed films and film scenarios, Klimov said, the commission for resolving disputes was also looking into the fate of young filmmakers who had not been admitted to the union; after examination, some of them were being "directly accepted." In December, Yermash was replaced by Aleksandr Kamshalov as head of Goskino.

In January 1987, the union's new model for the film industry was adopted at a meeting of the union's directorate.[23] In an interview with *Sovetskiy Ekran,* Klimov stated that the film industry would henceforth be underpinned by two basic principles: "democratization and decentralization." Film studios were to become self-financed, that is, supported by the profits from the films they produced. The purpose of the new model, Klimov said, was "to place the studio in direct dependence on its success with viewers . . . ." And in an interview with *Moscow News,* he added that "a studio that goes broke will be disbanded."[24] When asked whether such drastic steps would not lead to the "commercialization" of Soviet film, Klimov argued that Soviet film critics would prevent viewers from flocking to bad films; moreover, he went on, one percent of the profits of the film industry would be used to finance films by beginners or by established artists who chose to take the risks inherent in making high-quality pictures. Such changes in the industry, Klimov said, would soon "reveal the true cadres situation, would rather quickly determine 'who is who'."[25]

New editors were soon appointed for *Iskusstvo Kino* and *Sovetskiy Ekran,* and Vitaliy Zhdan was forcibly retired from his position as rector of VGIK.[26] The "revolution" in film was also energetically exported to the republics. Mikhail Belikov, a young Ukrainian filmmaker who had energetically supported the Klimov line at the fifth congress, replaced Timofey Levchuk as first secretary of the Ukrainian cinema workers' union. Belorussian cinema workers passed a vote of no confidence in the entire leadership of their union.[27]

[19]The director and scenarist Vladimir Naumov (b. 1927) became increasingly conservative, both artistically and politically, during the Brezhnev period.

[20]Timofey Levchuk (b. 1912) became first secretary of the Ukrainian Filmmakers' Union in 1963. Like Sergey Bondarchuk, he was a pillar of conservatism during the Brezhnev years. The anger directed at him by Yuriy Ilenko (b. 1936), a Ukrainian director, scenarist, and cameraman, is revealing of the pent-up frustration felt by liberals and experimentalists in the film industry.

[21]Where provided, the dates of these films have been taken from *Kino: entsiklopedicheskiy slovar'* (Cinema: Encyclopedic Dictionary), Moscow, "Sovetskaya entsiklopediya," 1986.

[22]See "Film Also Cannot Wait," *Pravda* (Moscow), Aug. 9, 1986, p. 3; and "Truth Helps, Habit Hinders," *Sovetskaya Kul'tura,* Aug. 30, 1986, p. 4.

[23]On this plenum, see *Iskusstvo Kino,* No. 4, 1987, pp. 3–30.

[24]See the interviews with Klimov in *Sovetskiy Ekran* (Moscow), No. 4, 1987, pp. 2–3, and *Moscow News* (English edition), No. 12, 1987, p. 11.

[25]*Iskusstvo Kino,* No. 4, 1987, p. 13. "Commercialization" is often a code word for "Western." It is generally seen as incompatible with artistic quality.

[26]Vitaly Zhdan (b. 1913), a specialist in the esthetics, theory, and history of Soviet film, began teaching at VGIK in 1948 under Stalin and was made rector of the Institute in 1973. Like Bondarchuk, he was a pillar of the conservative artistic establishment.

[27]See Julia Wishnevsky, "Soviet Cultural Figures at the Berlin Academy of Arts," *Radio Liberty Research,* RL 100/87, Mar. 12, 1987, p. 4.

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Members of the Klimov "team" were also continually traveling to the West, where they touted their vision of a revitalized Soviet film industry. Aleksey German stated in New York that henceforth his films and those of his associates "will have to compete with the pictures of their more talented and controversial colleagues that previously had been banned, plus with the increased imported fare and the ever-growing video market."[28] And Rolan Bykov, director of the film *Scarecrow*, which was awarded a state prize in 1986, added that in the future, studios "can run the risk of going under, of getting ruined—a thing that had never before happened in a socialist society."[29]

It will be recalled that in the resolutions of the fifth congress, emphasis was placed on making Soviet films shine in international competition. At the Cannes film festival in May 1987, Tengiz Abuladze's brilliant anti-Stalinist film *Repentance* won the runner-up prize; many in attendance felt that it, rather than Maurice Pialat's *Under Satan's Sun*, should have been awarded the Golden Palm first prize.[30] The Camera D'Or, a prize reserved for directors with first features, went to another Georgian filmmaker, Nana Dzhorzhadze.[31] Interestingly, two films by Soviet filmmakers who were definitely not on Klimov's team also did well at Cannes: Nikita Mikhalkov's *Dark Eyes* won the prize for best actor (Marcello Mastroianni), and Andrey Konchalovskiy's *Shy People*, the prize for best actress (Barbara Hershey). Konchalovsky, who has been making films in the United States for some years, is Mikhalkov's older brother.[32]

The 15th Moscow International Film Festival, which took place in July 1987, was perhaps the acme of the Westernization process under Gorbachev. Westerners were invited to sit on juries at the festival, and an American actor, Robert DeNiro, was named chairman of the jury in the feature-film category. Among the 1,500 guests were such luminaries as Federico Fellini, Stanley Kramer, Arthur Penn, Warren Beatty, Milos Forman, and Francis Coppola.[33] During the festival, it was reported, the Soviets paid $200,000 to purchase distribution rights to Forman's *One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest* and $250,000 for the same director's *Amadeus*. They also paid $200,000 for distribution rights to *Otello*, starring Placido Domingo.[34] Stanley Kramer announced that he would be making a film on the Chernobyl' disaster on location in the USSR.[35] Embarrassed by the fact that DeNiro's films had not been shown in the USSR, Klimov promised that soon such pictures as *Mean Streets*, *Raging Bull*, and *The Godfather* would be seen by Soviet citizens.[36] There were other surprises as well. The grand prize at the festival did not go to a Soviet or East European film, but to Fellini for his picture *Interview*. And a Walt Disney production, *The Journey of Natty Gann*, won the gold prize in the children's film category.[37]

An international federation of film critics, International Kinopress, established a prize at the festival in honor of the late Andrey Tarkovskiy. "The mention of Tarkovskiy," the *Los Angeles Times* reported, "described as 'the brave Soviet filmmaker,' won loud applause."[38] The Soviets also announced their intention to purchase the rights to Tarkovskiy's last two films *Nostalghia* and *Sacrifice*, made in Italy and Sweden.

Theater. A revolution similar to that in film has also taken place in the Soviet theater industry. In April-May 1986, "reelections" were carried out in 437 Soviet theaters, with more than 4,500 individuals participating in the voting. The elections resulted, through retirement or failure to be reelected, in a turnover of 10 percent of the theater leadership. In addition, under a new "experi-

[28]Alexander Batchan, "Mad Russian," *Film Comment* (New York), No. 23, June 1987, p. 49.

[29]Ibid. The film *Scarecrow* recounts the ordeal of an adolescent girl living in a bleak northern town. She is persecuted and symbolically executed by her classmates for a "crime" of which she is innocent. The film makes bold political and religious statements.

[30]The figure of $10 million for US distribution rights was mentioned by Abuladze during his recent visit to Berkeley. See "An Interview with Tenghis Abuladze," *Newsletter, Center for Slavic and East European Studies*, University of California, Berkeley, October 1987, p. 1. For an insightful review of Abuladze's *Repentance*, see N. Zorkaya, "By the Road that Leads to the Church," *Iskusstvo Kino*, No. 5, 1987, pp. 33–53.

[31]See the report on the Cannes Film Festival in *The Washington Post*, May 20, 1987.

[32]Nikita Mikhalkov (b. 1945) and his brother Andrey Konchalovskiy (b. 1937), who are both gifted filmmakers, are sons of the powerful first secretary of the RSFSR Writers' Union, Sergey Mikhalkov (b. 1913). As members of the Soviet "aristocracy," they have enjoyed possibilities to travel abroad denied to many of their colleagues. For a time, Konchalovskiy appeared to have de facto emigrated to the West, where he made four English-language films. (He was rehabilitated in the Soviet Union in January 1988; see *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Jan. 28, 1988, p. 8—**Eds.**) Nikita Mikhalkov's film *Dark Eyes* was essentially a Soviet-Italian co-production.

[33]*Los Angeles Times*, July 7, 1987.

[34]*The San Francisco Chronicle*, July 14, 1987.

[35]*Los Angeles Times*, July 15, 1987.

[36]*The San Francisco Chronicle*, July 10, 1987.

[37]*Los Angeles Times*, July 18, 1987.

[38]Ibid. This completed the rather remarkable rehabilitation of Tarkovskiy which had begun at the May 1986 filmmakers' congress. (Tarkovskiy died of cancer in Paris on December 29, 1986.) Tarkovskiy had been harassed and criticized during the entire Brezhnev period. His film *Andrey Rublyov* (1966) was shelved for over five years, while another film, *Mirror* (1974), was excoriated at a joint meeting of Goskino and the filmmakers' union. Tarkovskiy has stated that he was required to appeal to the presidiums of two different party congresses to obtain permission to make his last two Soviet films *Mirror* and *Stalker* (1979). In July, 1984, Tarkovskiy announced at a press conference in Italy that he and his wife would not be returning to the USSR. The Soviet authorities then held his teenage son "hostage" for a year-and-a-half. By the time his son was finally allowed to emigrate, Tarkovskiy had contracted cancer. He is said to have believed that his brutal treatment by the authorities contributed to his coming down with the disease. Rehabilitated in the USSR in the last year of his life, Tarkovskiy spurned Soviet overtures directed toward getting him to return to his homeland.

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

Soviet playwright Mikhail Shatrov in a 1980 photograph.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

ment" being carried out, theater collectives are to have "full independence in the selection of plays." The wages of theater personnel are, to some extent, to depend on the profitability of their productions. Theaters are to have the freedom to set the prices for tickets. The opening of new theaters for Soviet youth is being actively promoted. As for the danger of "commercialism," it is said the Soviet theater critics will ensure the future high quality of the stage.[39] In an important structural change, an independent Union of Soviet Theater Workers has been formed.

A number of important and controversial plays have been staged during 1986 and 1987, of which I will only mention Mikhail Shatrov's neo-Leninist play *Dictatorship of Conscience,* the text of which was published in the No. 6, 1986, issue of *Teatr*. Although in style Shatrov's play represents a fairly creaky adaptation of socialist realist conventions, in content it is bold indeed. The "positive heroes," such as the journalist Svetlana, assail various incarnations of "false communism," such as the Italian Red Brigades and Pol Pot in Cambodia. The spirit of Stalinism is symbolized by a French Comintern agent, André Marty, who defends the use of mass terror in 1937. A shadowy Brezhnevite, the dangerous Zotova, is also introduced into the play. Friedrich Engels makes several entrances as an all-knowing *raissoneur.* The play is noteworthy for its revolutionary idealism (the slogan "Workers of the World Unite!" will one day appear on the masthead of the *The New York Times*) and its advocacy of political purges of "false communists." Overall, Shatrov's political views strike one as being close to those of Gorbachev and Yakovlev.

Literature. In contrast to Gorbachev's notable success in restructuring the film and theater industries stands his marked failure to bring about sweeping change in the powerful USSR Union of Writers. As one of the new secretaries of the filmmakers' union, Viktor Dyomin, commented in mid-1987: ". . . that union has not changed much. They turned out to be less radical than the filmmakers' union. As a result, half of the old leadership or even more were reelected."[40]

On June 19, 1986, shortly before the Eighth Congress of the USSR Union of Writers was to convene, Gorbachev held a meeting with some prominent Soviet writers. Though *Pravda* carried a report on the meeting, a samizdat account makes more interesting reading.[41] According to the latter, Gorbachev gave unqualified support to the revolution that had just occurred in the filmmakers' union. "Perhaps there were excesses," he admitted, "but the main problems were resolved, and a new leadership was elected. That was the right thing to do. The new leadership is now acting very concretely and correctly." He added his authoritative voice to the criticism of the Russian nationalist film, *Lermontov,* voiced by Andrey Plakhov at the recent filmmakers' congress. Then, turning to those in the room, Gorbachev said that he had an "old question" to pose: "Whom are you with, masters of culture?"[42]

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[39]On this "experiment" in the theater industry, see the essay by Ye. Zaytsev (then first deputy USSR minister of culture), "Renewal of the Theater," *Teatr* (Moscow), No. 12, 1986, pp. 46–53. See also, A. Altayev and A. Tyutyunyk, "Let Us Verify Algebra with Harmony," ibid., No. 1, 1987, pp. 22–26.

[40]*Film Comment,* No. 23, June, 1987, p. 51.

[41]See "Conversation of the Members of the USSR Union of Writers with M. S. Gorbachev," *Arkhiv Samizdata* (Radio Liberty—Munich), No. AS 5785, June 19, 1986. The report in *Pravda* appeared on June 21, 1986.

[42]This was the title of an article by Maxim Gor'kiy published in *Pravda* in 1932. The article, intended as a response to American correspondents who had expressed reservations about the Bolshevik experiment, expressed scorn for the Western intelligentsia, self-appointed "masters of culture." In citing the article, Gorbachev was in all likelihood merely appropriating the term "masters of culture," without reference to the article's contents.

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The writers answered this question at their congress held later that month. The new eight-man bureau of the secretariat of the writers' union included only three clear-cut Gorbachev supporters: Vladimir Karpov (the new first secretary of the union), Grigoriy Baklanov, and Sergey Zalygin. The remaining five members—Chingiz Aitmatov, Yuriy Bondarev, Vasyl Bykov, Oles' Honchar, and Georgiy Markov—were, as events would show, either opponents of the Gorbachev line or fence-sitters. (But, by the fall of 1987, Bykov had moved firmly into the Gorbachev camp.) It is also significant that Markov, the previous first secretary of the union, was able to keep his membership on the bureau.

The speeches of Gorbachev's supporters at the congress, which were published in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, made it evident that they were in fact only a minority.[43] For example, Baklanov assailed the idea that writers should want to hold positions of power. "The only power which a writer can and should possess," he said, "is spiritual power . . . ." And Baklanov directly attacked Feliks Kuznetsov, the long-serving first secretary of the Moscow Writers' Organization. Poet Andrey Voznesenskiy also criticized Kuznetsov, wondering out loud whether "true elections" had been held in the Moscow Writers' Organization. In noting the absence at the congress of such poets and writers as Bella Akhmadulina, Bulat Okudzhava, David Samoilov, Arseny Tarkovskiy (father of the filmmaker), and the brothers Arkadiy and Boris Strugatskiy, Voznesenskiy obviously wanted to reinstate these liberal writers, who had been under a cloud during the Brezhnev period and frequently unable to get their work into print, and to enlist them on the side of the Gorbachevites.

In the first of many "restructuring" suggestions made by Gorbachev supporters, Voznesenskiy called for the creation of a "cooperative publishing house" at the head of which "would be a council of five to seven well-known masters, such as the conscience of our intelligentsia, D. S. Likhachev, and Ch. Aitmatov, V. Bykov, D. Granin, S. Zalygin, V. Rasputin." This proposed cooperative publishing house, Voznesenskiy was aware, would serve to dilute the power of the writers' union. Voznesenskiy also advocated publishing the complete works of previously censored writers such as Anna Akhmatova and Boris Pasternak.[44]

[43]On this congress, see the entire issue of *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, July 2, 1986.

[44]The full rehabilitation of the great poets Anna Akhmatova (1889–1966) and Boris Pasternak (1890–1960) is symbolically important for liberals like Voznesenskiy and Yevtushenko. Both were at one time vilified by the authorities, Akhmatova after the war by Stalin's powerful lieutenant, Andrey Zhdanov, and Pasternak by the Khrushchev regime after he was awarded the Nobel Prize for his novel *Doctor Zhivago*. Pasternak was forced to repudiate the prize and died shortly thereafter. Both Akhmatova and Pasternak are symbols of artistic integrity and anti-Stalinism.

At the Eighth Congress of the USSR Writers' Union: from left to right, N. Gribachev, G. Safiyeva from Tadzhikistan, A. Voznesenskiy, and M. Tank and I. Shamyakin (both from Belorussia).

—TASS from Sovfoto.

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Another Gorbachev supporter, playwright Viktor Rozov, underlined the necessity of attracting young writers into the union. Poet Yevgeniy Yevtushenko made a "restructuring" suggestion of his own: the statutes of the writers' union should, he said, be amended so that five first secretaries with equal rights would be elected; each secretary would serve a one-year term as head secretary, meeting with his colleagues at least six times a year. Under Yevtushenko's scheme, the power of the union's bureau would, of course, be significantly weakened. Yevtushenko also handed the presidium a letter signed by 40 delegates calling for the establishment of a Pasternak museum by the time of the 100th anniversary of Pasternak's birth in 1990.

Ales' Adamovich, another Gorbachevite, seconded Yevtushenko's suggestion that leaders of the writers' union serve short terms of office. He said that he had a "naive" question for those in attendance: "Should writers want to be bosses?" Adamovich also aired an idea that he said he had recently heard discussed: an all-Union conference of Soviet writers should, he suggested, be convoked in a year's time to evaluate the work of the union's new leadership.

The opponents of the Gorbachevites, on the other hand, expressed open reservations about the course of the "revolution in culture." Thus, Sergey Mikhalkov, first secretary of the RSFSR Union of Writers, warned against the penetration of the USSR Writers' Union by "parasites"—persons having no direct connection to literature—and cautioned against the "harm of playing at liberalism." Nikolay Gribachev spoke against the current unhealthy tendency to ignore the classic Soviet writers, such as Maxim Gor'kiy and Aleksey Tolstoy.[45] In a steely speech, Aleksandr Prokhanov assailed the appearance of a "new social type" indifferent to ideology, and attacked those who were all too ready to engage in "compromise" with the West. He rejoiced, on the other hand, at the appearance of another type of Soviet man: one prepared to pick up a club and go after foreign battleships off Soviet shores and Soviet bureaucrats alike. Such a new man, he said, typifies "a citizen of a great power."

A number of writers took advantage of the new freedom provided by *glasnost'* to air concerns over the future of the Russian environment, of Russian historical monuments, and of Russians themselves. Yuriy Bondarev, a member of the new bureau of the union's secretariat, cautioned: "If we do not cease destroying historical monuments, if we do not stop our violence against our earth and rivers . . . then one fine morning, which will be a last and funereal one, we, with our unquenchable optimism, will wake up and learn that the national culture of enormous Russia has been wiped out . . . ." Several writers, including Valentin Rasputin, warned against the "river diversion project," under which northern rivers of Russia were to be diverted south to arid Central Asia. (This project was subsequently scuttled by the Politburo, and "public opinion" was said to have been a major factor in the decision.[46])

The criticism went beyond ecology and historical preservation. Village prose writer Vasiliy Belov said that personally he was not gladdened "by the prospect of the gradual disappearance of a people, by its complete fusion [*sliyaniye*] with other peoples." He thus dissented from what he saw as the current nationalities policy of the regime. Significantly, few of the writers from the non-Russian republics appeared to exhibit discernible enthusiasm for the revolution in culture being promoted by Voznesenskiy, Yevtushenko, and their allies.

Blocked in their initial attempt to pack the leadership of the union of writers with their supporters, the Gorbachev forces turned elsewhere. In the summer of 1986, two Gorbachev supporters were made editors of major journals: Grigoriy Baklanov became the new editor of *Znamya,* and Sergey Zalygin, of *Novyy Mir.* Along with the journals *Druzhba Narodov* and, to a lesser extent, *Yunost',* these two journals quickly became the cultural standard-bearers of the Gorbachev program. *Znamya,* in fact, began to play a role similar to that of *Novyy Mir* in the Khrushchev period. Vladimir Lakshin, who had been an important member of Aleksandr Tvardovskiy's team at *Novyy Mir*, became first deputy editor of *Znamya*.

These journals proceeded to publish bold denunciations of the Stalin period, such as Anatoliy Rybakov's novel *Children of Arbat,* which appeared in *Druzhba Narodov,* and Anatoliy Pristavkin's *The Little Golden Cloud Passed the Night,* published in *Znamya*.[47] Such "buried treasure" as Mikhail Bulgakov's *Heart of a Dog* also appeared in *Znamya*. In a preview of the *Novyy Mir*'s contents for the year 1988, Zalygin announced that

[45]In calling for a return to the Soviet classics, Nikolay Gribachev (b. 1910) was seeking to recover the Stalinist literary legacy, which conjoins the official ideology, rigidly interpreted, with elements of proletarian populism (Gor'kiy) and Russian nationalism (Tolstoy). Concepts like "socialist realism" and "positive hero" are staple components of this legacy.

[46]See "In the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR," *Pravda,* Aug. 20, 1986.

[47]*Children of Arbat* appeared in *Druzhba Narodov* (Moscow), Nos. 4–6, 1987, and *The Little Golden Cloud Passed the Night,* in *Znamya* (Moscow), Nos. 3–4, 1987. On Rybakov's novel, see "Setting the Records Straight," *Moscow News* (English edition), No. 15, 1987, p. 11; and Walter Laqueur, "Beyond Glasnost," *Commentary* (New York), October 1987, pp. 63–65.

For an excellent discussion of de-Stalinization in recent Soviet literature, see Geoffrey A. Hosking, "At Last an Exorcism," *The Times Literary Supplement* (London), Oct. 9–15, 1987, pp.1111–12.

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At the Eighth Congress of the USSR Writers' Union in June 1986: at left, Valentin Rasputin; at right, Sergey Mikhalkov.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

the journal planned to publish Pasternak's *Doctor Zhivago*, with a foreword and commentary by Academician Likhachev; Baklanov said that *Znamya* hoped to publish Yevgeniy Zamyatin's anti-utopian novel *We*.[48]

In addition to these literary journals (which also publish historical and other non-literary material), Gorbachev's supporters came to dominate such mass publications as *Literaturnaya Gazeta, Sovetskaya Kul'tura, Ogonyok*, and the upstart *Moskovskiye Novosti*.[49] It was in *Ogonyok* (which used to be known as the "Soviet *Life* magazine") that Vladimir Karpov, the new first secretary of the union, rehabilitated the poet Nikolay Gumilev, who was executed by the Bolsheviks shortly after the revolution for alleged participation in a conspiracy.[50] The rest of the Soviet press also began to seek out and publish previously forbidden works. The journals *Oktyabr'* and *Neva* brought out Anna Akhmatova's great "Requiem," and the Russian nationalist monthly, *Moskva*, announced that it intended to publish Vladimir Nabokov's novel *Luzhin's Defense*.[51]

The domination of so many periodicals by Gorbachev supporters made it rather difficult for those who had reservations about the new "revolution" to get a word in edgewise. Only a few publications, such as the Russian nationalist journals *Nash Sovremennik, Moskva*, and *Molodaya Gvardiya*, and the weekly organ of the RSFSR writers' union, *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, consistently expressed reservations about what came to be known as the "new thinking." And even *Moskva* and *Literaturnaya Rossiya* showed occasional streaks of "liberalism."

As has been noted, the "liberals" were the most active and dominant current among Gorbachev's supporters. They soon made their views known concerning what the Soviets call the "literary process." Singled out for vilification was village prose writer Vasiliy Belov's novel *Everything is Still to Come*, published in *Nash Sovremennik* in the latter part of 1986.[52] The novel portrays the Western-oriented Soviet intelligentsia as being in the thrall of a fearful demonic plot. Like the film *Lermontov*, it paints the dangers of the "Jewish-Masonic conspiracy." The weak, indecisive Russian intellectuals upon whom the novel focuses are contrasted with the energetic, virtually omnipotent Soviet Jew, Misha Brish. Brish takes away the wife of one of the intellectuals, seeks to adopt his children officially and to change their name to Brish, and then makes plans to emigrate with his new family to the United States. Brish is as much at home in Paris as he is in Moscow; he is part of a shadowy, very powerful network. Belov's entire novel is a passionate, if benighted, warning against such cosmopolitanism.

Vladimir Lakshin attacked Belov's opus in a prominent review published in *Izvestiya* in December 1986, and Yevgeniy Yevtushenko criticized it sharply in his survey of the 1986 Soviet cultural scene published in *Sovetskaya Kul'tura*.[53] Two capacious overviews of Soviet literature for the year 1986, published in the journal *Znamya* in early 1987, also attacked the novel.[54] Finally,

[48]See the interviews with Zalygin and Baklanov in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Aug. 26, 1987, p. 7.

[49]On *Moskovskiye Novosti* and the English-language *Moscow News*, see the series of articles in *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Sept. 11, 14, and 15, 1987.

[50]Vladimir Karpov, "The Poet Nikolay Gumilev," *Ogonyok* (Moscow), No. 36, 1986, pp. 18–24. Gumilev was married to Anna Akhmatova at one time.

[51]Akhmatova's "Requiem" appeared in the No. 3, 1987, issue of *Oktyabr'* and in the No. 6, 1987 issue of *Neva*. However, *Luzhin's Defense* has not been published. For the reasons behind the delay in publishing Nabokov's novel, see Ronald Eggleston, "Writers' Union Officials Discuss Soviet Authors," *Radio Liberty Research*. RL 247/87, June 30, 1987, pp. 1–3.

[52]Vasiliy Belov, *Everything Is Still to Come: A Novel*, in *Nash Sovremennik* (Moscow), No. 7, 1986, pp. 29–106, and No. 8, 1986, pp. 59–110.

[53]See V. Lakshin, "Speaking truthfully . . . Novels about which People Argue," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Dec. 3, 1986, p.3, and Dec. 4, 1986, p.3; and Yevgeniy Yevtushenko, "The Right to Complexity," *Sovetskaya Kul'tura*, Jan. 3, 1987, p. 4.

[54]See Natalya Ivanova, "Trial by Truth," and Igor Zolotusskiy, "Trip Report," *Znamya* (Moscow), No. 1, 1987, pp. 198–240.

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Igor Dedkov, a reviewer of literature for the authoritative CPSU organ *Kommunist,* weighed in with harsh criticism of the novel in an article entitled "Literature and the New Thinking."[55] In short, this novel became the literary equivalent of Nikolay Burlyayev's film *Lermontov* as far as the "liberals" were concerned.

Another writer often singled out for attack by the "liberals" has been Siberian author Viktor Astaf'yev. His much-discussed short novel, *The Sad Detective,* published in the January 1986 issue of *Oktyabr',* was criticized for its negative depiction of Soviet intellectuals living in a provincial Russian city.[56] Astaf'yev's correspondence in samizdat with historian Natan Edelman also became the talk of Moscow for its anti-Semitic animus,[57] and Astaf'yev earned the ire of Georgians for his uncomplimentary view of them in his essay "Catching Gudgeons in Georgia."[58]

Arguably the most significant recent work of literature to appear so far in the Gorbachev period has been Kirghiz author Chingiz Aitmatov's uneven but often riveting novel, *The Executioner's Block,* published in *Novyy Mir* in 1986.[59] The novel deals boldly with such long "forbidden" or discouraged topics as the Soviet drug trade, agricultural reform, the destruction of the environment, and anti-militarism. But what made the novel most controversial was its "God-seeking" aspect: in an obvious borrowing from Mikhail Bulgakov, Aitmatov introduced Jesus Christ and Pontius Pilate into the novel, as well as a former Russian Orthodox seminarian who has been expelled from seminary for "heresy." The former seminarian, Avdi Kallistratov, preaches a new religion, featuring the "God of tomorrow."[60]

[55]*Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 12, 1987, p. 63.

[56]Viktor Astaf'yev, "The Sad Detective: A Novel," *Oktyabr',* No. 1, 1986, pp. 8–74. This novel recounts the experiences of a retired policeman and invalid living in a squalid provincial Russian city. It traces the spiritual disintegration of the populace, resulting in alcoholism, rape, hooliganism, and murder. The hero bears the *stigmata* of his dangerous profession; he has twice been crippled by drunken hoodlums. The novel treats such subjects as the breakup of the Russian family and the destruction of the environment. The town's Westernizing intelligentsia are shown to be interested only in "cognacs, cocktails, and sex."

[57]This correspondence has been published in *Sintaksis* (Paris), No. 17, 1987, pp. 80–87.

[58]Astaf'yev's "Catching Gudgeons in Georgia" appeared in *Nash Sovremennik,* No. 5, 1986, pp. 123–41. The sketch offended some Georgians because of its perceived tendency to stereotype them as sharp and unscrupulous traders.

[59]Chingiz Aitmatov, *The Executioner's Block. A Novel,* in *Novyy Mir* (Moscow), No. 6, 1986, pp. 7–69; No. 8, 1986, pp. 90–148; and No. 9, 1986, pp. 6–64. See also Katerina Clark, "The Executioner's Block: A Novel of the Thaw," *The Times Literary Supplement,* June 26, 1987, p. 696.

[60]The term "God-seeking" (*bogoiskatel'stvo*) is used in Soviet references to describe a group of Russian intellectuals who turned away from Marxism toward an interest in religious themes in the first decade of this century. Nikolay Berdyayev and Mikhail Bulgakov were two members of this group. They were severely attacked by Lenin.

The liberal nationalists among Gorbachev's supporters have generally been enthusiastic about Aitmatov's novel. In two articles, Ales' Adamovich claimed that it represented a work of "super-literature."[61] According to him, Aitmatov's novel together with Astaf'yev's *The Sad Detective* and Valentin Rasputin's 1985 tale, *The Fire* (published in *Nash Sovremennik*), is "a volcanic mountain" cast up by the red-hot lava of the Gorbachev period. Incidentally, there is a fairly general consensus that these three works, which are all by established Soviet authors, were the most significant pieces of literature to appear in the first two years of Gorbachev's reign. In contrast to Adamovich, the liberal Vladimir Lakshin singled out *The Executioner's Block* for severe criticism.[62] It appeared to be Aitmatov's "God-seeking" in particular that exercised Lakshin. By simply reviewing the novel together with Belov's *Everything Is Still to Come,* Lakshin placed it in dubious company.

In connection with the issue of "God-seeking" in contemporary Soviet culture, one should mention a fierce attack on Aitmatov, Astaf'yev, and Belorussian writer Vasyl Bykov (also a member of the bureau of the USSR Writers' Union) published in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* in July 1986.[63] In a piece entitled "Flirting with Dear Little God" (the term is taken from Lenin), the author, I. Kryvelev, a doctor of philosophical sciences and a specialist on the history of religion, assailed the three writers for airing religious themes in their works. Kryvelev's article, in turn, became controversial. Yevtushenko, for example, contested Kryvelev's views in a letter published in the same newspaper, but was then himself "refuted" in the same issue by another doctor of philosophical sciences, Suren Koltakhchyan.[64] In an article entitled "The New God-Seeking and Old Dogmas," published in the *Novyy Mir,* Andrey Nuykin attempted to moderate the impact of Kryvelev's attack.[65] Since the need to construct morality on a basis other than religion has been a leitmotif in the speeches of propaganda chieftain Aleksandr Yakovlev, one must assume that religion is one issue upon which the Gorbachev supporters are divided.

However, the disagreements need not necessarily be over substantive issues. In his overview of cultural

[61]See Ales' Adamovich, "Lesson of Truth," *Literaturnaya Gazeta,* Mar. 17, 1986, p. 5; and idem, "Against the Rules," ibid., Jan. 1, 1987, p. 4. For a discussion of recent Soviet cultural expression, see Anthony Olcott, "Glasnost' and Soviet Culture" in Maurice Friedberg and Heyward Isham, Eds., *Soviet Society Under Gorbachev,* Armonk, New York, M. E. Sharpe, 1987, pp. 101–30.

[62]Lakshin, *Izvestiya,* Dec. 3 and 4, 1986.

[63]I. Kryvelev, "Flirting with Dear Little God," *Komsomolskaya Pravda* (Moscow) July 30, 1986, p. 4.

[64]Ibid., Dec. 10, 1986, p. 2.

[65]Andrey Nuykin, "The New God-seeking and Old Dogmas," *Novyy Mir,* No. 4, 1987, pp. 245–59.

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events for the year 1986, Yevtushenko found fault with Aitmatov's novel—as well as with Belov's *Everything Is Still to Come* and Astaf'yev's *The Sad Detective*—not so much, one suspects, for its artistic failings, as for Aitmatov's failure to side unequivocally with the Gorbachevites.[66] As a member of the writers' union bureau and as one of the two leading Soviet prose writers (the other would be Valentin Rasputin), Aitmatov is in a position to offer pivotal support to the Gorbachev forces.

Failing to take over the leadership in the writers' union, the Gorbachevites have, as we have seen, attempted various "restructurings" which would give them greater leverage in the literary field. It will be recalled that at the eighth writers' congress, Andrey Voznesenskiy suggested the formation of a cooperative publishing house. In accord with this suggestion, Bulat Okudzhava, Venyamin Kaverin, Fazil Iskander, and other writers proceeded with plans to set up the "Vest' " (News) cooperative publishing house in Moscow.[67] As Okudzhava stated during a visit to the United States in May 1987, the main purpose of the new endeavor was to help younger authors get into print.[68] *Literaturnaya Gazeta* has reported on the establishment of another writers' cooperative, called "Zharki," in Novosibirsk.[69]

In November 1986, the formation of the Soviet Cultural Foundation was announced. Among its stated purposes are the promotion of mass cultural activities; the preservation of historical monuments; and the repatriation of Russian treasures from abroad. Academician Dmitriy Likhachev chairs the presidium of the new foundation.[70] Gorbachev's wife Raisa is also a member of the presidium.[71] It was in his capacity as chairman of this new body that Likhachev gave approval to publish *Doctor Zhivago* in 1988.

In sum, two years after Gorbachev's accession, the "revolution by culture" had made impressive gains. The film and theater industries had been taken over by Gorbachevites and were being swiftly "restructured." The large and powerful USSR Writers' Union had not fallen to initial assault, but several major literary journals were dominated by supporters of Gorbachev's program, and a number of mass publications, such as *Ogonyok* and *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, were nudging and pushing the "literary process" in the desired direction. The coalition of "liberals" and liberal nationalists appeared, despite occasional disagreements, to be holding together.

II: "Stalingrad"

Today in our country we have what resembles a battle for a city with fighting raging for each and every street, house, and apartment.[72]

In March 1987, there occurred a strong and potentially threatening counteroffensive against the Gorbachevites. The figure at the center of this counterattack was the CPSU "second" secretary, Yegor Ligachev. Western analysts had been aware for some time that Ligachev was not fully pleased with either the headlong pace or the convulsiveness of the Gorbachev reforms.[73] Throughout 1986, Ligachev's irritation seemed to grow. To take one example, in his speech to a conference of theater workers, which was published in the No. 8, 1986, issue of *Teatr*, Ligachev cautioned against possibly harmful results from the proposed restructuring of the theater industry. The theater experiment, he warned, "can produce not only positive but also negative results." The role of Soviet theater, he said pointedly, should be "constructive" as well as "destructive," because "we do not need a *one-sided* truth, we need the *full* truth."[74] Ligachev stated that literature and art must be permeated with "social optimism," and must feature attractive communist heroes. He suggested some themes that Soviet theater should treat: the campaign against alcoholism (he implicitly attacked *Literaturnaya Gazeta* for advocating the "cultured imbibing" of alcoholic beverages); the USSR's dangerous dependence on Western technology; and the West's groundless charges concerning human rights violations in the Soviet Union.

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[66]See *Sovetskaya Kul'tura*, Jan. 3, 1987.

[67]On "Vest'," see the samizdat publication *Glasnost'* (Moscow), No. 1, 1987, p. 12.

An English-language edition is prepared by the Center for Democracy, 358 West 30th Street, New York City. The original Russian texts of *Glasnost'* are published as insert supplements to the émigré newspaper *Russkaya Mysl'* (Paris). *Glasnost'* reports that the future of "Vest' " and other cooperative publishing houses is very much in doubt. (*The New York Times* of Feb. 3, 1988, cited Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov to the effect that the Soviet government had decided not to allow publishing cooperatives.—**Eds.)**

[68]A presentation by Okudzhava at the Kennan Institute, Wilson Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, May 20, 1987.

[69]*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Nov, 24, 1987, p. 1.

[70]The other members are Yuriy Bondarev, I. S. Zilbershtein, G. V. Myasnikov, E. F. Nesterenko, B. I. Oliynyk, V. I. Popov, B. S. Ugarov, V. M. Falin, and S. V. Yamshchikov. See the report in ibid., Nov. 17, 1986, pp. 1–2.

[71]Ibid.

[72]Oleg Yefremov, in *Moscow News* (English edition), No. 15, 1987, p. 8.

[73]It was noted, for example, that Ligachev's speech to the 27th CPSU Congress in early 1986 was more restrained than that of Moscow party boss Boris Yel'tsin, an ardent supporter of rapid *perestroyka*. See, for example, the account by R. Judson Mitchell in Richard F. Staar, Ed., *1987 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1987, p. 343. Yel'tsin was removed as head of the Moscow party organization in November 1987.

[74]See Yegor Ligachev, "We Need the Full Truth," *Teatr*, No. 8, 1986, pp. 2–7 (italics in the original).

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Some of the participants at the November 12, 1986, constituent conference of the Soviet Cultural Foundation in Moscow's House of Unions: from left to right, A Novikov, Chief Stage Director of the Crimean Gorkiy Theater; ballerina M. Plisetskaya, People's Artist of the USSR; N. Yeryomenko, People's Artist of the Belorussian SSR; B. Kariyeva, People's Artist of the USSR from Uzbekistan; and B. Ugarov, President of the USSR Academy of Arts.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

Concerning the proposed self-financing of Soviet theater performances and concerts, Ligachev stated categorically that the Politburo did not support such a concept. "It is wrong," he declared, "to subordinate art to commercial interests." And he added: "There can be and will be . . . no question of a market economy." The Soviet economy, he said, must remain and will remain socialist. Though Ligachev's views on these issues were forceful and unequivocal, they did not in fact prevail. A report appearing in *Moscow News* in August 1987 stated that for the previous six months, "several Moscow theaters have been paying their way."[75] The film industry has also, as we have seen, been moving in the direction of self-financing.

During the Khrushchev period, a setback for the reformers occurred with the formation of the RSFSR Union of Writers in 1958 under the leadership of arch-conservative Leonid Sobolev.[76] Thirty years later, that union struck again. In his lead-off address to the March 1987 session of the secretariat of the Russian republic's writers' union, first secretary Sergey Mikhalkov referred to a speech made earlier that month by Ligachev to a gathering of writers and intellectuals in Saratov. In a pointed act of lese majesty, Mikhalkov omitted all mention of Gorbachev's name: "It is not accidental," he said, "that during the meeting in Saratov, Y. K. Ligachev said that one should deal carefully with individuals who, by their talent, have assured their place in our culture. Today many are prepared simply not to notice people who wear decorations, people's artists of the USSR, and so forth . . . . Behind the slogans 'Long live *glasnost'*!' and

[75]Viktoriya Tikhomirova, "The Theater of 'Unopened' Plays," *Moscow News*, No. 33, 1987, p. 14.

[76]The RSFSR Writers' Union was brought into existence in order to bolster the orthodox tendency in Soviet Russian literature. It was hoped that the new union would serve to dilute the influence of the large urban writers' organizations in the Russian republic, especially of the lioeral Moscow Writers' Organization. It was believed, correctly it turned out, that the provincial Russian writers would be more orthodox.

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'Long live *perestroyka*!' there are concealed . . . speculators, mediocrities, and very shady people . . . ."[77] In the Soviet political context, Mikhalkov's speech was extraordinary; he appeared openly to be siding with the second party secretary against the general secretary, whose name he "forgot" to mention.

Mikhalkov's salvo was just the first of many. Yuriy Bondarev, a member of the bureau of the USSR Writers' Union and of the presidium of the new Soviet Cultural Foundation, followed with a passionate speech in which he stated:

I would define the present situation of Russian literature as that of July 1941 . . . when the progressive forces, showing unorganized resistance, retreated before the battering onslaught of civilized barbarians . . . . If this retreat should continue and the time of Stalingrad not come, then it will end with our national values and everything which represents the spiritual pride of the people being toppled into the abyss.[78]

As for *glasnost'*, Bondarev lamented that it had become a "stolen *glasnost'*." The Soviet mass media were giving a voice to only one side, what he termed "the attacking, destructive side."

Petr Proskurin, a secretary of both the RSFSR and USSR writers' unions, lashed out against *Pravda, Literaturnaya Gazeta, Ogonyok,* and *Moskovskiye Novosti*. (An attack on *Pravda* is also not an everyday occurrence in the Soviet Union.) These publications, Proskurin said, steadfastly ignore the fact that the word "communist" has disappeared from the vocabulary of several generations of Soviet writers. "Our criticism keeps silent," he complained. "*Pravda* keeps silent, and *Literaturnaya Gazeta* discourses about what novel has appeared in Argentina but pays no attention to what is taking place in Russia."

Mikhail Alekseyev, editor of the journal *Moskva*, noted that *glasnost'* was being used by those "who even before were demagogues." N. Shundik confided that recent events reminded him of the tumult following the 20th Party Congress in 1956. "Certain of our 'revolutionaries' see the shaking of the boat as a revolutionary process . . ." he said. But the boat, he cautioned, could sink.

Feliks Chuyev supported Proskurin's complaint that "the word 'communist' has been completely forgotten, especially in the books of young people." And Yegor Isayev observed that other words like "socialism," "work," and "labor," had become devalued. A. Keshokhov offered his opinion that works like *Doctor Zhivago* should be published in book—not journal—format. In all, of the 13 speakers, 10 came out clearly against the Gorbachev line, and only one, V. Dement'yev, appeared cautiously to support it.

These statements by the members of the secretariat of the RSFSR Union of Writers were challenged by the Gorbachev "liberals." "What do they talk about at our meetings," asked Bulat Okudzhava. "One of them [Sergey Mikhalkov] lamented that the younger generation pays no attention and disregards the orders and medals with which he is decorated. Another [Yuriy Bondarev] recalled Stalingrad and some unmentioned enemies, whom he must fight. Who are these enemies? Where do such feelings of animosity come from? Sometimes it may be heard that the Writers' Union needs no *perestroyka*. It needs [one], and how!"[79]

The reaction of Andrey Voznesenskiy was similar: "Yuriy Bondarev . . . recently described Russian literature as being besieged by destructive criticism, comparing it to the Red Army under attack by the Nazis in 1941. He called for a new Stalingrad to preserve national values. This is how reactionaries perceive *glasnost'*, as an invading Nazi army! Things are not yet where they should be . . . ."[80]

Indeed, from Voznesenskiy's point of view, they certainly were not. April 1987 witnessed a follow-up conference to the Eighth Congress of the USSR Writers' Union. Once again, the "reactionaries" came out swinging.[81] Mikhail Alekseyev led off by stating—with some justification—that the services of such writers as Valentin Ovechkin, Vladimir Chivilikhin, and Leonid Leonov in preparing the way for *perestroyka* had not been recognized.[82] While singling out nationalist writers for praise, Alekseyev said that a certain "foursome" of contemporary writers, on the other hand, were attempting to pass themselves off as the only lovers of truth. On the touchy issue of nationalism, Alekseyev observed that "the most direct path to the hearts of other people lies through the heart of one's own people . . . ." And he concluded by warning of the need for "vigilance": "Joining ourselves to the process of *perestroyka*, let us be vigilant and circumspect so that, as they say, the baby is not thrown out with the bath water."

[77]Mikhalkov's and the other speeches cited appeared in *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, Mar. 27, 1987. Ligachev's Saratov speech was published in the March 14, 1987, issue of *Sovetskaya Kul'tura*.

[78]*Literaturnaya Rossiya*, Mar. 27, 1987, p. 3.

[79]Bulat Okudzhava, "I Have New Hope," *Moscow News*, No. 22, 1987, p. 11.

[80]Andrey Voznesenskiy, *The Nation*, June 13, 1987.

[81]See the speeches published in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, May 6, 1987.

[82]The late Valentin Ovechkin (1904–1968) wrote about life on the Soviet collective farms and was an advocate of agricultural reform. Leonid Leonov (b. 1899) has written several important novels which treat peasant and environmental issues. The late Vladimir Chivilikhin was a pioneering Soviet environmentalist.

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A fiery younger writer, Yuriy Sergeyev, touched upon a topic which was to be much discussed at the conference: mass culture. It soon became apparent that this term was being used as a code word for the entire process of Westernization taking place under Gorbachev. "So-called 'mass culture'," Sergeyev fulminated, "has inundated the West with filth, sex, murders, violence, and cruelty, and the way has been prepared by this very rock music." Rock music, he complained, "blasts out of television and radios" and is extolled in the press. On the other hand, Sergeyev praised the Russian nationalist journal *Nash Sovremennik* for its good selection of materials, but added, "judging from our press, it is as if no such journal existed." Like Alekseyev, Sergeyev warned of the need to be "vigilant."

Significantly, several non-Russian writers appeared to join their voices to those of the "reactionaries." Borys Oliynyk, a Ukrainian writer, decried a sycophantic cringing before the West: "In order to earn a condescending thump on the back and a high-handed 'O.K.,' we are prepared to retreat before those who demand of us ideological disarmament." He continued: "When our Russian colleague bows down with natural filial love to his native land, there arise whispers about all possible great-power 'isms.' What does this mean, comrades?" Belorussian writer Nil Hilevich came out against "national nihilism," and he and Oliynyk were supported by Azerbaijani writer Ismail Shikhla.

Feliks Kuznetsov, first secretary of the Moscow Writers' Organization, spoke about the dangerous inroads that "mass culture" was making into Soviet society. He criticized I. Kryvelev for his attack on Aitmatov, Bykov, and Astaf'yev in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* and revealed that the newspaper had failed to publish a rebuttal by Kuznetsov. He explicitly identified himself with the sentiments of Hilevich decrying "national nihilism."

As is his custom, Aleksandr Prokhanov hit hard in his speech. "Brilliant publicists, refined cinematographers, venerable men of letters," he said, "have all united in a campaign of annihilation which encompasses ideology, art, and social relations. This 'negating culture' is well organized, acts in unison, attacks its goals according to plan, and many of these targets have already been razed to their foundations." Those comprising the self-appointed "avant-garde of *perestroyka*," he warned, are far from neutral toward "other recently very strong tendencies." Their attitude is, in fact, "repressive." It was only logical therefore that those groups under attack should unite "in the face of this annihilating attack, before the threat of a new cultural dictatorship."

Prokhanov also complained that the Army was increasingly being seen as the "main obstacle to the achievement of 'heaven on earth'."[83] Ivan Stadnyuk, the author of numerous war stories, reported indignantly that a "well-known prose writer" had predicted that Stadnyuk's books would soon be anathematized. Stating that he was proud of his war decorations, Stadnyuk singled out the publications *Znamya* and *Moskovskiye Novosti* for criticism.

Sergey Vikulov, editor of *Nash Sovremennik*, returned to the theme of Stalingrad. It is "never too late," he said, to stand up for the homeland. "Today many understand that we have nowhere further to retreat." And Vikulov attacked the rampant Westernization of Soviet society: "In music, in style of behavior, in clothing, in our dances, we only play the role of pathetic imitators."

A particularly fiery (and programmatic) speech was given by poet Stanislav Kunyayev. He praised the March meeting of the RSFSR writers' union for speaking "at the top of its voice" about negative phenomena that had to be exposed. He supported Yuriy Bondarev's warning against "false democrats." In the area of literature, he warned, "forces have indeed been activated which thirst for a diktat." Kunyayev lashed out at the attempt by Yevtushenko and others to depict Russian nationalists as "a class enemy." He was especially incensed by Yevtushenko's poem "The Man from Okhotnyy Ryad" (a place name signifying "Black Hundred") in the No. 4, 1987 issue of *Znamya*. Writers like Vasiliy Belov, Yuriy Bondarev, and Vladimir Soloukhin, Kunyayev complained, had been placed on a kind of hit list by the Soviet press, and a number of literary critics (all of them Russian nationalists) were, he said, having considerable difficulty getting into print.[84]

Kunyayev asserted a writer's right to deal openly with the national question. Why, he asked, were there shouts of "taboo"? "Why is Belov forbidden" to write about it? Kunyayev also vigorously supported the objections of Belorussian writer Hilevich and Ukrainian writer Oliynyk to "a vulgar class approach to national cultural values." He declared that he was as opposed to "Russification" as anyone. Kunyayev joined Yuriy Sergeyev in excoriating rock music which, he said, should not be "propagandized" by the Soviet government. He accused the paper *Moskovskiye Novosti* and the Soviet youth journal

[83]Colonel General D. A. Volkonogov, deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, who was the armed forces representative at the meeting, assailed various unnamed writers for promulgating dangerous pacifist views. (Later in the conference, Ales' Adamovich stated that Volkonogov was criticizing a piece published by Adamovich in *Moskovskiye Novosti*.) By contrast, writer Aleksandr Prokhanov was singled out by Volkonogov for warm praise.

[84]A similar "hit list" of authors that are having difficulty getting published appeared in an article defending Vasiliy Belov's *Everything Is Still to Come*. See Vyacheslav Gorbachev, "What Is Still to Come?" *Molodaya Gvardiya*, No. 3, 1987, p. 255–56. See also idem, "*Perestroyka* and Fabrication," in ibid., No. 7, 1987, pp. 220–47.

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Yunost' in particular of promoting rock.

In response to Viktor Rozov's statement that he was unable to bring himself to utter the words, "I am proud to be a Russian," Yuriy Bondarev exclaimed: "'I am a Russian and proud of it,' 'I am a Ukrainian and proud of it,' 'I am a Georgian and proud of it'—in these words is a grateful love for one's home . . . ."

Vladimir Krupin, chairman of the union's commission on the preservation of nature, charged that his commission had recently been "physically forbidden" to act. The river diversion scheme, he warned, was once again being bruited. Krupin also fulminated against rock music: "Elvis Presley, soft rock, then hard rock, then punk rock—these are all species of narcotics." He lamented the fact that the publication of the multi-volume *History of the Russian State* by Nikolay Karamzin (1766–1826) had once again been postponed. More should be known, he declared, about the opponents of the 19th-century revolutionary democrats. "Why do we know the revolutionary democrats and not the other side?"

By my count, 16 of the writers who spoke at the conference took a clear anti-Gorbachev line, ten (including an Estonian and an Uzbek[85]) were supportive, and nine did not make their position clear. It seemed obvious that a strong coalition of nationalists (both Russian and non-Russian), pro-military neo-Stalinists (such as Prokhanov and Stadnyuk), and endangered literary bureaucrats (such as Kuznetsov) was emerging. Russian nationalists appeared to be the dominant group in this alliance.

The Gorbachevites who were present at the conference defended their positions. Baklanov said that *Literaturnaya Gazeta* had "prepared the way for *perestroyka* as perhaps no other publication." He also defended the publication of works that had been banned, such as those of the famous *Novyy Mir* editor in the Khrushchev period, Aleksandr Tvardovskiy.

Sergey Zalygin, the current editor of *Novyy Mir*, not only defended what *Literaturnaya Gazeta* had been publishing, but offered a major "restructuring" proposal: the bureau of the secretariat of the USSR Writers' Union—of which he was a member—had, he said, done nothing for the past year and its composition should be changed. Aleksandr Borshchagovskiy, a writer and critic of the older generation, was more aggressive in tone. Zalygin, he said, was being too "delicate" in his criticism: "The bureau of the secretariat simply does not exist" and must be changed. The writers' union has devoted itself to "protecting the interests and privileges" of its hierarchy and has not taken a single step toward "democratizing" life for Soviet writers. Borshchagovskiy assailed Sergey Mikhalkov for his alleged obsession with "decorations and titles." He firmly supported Vladimir Lakshin's criticism of Belov's *Everything Is Still to Come* and upbraided Petr Proskurin for attempting to defend Belov. There should be no untouchables, he asserted, in the ranks of Soviet writers.

Soviet author Sergey Zalygin, editor of Novyy Mir, *photographed in August 1987.*

—TASS from Sovfoto.

Voznesenskiy accused Kunyayev of attempting to create a "schism" on the "national question," and he skewered Proskurin for his recent criticism of what Proskurin called "necrophilism," (that is, the publication of previously banned works by deceased writers and poets such as Tvardovskiy and Akhmatova). Those standing in long lines to buy journals like *Druzhba Narodov* were, he said, "voting for *glasnost'*." He praised Rybakov's anti-Stalinist novel *Children of Arbat* as well as the decision to rehabilitate Pasternak and publish *Doctor Zhivago*. On rock music, Voznesenskiy said that it was merely "rhythm." Boris Grebenshchikov and the Lenin-

[85]The Estonian writer was Vladimir Beekman, and the Uzbek writer, Ulmas Umarbekov. For an insightful discussion of nationalities issues under Gorbachev, see Paul Goble, "Gorbachev and the Soviet Nationality Question," in Maurice Friedberg and Heyward Isham, op. cit., pp. 76–100.

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grad rock group "Aquarium" had, he added, made "major masterpieces in the genre of rock music."[86] And he had a new "restructuring" suggestion for the union: "I propose the creation of a special secretariat devoted to the reception of young writers. Let such masters as V. Kaverin, Ch. Aitmatov, V. Rasputin, B. Okudzhava, and Ye. Yevtushenko recruit two or three young writers for whom they would answer . . . ." Three of the five writers mentioned by Voznesenskiy—Kaverin, Okudzhava, and Yevtushenko—are decided adherents to the Gorbachev line.

Andrey Dement'yev, editor of the journal *Yunost'*, focused his comments on the alienation of Soviet youth who, he maintained, simply must be brought into the "literary process." Like Voznesenskiy, Dement'yev had a "restructuring" suggestion to make: "Our journals are presently often disunited. I think it would make sense . . . to create a council of the chief editors of the literary-artistic journals of the USSR Writers' Union. We must be closer to one another." The proposed council could, of course, be used as a club against editors departing from the Gorbachev line.

Thus, both the Gorbachevites and their opponents gave no quarter in what at times resembled hand-to-hand combat. The "reactionaries" had, it appeared, achieved at least "containment," if not the beginnings of a "rollback." It is little wonder that Yuriy Bondarev, in an interview published in July 1987, expressed satisfaction with what had happened at the USSR writers' conference: "The plenum ended, to put it mildly, with the consolidation of good forces . . . ."[87]

Politics and Culture

It is worth recalling that a split in the ranks of Soviet writers occurred in 1954 at the second USSR Writers' Union Congress. As the late Max Hayward noted, the

[86]On Boris Grebenshchikov and "Aquarium," see the materials in *Strana i Mir*, No. 4, 1987, pp. 105–19. On the subject of Soviet rock music, see "Soviet Rock Goes to London," *Moscow News*, No. 32, 1987; and "Funky glasnost," *The Economist* (London), Oct. 3, 1987, p. 104.

[87]Yuriy Bondarev, "Time Is an Incorruptible Judge," *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, July 3, 1987, p. 3.

Politburo member Yegor Ligachev at a June 1987 session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

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relative strength of the two groups "evidently depended on some configuration in the party presidium . . . ."[88] One can date a similar split to the March 1987 meeting of the secretariat of the RSFSR writers' union. In this instance, too, the split appeared to reflect division at the highest level of the party.

The June 1987 Central Committee plenum, like the January 1987 plenum before it, represented a critical milestone in modern Soviet politics. In a certain sense, both party plenums were personal triumphs for Gorbachev, who managed both to gain qualified acceptance of his package of economic reforms and to elevate to full Politburo membership an energetic and resourceful adherent, Aleksandr Yakovlev (at the June plenum). The two plenums may, however, have served to rally opponents of Gorbachev's program in the party leadership.

One man who appears to have been particularly energized by the June 1987 plenum was Ligachev. The promotion of Yakovlev to full membership in the Politburo raised the obvious possibility that Gorbachev was grooming Yakovlev to replace Ligachev in the post of second party secretary. Understandably, Ligachev began to flex his political muscle as the number two man in the Politburo, moving to strengthen and broaden his influence in the critical sphere of culture. Thus, in June 1987, Proskurin, the critic of "necrophilism," was named RSFSR representative to the Soviet Cultural Foundation, despite strong objections to his views on the part of the foundation's chairman Likhachev.[89] In the same month, Kuznetsov was made head of the Gorkiy Institute of World Literature. Neither appointment could have been to the liking of the Gorbachevites.

Ligachev used his political clout during his two visits, on July 1 and July 3, to the offices of *Sovetskaya Kul'tura*, a publication that under the editorship of Albert Belyayev had become a clarion of the "new thinking."[90] Ligachev was greeted coolly by the paper's editorial board, and the staff then proceeded to lecture him on what should be done in the area of Soviet culture. V. Ganyushkin informed him that a "class approach" to the inheritance of the past needed to be reclaimed and warned that "an interest in magnates from the past has begun to squeeze out a knowledge of the actions of revolutionary heroes." Film critic V. S. Kichin voiced alarm that a "simplified understanding of democracy" had led to the spread of "dangerous ideas" in Soviet society, such as those promulgated by the unofficial organizations *Pamyat'* (Moscow) and *Otechestvo* (Sverdlovsk). Both speakers clearly wanted Ligachev to address the dangers represented by Russian nationalism.

Ligachev, however, had other concerns on his mind. "On the waves of *perestroyka* and of renewal," he noted, "there have been cast up, as one would have expected, foam and debris. There have appeared 'energetic' people who at times try to replace our spiritual values with their own dubious ideas and intentions." This sounded like a paraphrase of what writers like Mikhalkov, Bondarev, and Proskurin had been saying. And indeed, Ligachev unambiguously joined his voice to theirs:

Recently at the plenum of the Soviet Writers' Union, and still earlier at the session of the secretariat of the RSFSR Writers' Union, prominent Soviet men of letters expressed concern over several negative developments. It was remarked that in some works one does not encounter the word "communist" and that literary criticism avoids the very concepts of socialist realism and positive hero . . . . We should not permit the names and works of cultural figures who comprise the summit of Russian and our Soviet classics to be pushed into the second rank in the press, television, film, music, and fine arts.[91]

On the vexing question of "mass culture," Ligachev stated: "Not long ago V. G. Rasputin visited me. During the course of our discussion, he expressed uneasiness at the fact that the aggressiveness of so-called mass culture and of the torrent of musical imitations is growing." In saying that he and Rasputin had come to a meeting of the minds on the subject of mass culture, Ligachev was sending an important signal. The West, he warned, is attempting to foist its bourgeois mass culture on the Soviet Union. And he lashed out at a recent Soviet documentary: "In Leningrad, they made a documentary film devoted to the group 'Pop-Mechanics.' What an ideational and artistic hotchpotch!"

Ligachev may have been influenced by an article on the subject appearing in *Moskva*.[92] The author discusses subjects ranging from heavy metal rock music, to evening soap operas like "Dynasty" and "Dallas," to movies like *Rambo*, to show how this "culture" is making dangerous inroads into West European societies.

Ligachev pointedly informed the staff of *Sovetskaya Kul'tura* that at the June 1987 Central Committee plenum it had been shown that "under the guise of a struggle with the ambitions of one group, the ambitions of another group—its predilections, attachments, and

[88]Max Hayward, "Conflict and Change in Sovet Literature," in Max Hayward and Leopold Labedz, Eds., *Literature and Revolution in Soviet Russia, 1917–1962*, London, Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 212.

[89]Vera Tolz, "Plenum of Soviet Journalists—Another Attempt to Limit Glasnost' in the Soviet Press," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 255/87, July 8, 1987, p. 4. This dispatch is incorrectly dated June 8.

[90]See the account of Ligachev's comments and meetings with the newspaper's staff in *Sovetskaya Kul'tura*, July 7, 1987, p. 2.

[91]Ibid.

[92]Nataliya Korzun, "The Phenomenon of Mass Culture," *Moskva*, No. 6, 1987, pp. 134–53.

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subjective point of view—are being foisted upon us. One encounters this in the mass media, in art, and in literature." It was time to "uproot cliquishness (*gruppovshchina*)," which was "inflicting harm on the development of Soviet culture."

Ligachev's reception by the editorial staff of *Sovetskaya Kul'tura* had hardly been a warm one, and it was reasonably clear that no meeting of the minds had resulted from his two visits to its offices. In subsequent issues of the newspaper, however, articles and major interviews with what could be called Ligachevites began to appear—for example, an interview with and a capacious article by Bondarev; a piece by Viktor Astaf'yev; and an article by Russian nationalist critic Ivan Vasil'yev.[93] It was clear that Ligachev had flexed his political muscle to some effect.

Cinema: A rollback of sorts also began to occur in the sphere of film, where, as we have seen, the Gorbachevites had initially scored a major triumph. In its July 28, 1987, issue, *Sovetskaya Kul'tura* published an interview with Sergey Bondarchuk, who had recently been elected "artistic leader" of a new collective (*ob'yedineniye*) at Mosfilm studios.[94] The programmatic statement of this collective—which included filmmakers Nikita Mikhalkov and Gleb Panfilov, one of the new secretaries of Klimov's union and thus a defector from the Gorbachevites—assailed "the process of hidden bourgeoisification and commercialization of our cinema, a process that carries the threat of pop and mass culture, wiping out the social and spiritual values that make up the content and meaning of our Soviet way of life . . . ." Bondarchuk attacked those who "use *perestroyka* for their own personal, ambitious goals" and asserted that he personally felt no need to "restructure" himself: "Why should I repudiate everything that I have done?"

On July 11, *Sovetskaya Kul'tura* published a letter from Yevgeniy Surkov, former editor of *Iskusstvo Kino*, who claimed that there were a number of distinguished Soviet filmmakers who had in effect been removed from participation in the union's work. Klimov replied in the August 11 issue of the same paper in the form of an interview given to film critic V. Kichin.[95] Klimov remarked: "The people about whom the author [Surkov] writes have only been deprived of their 'general's' privileges [in the union] . . . . Their participation in the activity of the union depends entirely on them." Reminded by Kichin that several of these individuals participate in the collegium of Goskino, Klimov said that the collegium should be restructured so that there would be no "lifetime" positions in it.

But there were indications that the Klimov juggernaut was meeting with resistance from other quarters as well.



Soviet film director Sergey Bondarchuk pictured at the November 1986 rehearsals for the Bolshoi Theater's production of the Tchaikovsky opera "Mazepa."

—TASS from Sovfoto.

Since the May 1986 filmmakers' congress, he and the members of his secretariat had been attempting to purge the All-Union State Institute of Cinematography (VGIK) in Moscow. According to a colleague of Klimov, Viktor Dyomin, his plan was the following: "In September [1987] all students, old and new, should be sent out for internships. After that, all VGIK instructors should be thrown out, and the premises ought to be thoroughly disinfected. Then new teachers who can teach must be se-

[93]See Yuriy Bondarev, "Truth Is Multifaced . . . ," *Sovetskaya Kul'tura*, July 18, 1987, p. 6; idem, "Criticism—a Category of Truth?" ibid., Aug. 27, 1987, p. 6; Viktor Astaf'yev, "Thank You Eternally" and other sketches, ibid., Aug. 1, 1987; and Ivan Vasil'yev, "It's Bad For Us and Not Good for You," ibid., July 25, 1987, p. 3.

[94]Sergey Bondarchuk, "Ask of Yourself," ibid., July 28, 1987, p. 5.

[95]Yelem Klimov, "A Drama That Must Have a Happy Ending," ibid., Aug. 11, 1987, p. 4.

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lected."[96] The battle for the control of VGIK was recently described by *Moscow News*:

The VGIK students were the first to undertake an analysis of the situation's causes and consequences. They did so at a Komsomol meeting in April 1986. The new Secretariat of the Cinematograhers' Union, led by Yelem Klimov, set up a commission to study the situation at VGIK. The commission worked in the students' full view, which certainly encouraged them to take fresh action. They established a special committee in charge of restructuring the academic process, conducted opinion polls and roundtable discussions, and finally organized an open debate to give everyone an opportunity to criticize, argue, and make suggestions. Passions rose to a high pitch during the hearings. . . .

The account continues:

When the former head Vitaliy Zhdan retired (not at once, and not without a struggle), the conflict entered a new stage. The VGIK management maintained that once the old head retired, perestroyka *was complete, and the status quo would be valid. But the students and some of their professors disagreed . . . . Specifically, they advocated the engagement of top filmmakers with undisputed artistic reputations, the people actually making films. . . . This demand ran into serious resistance on the part of the academic council, which had more rights and better tactical skills than students . . . . There was only one candidate, deputy head Aleksandr Novikov, for the 'election'.*[97]

Terming this development a "profanation of democracy," Klimov managed to get another candidate, the 43-year-old non-party member Sergey Solov'yev, put forward for the post of rector. Solov'yev, however, was then blocked by the VGIK academic council and the Ministry of Education. An impasse had been reached.

The same issue of *Moscow News* which described the VGIK situation carried a statement by the new Goskino chairman, Aleksandr Kamshalov, indicating that the "self-financing" of the film industry being advocated by Klimov and his colleagues was encountering serious obstacles. "*Perestroyka,*" Kamshalov said, "is going on with difficulty in cinematography. We cannot switch over to the self-supporting system. Since last year, we have been a non-profitable industry. In two years' time, we'll try to introduce such a profit-and-loss accountancy system for Mosfilm, particularly for Rolan Bykov's and [Vladimir] Men'shov's workshops . . . ." Clearly, Kamshalov was calling for a less revolutionary pace than that sought by Klimov.

An article entitled "Remarks of a Retrograde," which appeared in *Sovetskaya Kul'tura* in September 1987, suggested that the elitist films being promoted by Klimov and the new leadership of the union were unable to attract a mass audience.[98] By the time of the next filmmakers' congress, when new elections will be conducted, the author Stanislav Govorukhin warned, the Soviet cinema could have lost "half its viewers." He reminded his readers that at the Moscow international film festival in July, Nikita Mikhalkov's film *Dark Eyes* had received a spontaneous ovation from the several thousand people in the hall. A film critic, on the other hand, had commented: "Bad. Hopelessly bad." Such critics, Govorukhin said, believe that it is poor form to praise a film that might have popular appeal. Significantly, there have been attempts in recent months to rehabilitate the film *Lermontov*.[99]

Literature. In literature, the counterattack grew throughout the summer of 1987. It is noteworthy, for example, that the "reactionaries" began to assail those liberal nationalists who were continuing to support the Gorbachev line. In an article appropriately entitled "Revenge," published in late August in *Literaturnaya Rossiya,* Vasiliy Roslyakov attacked Sergey Zalygin, lumping him together with "liberal" activist Andrey Voznesenskiy.[100] And Yuriy Bondarev scored Academician Likhachev on the pages of *Sovetskaya Kul'tura* for advocating a spurious "repentance"; Likhachev hit back in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*.[101]

Writing in *Ogonyok* in August, novelist Anatoliy Pristavkin, a Gorbachev supporter, expressed chagrin at the hard-hitting campaign by his "brothers of the pen." "For what purpose," he asked, "have they been given the great, mighty, etc., Russian language—so that they should settle scores from the rostrum? Write better. Let that be your answer to your enemies . . . ."[102]

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[96]In *Film Comment*, No. 23, June 1987, p. 51.

[97]Boris Berman, "Dramatic Developments at Cinematography Institute," *Moscow News*, No. 20, 1987, p. 11. See also the report on the situation at VGIK in *Iskusstvo Kino*, No. 7, 1987, pp. 21–31.

[98]Stanislav Govorukhin, "Remarks of a Retrograde," *Sovetskaya Kul'tura*, Sept 17, 1987, p. 3. See also Yuriy Yakovlev, "Let a New Hero Come from the Screen," ibid., Oct. 1, 1987, p. 4. Yakovlev cites Ligachev explicitly on the danger of "cliquishness."

[99]On this, see "So, To Whom Is This Useful?" *Nedelya* (Moscow), No. 25, 1987, p. 17. For a defense of the film, see Yuriy Tyurin, "Trustworthiness and Invention," *Nash Sovremennik*, No. 6, 1987, pp. 183–84. For a recent attack, see S. Rassadin, "The Doors Are Slamming," *Iskusstvo Kino*, No. 7, 1987, pp. 10–12.

[100]Vasiliy Roslyakov, "Revenge," *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, Aug. 28, 1987, p. 8.

[101]Bondarev's attack appeared in *Sovetskaya Kul'tura*, Aug. 27, 1987, p. 6; and Likhachev's response, in "From Repentance to Action!" *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Sept. 9, 1987, p. 2.

[102]Anatoliy Pristavkin, "Responsibility," *Ogonyok*, No. 32, 1987, p. 8.

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In early October, two liberal editors of *Novyy Mir*, Anatoliy Strelyanyy and Igor Vinogradov, resigned from the journal's board.[103] Ligachev's campaign against "cliquishness" appeared to be having an effect on that journal. The No. 8, 1987, issue, published poems by the outspoken anti-Gorbachevite Stanislav Kunyayev. These poems might simply have been in the "pipeline," but it is also possible that their publication was a signal of changes in editorial policy. In 1988, *Novyy Mir* plans to publish works by such conservative writers as Viktor Astaf'yev, Vasiliy Belov, and Valentin Rasputin.

Dialectics of Culture

Gorbachev and Yakovlev were, of course, not unaware of the counteroffensive against their supporters. Their views on the controverted issues were aired on the pages of *Sovetskaya Kul'tura*.[104] It is impossible to miss a certain defensiveness in Gorbachev's remarks. *Perestroyka*, he affirmed, "is not only negation, and if it is negation, it is dialectical negation." He then proceeded to address points that he thought might be in the minds of his listeners: ". . . will this new stage not turn out to be a negation of everything that has preceded it, and have we not forgotten our history? And is there not in the present politics an undervaluing of everything that previous generations have done?" To think thus, he declared, would be a serious mistake. Gorbachev then reminded his audience that they were all in the same boat, all on the same side of the barricades. He referred directly to the March 1987 meeting of the secretariat of the RSFSR Writers' Union which had launched the counterattack against his followers: ". . . when passions flared up at the session of the directorate of the Russian writers' union, I asked the comrades to pass on the message that we would be very disturbed if suddenly, instead of the consolidation of our creative intelligentsia, there should take place, so to speak, a squabble . . . ." While there had indeed been "extreme acts (*kraynosti*)," they had so far taken place within the framework of "a struggle for socialism."

In response to a statement by chief editor Albert Belyayev, who cautioned against the danger represented by cultural activists "fighting for the originality and purity of national culture," Gorbachev said: "We are a state that unites a unique friendly family of peoples! That is Lenin's testament!"

A similar approach was taken by Aleksandr Yakovlev in his speech, "*Perestroyka* and Morality," delivered in the provincial city of Kaluga and published on July 21 in *Sovetskaya Kul'tura*.[105] As in Gorbachev's speech, there was a defensive tone. He admitted the need for environmental protection and the preservation of historical monuments, and he made clear that he was no defender of "mass culture." But he asked why mass culture has gained a foothold in the Soviet Union and answered that it was because during the period of stagnation (meaning Brezhnev's rule) people ceased attending Soviet theaters and cinemas. Thus, mass culture had to be counteracted with attractive and high-quality Soviet art.

Yakovlev then proceeded to lash out at critics of the Gorbachev cultural line. "A striving for a kind of group revenge," he noted, "at times replaces everything else. The fomenting of 'panic-stricken horror' over the unfamiliar processes taking place in the intellectual sphere does not bespeak a proper sense of social responsibility . . . ." Moreover, added Yakovlev, "there are still more than a few cultural figures who keep a very significant silence concerning the social transformations . . . ."

Nationalism and religio-nationalism constitute the greatest danger to contemporary Soviet society, Yakovlev intimated. Like I. Kryvelev in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, he insisted that one can, indeed must, have morality without religion. He opposed "the clan-like aspirations and ambitions" of individuals who seek to inflame "national exclusiveness" or " 'play' with religious prejudices." Such opponents attempt to "adorn the feudal or bourgeois past . . . to reconcile the democratic and the reactionary . . . in the pre-socialist history of this or that people." In so doing, he warned pointedly, "they put into question the conformity to natural law of the social revolution." Lenin, he reminded his listeners, firmly opposed all nationalisms.

Regarding the preservation of historical monuments, Yakovlev said that the Soviet Union has been doing much more than the tsars ever did. However, he warned that preservation efforts must "have nothing in common with the poeticization of what is reactionary in the history and culture of the past." Citing Gorbachev, he declared:

[103]See the report in *Russkaya Mysl'*, Oct. 9, 1987, p. 7. If this report is correct, it could mean that the two editors resigned over the journal's decision to publish works by such outspoken conservatives as Stanislav Kunyayev and Vasiliy Belov.

[104]See fn. 1 for the Gorbachev reference. The July 2, 1987, issue of *Pravda* reported that Gorbachev had donated 50,000 rubles of his royalities from books published abroad to the Soviet Cultural Foundation to build a monument in Smolensk to Vasiliy Tyorkin and the poet who wrote of him, Aleksandr Tvardovskiy. Gorbachev thus appeared to identify with the liberal Marxism of Tvardovskiy.

[105]Aleksandr Yakovlev, "*Perestroyka* and Morality," *Sovetskaya Kul'tura*, July 21, 1987, p. 2. Interestingly, while in the Kaluga area, Yakovlev visited Optina Pustyn Monastery, where restoration work is being conducted. For a comprehensive statement of Yakovlev's views on subjects ranging from philosophy to culture to religion, see his address of April 17, 1987, entitled "The Achievement of a Qualitatively New Condition of Soviet Society and Social Sciences," in *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR* (Moscow), No. 6, 1987, pp. 51–80.

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Soviet poet Yevgeniy Yevtushenko in Moscow, November 1985.

—Inge Morath/Magnum.

"We are all born of October."

On August 7, Gorbachev disappeared from public view for 52 days.[106] Whatever the reasons for this prolonged vacation, his opponents made use of his absence. On September 11, KGB Chairman Viktor Chebrikov's speech on the occasion of the 110th anniversary of the birth of Feliks Dzerzhinskiy, founder of the Cheka, was published in *Pravda*.[107] Chebrikov underlined that Dzerzhinskiy had "decisively dissociated himself from the tactics of 'left communists,' who threatened the party with a schism." The Trotskyites were several times cited as a particularly insidious enemy. Turning to the cultural sphere, Chebrikov said: "The works of writers, cinematographers, artists, musicians, theater people, in a word, of all creative workers possess an enormous power to affect people emotionally. Understanding this, our opponents try to push individual representatives of the artistic intelligentsia into a position of fault-finding, demagogy, and nihilism, into blackening several stages in the historical development of our society, into repudiating the chief purpose of Soviet culture—the spiritual elevation of human labor." Chebrikov thus aligned himself unambiguously with the "reactionaries" on questions of culture.

Later in September, at a meeting with the heads of the Soviet mass media and propaganda organs, Ligachev condemned recent criticisms of Soviet leaders, including Stalin, and singled out two publications, *Moskovskiye Novosti* and *Ogonyok*, for obloquy. Ligachev's ire, according to *The New York Times*, was particularly aroused by the publication in *Moskovskiye Novosti* of an obituary for émigré writer Viktor Nekrasov, who had been expelled from the CPSU in 1972.[108] The obituary was signed by Grigoriy Baklanov, Bulat Okudzhava, Vyacheslav Kondrat'yev, and Vladimir Lakshin. *The New York Times* wrote: "Mr. Ligachev reprimanded the editor of *Moscow News*, Yegor Yakovlev, for printing the obituary, contending that Mr. Yakovlev had been advised by the party not to publish the notice, witnesses

[106]Philip Taubman, "After 52 Days and Many Rumors, Gorbachev Reappears at Kremlin," *The New York Times*, Sept. 30, 1987.

[107]Viktor Chebrikov, "A Great Example of Service to Revolutionary Ideals," *Pravda*, Sept. 11, 1987, p. 3.

[108]For Ligachev's remarks, see "Conference in the Central Committee of the CPSU," *Pravda*, Sept. 18, 1987, and "No. 2 Soviet Official Puts in a Bad Word Against Glasnost," *The New York Times*, Sept. 24, 1987.

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said. Mr. Yakovlev rose to his feet to challenge Mr. Ligachev's assertion and defend publication of the tribute, the witnesses said." Ligachev's blistering anger comes through even in the presumably toned-down version of his remarks published in *Pravda*: ". . . several editorial boards willingly publish that which accords with their own point of view. But that which is not in accord is either not published or is accompanied by a commentary refuting it. This results in a one-sided democracy which must be gotten rid of." It stands to reason that Yegor Yakovlev would not have openly challenged the second party secretary unless he believed that he enjoyed the firm support of General Secretary Gorbachev.

Despite the fact that Gorbachev's supporters continued to struggle hard on behalf of his policies, Ligachev's forces were able to make important gains during the fall and early winter of 1987. Quite significant was the election of Aleksandr Mikhaylov rather than Yevtushenko to succeed Kuznetsov as head of the powerful 2,000-member Moscow Writers' Organization.[109] Yevtushenko was, of course, a fervent Gorbachev supporter, while Mikhaylov was the candidate of the conservatives.[110] In his campaign speech, Yevtushenko said that he advocated "democratic *perestroyka* in the structure of the leadership" and that, if elected, he would propose the formation of a "collective leadership" embodied in a new bureau of the secretariat consisting of four first secretaries. He also promised that he would propose the names of Y. Chernichenko, M. Shatrov, and A. Pristavkin (all of them noted Gorbachevites) as candidates for the new bureau. Mikhaylov, by contrast, stressed that his policies would be based on "reality." One of the realities that he would take into consideration would be "everything that has been done by the present secretariat, headed by F. Kuznetsov." In the election, Mikhaylov received 93 votes to Yevtushenko's 55. A third candidate, V. Shugayev, received 15 votes.

The delivery of a cautious and fairly bland speech by Gorbachev on November 2 to mark the 70th anniversary of Soviet power—a speech that some of his supporters had predicted would be a new "secret speech"—was another indication of the growing strength of the conservatives. The removal of outspoken Moscow party leader Boris Yel'tsin on November 11 from his position and the manner in which he was criticized and repudiated by Soviet leaders, including Gorbachev, was another indication.[111] In early December, Ligachev revealed to Michel Tatu of *Le Monde* that he, and not Gorbachev, was chairing the meetings of the party Secretariat.[112]

To sum up, as of December 1987, Soviet writers, filmmakers, and intellectuals appeared to be separated into two warring camps, one looking to the General Secretary, the other to the "Second" Party Secretary, for guidance and support. Thanks to the policy of *glasnost'*, the contours and personae of the struggle seemed reasonably clear. What is not clear is what turns the struggle will take in the future.

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[109]See *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Oct. 21, 1987, pp. 1–2.

[110]Vyacheslav Gorbachev, deputy editor of *Molodaya Gvardiya* and an outspoken conservative, numbers Mikhaylov among the angels in his article, "*Perestroyka* and Fabrication," loc. cit. In fact, Mikhaylov is classed together with poet Stanislav Kunyayev and novelist Petr Proskurin. High praise indeed! Those singled out for attack, on the other hand, include Vitaliy Korotich, Yegor Yakovlev, Vladimir Karpov, and several Soviet rock groups. Ligachev's name, significantly, is cited before that of Gorbachev.

[111]Gorbachev's speech appeared in the November 3, 1987, *Pravda*. The announcement of Yel'tsin's removal was published on November 13th in *Pravda*. For an informative account of the reasons behind Yel'tsin's downfall, see Michel Tatu, "The Opponents of the Reforms Score a Point in Moscow," *Le Monde* (Paris), Nov. 13, 1987. See also Tatu's recent book *Gorbatchev*, Paris, Le Centurion, 1987, pp. 165–66. 243–49.

[112]*Le Monde*, Dec. 4, 1987, p. 1.

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Polish Trade Unions "Normalized"

Jerzy M. Kolankiewicz

Wojciech Jaruzelski's regime has failed to diminish to any significant degree society's alienation from government, despite far-reaching local government electoral reform proposals,[1] concessions on the autonomous organization of associations,[2] and the publication of the semi-autonomous journal *Res Publica*, as well as other concessions of a distinctly political character. Indeed, the announcement of a referendum[3] on the latest economic reforms and concomitant political democratization decided upon at the October 1987 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) can be seen as a desperate attempt by the government to involve in the reform process a society that has passively rejected the entire gamut of councils, commissions, and consultations proffered as replacements for the popularly created Solidarity.

Given the growing apathy, frustration, and cynicism of the Poles,[4] a decline in real income,[5] and the abysmal state of working, health, housing, and environmental conditions, the government could hardly have found a worse time to introduce new anti-subsidy economic measures that promised soaring increases of 50 to 200 percent in the costs of food, fuel, transportation, child care, and other essentials and whose pay-off perspective is measured in terms of years. Uncertainty over the outcome of economic reform can only compound society's already profound distrust of the government. Ironically, it is precisely this kind of social and political environment that may spawn a new role for Polish trade unions. For, if the defense of already eroded living standards entails *opposing* the anti-subsidy market-type reforms promoted by the government, then the government may find union-sponsored opposition, even strike action, preferable to uncontrolled reaction and confrontation in the streets.

Will the Polish trade unions have the legitimacy and capability to perform this role of tension-management? Or for that matter, will they play any role in influencing the progress of government-sponsored economic reform? Some tentative answers can be put forward after an examination of the how and why of the present conditions of union existence.

Rebuilding Trade Unions

Trade unions have been a key ingredient in Jaruzelski's attempts to demonstrate his regime's continuity with the violently foreshortened Solidarity era.[6] It is no accident that until quite recently the regime regularly reported on the "implementation" of the Gdańsk-Szczecin-Jastrzębie Accords of 1980 and related demands. Not till late 1986, did the government feel free to suggest that those agreements belonged to another era.[7]

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[1]M. Urbaniak, "New-Style Elections," *Odrodzenie* (Warsaw), Sept. 19, 1987.

[2]For a discussion of these proposed associations, see E. Szemplinska, "A Bit Faster Up That Hill," *Tygodnik Powszechny* (Kraków), July 6, 1987.

[3]J. Tagliabue, "Poland, Planning Many Changes, Calls a Referendum on the Economy," *The New York Times*, Oct. 9, 1987.

[4]This is now documented even by traditionally "conservative" sources. See "Voices for Reform," *Rzeczywistość* (Warsaw), Sept. 6, 1987.

[5]*Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), Sept. 5-6, 1987. The argument that price increases are basic to economic reform is now suspect due to the declining market availability of goods, despite significant price increases and plan forecasts for an increased market share. See *Metalowiec* (Katowice), Sept. 13, 1987.

[6]For an extended version of this argument, see the author's "The Politics of Permissible Pluralism," *Eastern European Politics and Societies* (Berkeley, CA), Vol. 1, No. 4, Winter 1988.

[7]See S. Koziaczy in *Trybuna Ludu*, Nov. 22-23, 1986. Government spokesman Jerzy Urban referred to them as "facts of history" (*Rzeczpospolita* [Warsaw], June 22, 1987). His comments came after Pope John Paul II had questioned the extent of the regime's efforts to implement the accords, and after trade union leaders had begun to speak of the need for "new" accords.

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Whereas de facto membership in Solidarity had been outlawed (and the right to employment severely infringed) much earlier under martial law, almost from the onset of martial law a debate on the future structures of trade unions was initiated. The Social Consultative Commission of the Council of State, aided by the Committee for Trade Unions of the Council of Ministers, was casting around as early as February 1982 for a suitable alternative to (1) the highly centralized pre-1980 branch-union model and (2) the "regionally"-based Solidarity model. The regime felt it necessary to distance itself symbolically from both models. Negotiations on the structure of the unions seemed to exclude the Central Council of Trade Unions (CRZZ) model, because of its discredited history leading to what was officially accepted as "legitimate working class protest." Likewise, the experience of trade union pluralism in the Solidarity era and the expectations associated with the grassroots creation of unions also prompted the Jaruzelski regime to move away from this model.

The re-emergence of all the pre-December 1981 union structures, suitably chastened, legally restricted, shorn of their old leadership, and committed to the "leading role of the party," was still an option for the regime in early 1982. Of course, the territorial basis of Solidarity with its defining "Solidarity strike" propensity would have to be delegalized, preferably by forcing it into a branch structure (which, it might be noted, was already emerging during 1981). A regional nerve center, similar to the one located in Gdańsk during the Solidarity period—which had constituted an independent base of aggregated power—was not envisaged.

In retrospect, however, the third option, cautiously organizing highly fragmented, even atomized, trade

Solidarity leader Lech Wałęsa (right) and Polish Deputy Premier Mieczysław Jagielski signing the Gdańsk accord at the Lenin Shipyard in August 1980.

—Alain Dejean/SYGMA.

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unions at the 25,000 or so workplaces—ones based on occupation, trade, profession, or sector—was always the most likely. Such a solution would appear even-handed (a favorite regime ploy) by eliminating all pre-existing structures, and thus creating the appearance of a fresh start. Most important, it would impart a flavor of pluralism, if only through its highly heterogeneous and dispersed form. Moreover, by allowing the new unions the prefix NSZZ (that is, "independent and self-managing trade union;"[8] the notion of "class" union was added only later), the authorities made a conscious effort to preserve a sense of continuity with the Solidarity era. The 1982 law on trade unions itself was presented as emerging directly out of the demands and discussions of 1980–81, but with the critical difference that the initiator of those discussions, Solidarity, was now underground and illegal.

The major argument advanced by the regime for winding up all pre-existing trade union activity in the October 8, 1982, Law on Trade Unions,[9] was that it had inherited an over-pluralized, self-destructively competitive trade union movement. During the period August 1980 to December 1981, alongside NSZZ Solidarność there had been some 81 autonomous unions and 24 branch unions, both groups organized under their own central union authority. These two central union authorities in addition to Solidarity's Coordinating Commission had sought to bring coherence to often conflicting sectoral, regional, and occupational interests. Moreover, two rural-based unions, particularly in a context of food shortages, had added to what the regime sought to present as pluralistic pandemonium. Nonetheless, with an eye to Convention No. 87 of the International Labour Organization (ILO), the union-builders felt compelled to insist that the limitation of one union per factory was only a temporary transitional measure, and that the emerging new union structure would have its specific form of pluralism.[10] Thus, for example, to distance itself from the pre-1980 CRZZ model of a highly centralized, bureaucratic, branch union hierarchy, authorities stressed the voluntary nature of interfactory associations; the wait-and-see clause giving power to the Council of State to permit such structures sought to suggest a degree of reticence on the part of the regime rather than the *a priori* imposition of a new order.

The construction of the new "independent and self-managing" unions began de facto in October 1982, after the term of the interim and ad hoc party-based "social commissions" (*komisje socialne*) had expired. Concern was immediately expressed that management was recreating the unions to suit its own purposes, indicating who would sit on the initiatory groups, draw up the statute as spelled out in the legislation, and set the tone of the new unionism.

Fears that the Solidarity opposition would or could conceivably appropriate the new unions were often voiced, but given society's antipathy to these new unions as usurpatory entities, as well as the existence of legal constraints, this was not a realistic concern. In fact, the regime's emphasis upon the quantitative aspects of recruitment as a measure of the new organization's legitimacy was sufficient to discourage the opposition from joining the new unions for whatever purpose. In any case, it is obvious that the regime's real aim at this point was to install core union cadres *prior* to mass recruitment and to elaborate new rules of engagement with management, the simultaneously emerging self-management employee councils, and the party.

The 1982 law, with its accompanying legislation and the addenda enacted in 1985,[11] is now generally familiar. It gave the unions the right to represent their *members* (later expanded to include *all employees*) in the workplace. Much was initially made of the defense of *interests* and *rights*, both collective and individual,[12] but later formulations placed more emphasis on creating the conditions for fulfilling tasks, introducing technological innovation, and raising productivity.

Membership

The new unions set ambitious membership goals: first, 50 percent of the employed workforce; then the nearly 10 million figure achieved by Solidarity; and, ultimately, the 14 million or so members of the pre-1980 trade unions. It has barely reached the first target.

By mid 1983, union membership was at roughly 3 million. Of these, two thirds were non-party.[13] The remaining 1 million (that is, half the members of the shrunken communist party) had been deployed in setting up the new unions. As was to be expected, in the Gdańsk, Wrocław, and Łódz regions, less than 25 percent of workers

[8]"Resolution of the Council of State of October 12, 1982, On the Principles and the Method of Creating Union Organizations in Workplaces," *Dziennik Ustaw* (Warsaw), No. 34, 1982, Item 222, Art. 3.

[9]"Decree of October 8, 1982, On Trade Unions," ibid., No. 32, 1982, Item 216.

[10]J. Brol and G. Bieniek, "The New Decree on Trade Unions in Light of International Conventions," *Nowe Drogi* (Warsaw), No. 3, 1983.

[11]"Decree of July 24, 1985, Regarding Changes in the Decree On Trade Unions and Several Other Decrees Defining the Activity of Trade Unions," *Dziennik Ustaw*, No. 35, 1985, Item 162, para. 22(B).

[12]*Rzeczpospolita*, May 13, 1987.

[13]J. Ruszczyc, "The Union Movement: Something to Build On," *Trybuna Ludu*, July 18, 1983.

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had joined (with only 15 percent in Gdańsk), while the workers in the higher-education and health sectors were displaying an opposition to unionization that continues to this day.[14]

There was little incentive for non-union employees to join, since the 1982 law already guaranteed that non-members would not be discriminated against. However, as questions arose over who would enjoy the use of trade union sanatoria and vacation facilities, (a major incentive to create a union before the end of 1983, at which time such factory-level union property would otherwise be forfeited),[15] have opportunities for foreign travel, get preferential access to housing granted by the 1985 addenda to the union legislation, and generally benefit from the expanding influence of the new bodies over other funds, rewards, and bonuses, the pressure on non-union members to join became greater. Such inducements should not, however, be overestimated, since many forms of social insurance in workplaces are not managed by the unions.

As late as 1985, some enterprises still could not enlist the 30 members needed to initiate a union. A new law adopted that year lowered the required number to 10 and permitted the creation of interfactory locals. The position of trade union functionaries in the workplace was also considerably strengthened under this legislation, as though to reinforce the then prevalent media stereotype of embattled activists (or, more likely, because the chance that undesirable trade union leaders would emerge had by this time disappeared).

Finally, the trade union legislation provided that pensioners could join the trade union at their former place of employment. This helped swell union rolls, since by conservative estimates, retirees came to number one out of seven members. It also helps to explain why the pension issue has been such a vital concern of the new unions.

By the beginning of 1986, the unions claimed a total of 5,785,735 members, 10 percent of whom were pensioners, in 25,387 workplace organizations. However, 7.2 percent of workplaces—admittedly small ones—still refused to introduce the new unions; 4,608 (8.3 percent) of the membership still did not belong to an interfactory organization (federation); and 10 of the 132 national units still preferred to remain outside of the National Confederation of Trade Unions (OPZZ), even though 76 percent of PUWP members were by then union members.[16]

Structure

The manner in which the new unions emerged has left a clear imprint upon their organizational make-up, behavior, and general credibility. Since a major incentive for the formation of unions was the retention of union property, the principle "to the quickest, the prize" came to apply. The fact that the law allowed as few as 10 workers to found and register a union local resulted in a strange conglomeration of small unions joined together in even stranger "federations." The rule was that all unions in a federation had to have the same employer, for example, the same ministry. Thus, several federations could and did emerge under a single branch ministry.[17] Large occupational groups such as the miners, metal-workers, and steel workers also quickly formed federations and sought to address such concerns as virtual forced labor for mine-workers (with obligatory Saturday and Sunday work envisaged until the end of 1985). On the other hand, the Union of Polish Teachers (ZNP), which had traditions stretching back to the 19th century and had maintained its separate identity during the Solidarity period, strongly resented being abolished by the 1982 legislation and very quickly reestablished itself as one of three national unions, with a membership of over 1.5 million. For others (about 30 percent), regional umbrella organizations in the form of the WPZZ (Voivodship Trade Union Confederation) served the same function of creating lateral ties, but the close resemblance of these bodies to the pre-1980 WRZZ (Voivodship Trade Union Council)—symbolic of everything that was wrong with the old unions—caused concern about their ultimate destiny.[18] Suspicions grew that the "old" was coming back.

Most unions adopted a federated structure, which provided an independent legal identity to each and every factory organization, each with its own statutes, rather than to a national union organization directly overseeing its individual *members* (who in turn were represented locally only by factory councils).[19] A fierce sense of independence from a central organization, if not necessarily from management, appears to have been an

[14]Ibid., Oct. 6, 1983.

[15]Ibid., July 18, 1983.

[16]F. Ciemny, "Calculations and Tendencies," *Związkowiec* (Warsaw), June 29, 1986. By March 1986, union membership constituted 50.3 percent of all employed (out of a possible 10,368,000). By mid-June 1987, the total figure of union members was 6.8 million, including pensioners, in 26,000 organizations. An article in *Trybuna Ludu*, July 3, 1987, cites the following figures for 1987 as quoted by Alfred Miodowicz (OPZZ chairman): over 7 million union members were organized in 26,000 workplace trade unions, of which 4,000 continued to exist outside the OPZZ.

[17]T. M. Kozlowski, "The Law of Facades," *Tygodnik Demokratyczny* (Warsaw), Nov. 23, 1986. The Council of State permitted many "federations" to function prior to the date targeted by the Trade Union Law, that is, the end of 1983. Some began functioning as early as July 1983.

[18]Unions could also set up temporary territorial links with unions in other sectors. These institutions would not possess union status i.e., protection under the law. *Rzeczpospolita*, Mar. 31, 1987.

[19]Ibid., Mar. 27, 1987.

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outgrowth of the reaction against pre-1980 centralization. This sense of independence continues to be maintained by the unions today, something the regime must find more than a little irksome.

As the federations grew and began to gain union affiliates (rather than members), moves were also afoot to put a "hat" over these federations and the entire union body, of which some 30 percent of the members were still outside of any federation or in federations that clung to their atomized independence. By October of 1984, the idea of an All-Polish Meeting of Trade Unions proposed at the Szombierki coal mine in Bytom had been accepted by 59 of the 118 federations, representing 70 percent of the union membership. The proposed representative body, the All-Polish (or National) Confederation of Trade Unions was to (1) oversee the realization of the Gdańsk-Szczecin-Jastrzębie Accords; (2) review the law on trade unions and resolve the outstanding question of trade union pluralism (that is, rule out pluralism as an option); (3) decide on principles for the negotiation of one-year and five-year plans with the government; and (4) take over remaining national-level union property valued at over 20 billion zlotys, and develop a sound financial basis for the unions.[20]

There appeared to be unseemly haste in the creation of such a national body, given that its grass-roots constituent elements were far from established. A "colossus with feet of clay" was the assessment of some.[21] It should be stressed that only 25 percent of the respondents to a survey conducted by the Center for Public Opinion Research (CBOS) in 1984 expressed clear support for the new unions, while 10 percent were decidedly opposed, and 40 percent found them to be irrelevant.[22] Hence, these maneuvers often took place within a context of worker indifference toward unions in which every new member, even from the party, had to be vigorously fought for.

Despite claims that "we do not ask where you came from," that is, whether from the former branch or Solidarity unions,[23] previous union affiliation and current union membership were recognized as being major determinants of political attitudes and behavior, both of which had polarized considerably since martial law.[24] The polarization was further aggravated by the ongoing division of property among the new federations, with the largest taking the spoils, a fact that placed even more pressure on the rank-and-file to join.[25]

Trade Unionism vs. Self-Management

As trade unions re-established themselves and expanded in the workplace, they soon came into conflict with self-management organs. In the post–martial law period, the unions sought short-term victories for employees/members in the wages area, while the latter found themselves struggling in the murkier waters of economic reform with few directly observable achievements.[26]

Self-management, which was suspended during martial law, was partially reinstated by the suspension of martial law itself and further unfettered by the legislation of the transitional period. This allowed it to function in 5,230 enterprises (out of 6,580), although in 1,371 of these, the critical authority to nominate and dismiss the directors was denied.[27] The power to suspend self-management, should it result in decisions deemed unlawful or contrary to fundamental societal interests, was accorded to the appropriate ministry or local people's council, with the right of appeal to a Commission for Labor Self-Management presided over by a renascent Stanisław Kania.[28]

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[20]Danuta Frey, "Recording History" *Prawo i Zycie* (Warsaw), No. 42, 1984.

[21]D. Sielska, "Emerging from the Basics," *Życie Warszawy*, May 2, 1984.

[22]S. Gabrielski, "The View After the Storm," *Gazeta Pomorska* (Bydgoszcz), July 25, 1984. A study by the Supreme Chamber of Control (NIK) found that, in the opinion of unionists, trade union declarations were ignored by 70 percent of factory administrations monitored.

[23]For example, Alfred Miodowicz, the OPZZ head was previously in Solidarity, and became involved in the new unions at a late date.

[24]*Raport z badania. Polacy '84* (Research Report: Poles '84), Warsaw, University of Warsaw, 1986. Since 1984, the so-called silent minority (with no clear opinion) within the official unions has grown considerably (from 16.4 percent to 25.2 percent of the total membership); those solidly for the regime have grown more slowly (from 40.1 percent to 42.8 percent). What is disappearing is the "center," which had previously apportioned blame for the existence of martial law between both the government and Solidarity, but which largely accepted the need for the imposition of martial law (from 32.4 percent to 21.7 percent). Growing apathy, with concomitant polarization at the extremes, does not augur well for national reconciliation. See K. Jasiewicz, "Poles '84 Looked at a Year and a Half Later," *Raport wstepny z badania "Opinie o polaków-Jesień '85"* (Introductory Report to the Study "The Opinions of Poles—Fall '85"), Warsaw, 1986, appendix to main report.

[25]*Głos Robotniczy* (Katowice), Oct. 9, 1984.

[26]A. Kaniewski, "Disorder, Self-management, and Trade Unions," *Słowo Powszechne* (Warsaw), Dec. 16-18, 1983.

[27]"The Decree on the State of War," *Dziennik Ustaw*, No. 29, 1981, Item. 154, Art. 16, suspended employee self-management. Legislation that suspended martial law at the end of 1982 permitted some revival of self-management. "Directives of the Council of Ministers Issued On December 27, 1982, On the Matter of Lifting Some Restrictive Measures From the Period of Martial Law," ibid., No. 2, 1983, Item 11, para. 3(1). The current stage of reform, referred to as the "second stage," proposes to reduce further the number of key enterprises to 400 (from the original number of 1,371).

[28]"Decree On the Special Legal Regulations in Effect During the Socio-Economic Crisis and on Changes in Some Decrees," ibid., No. 39, 1983, Item 176, Art. 9 (2); also "Decree of the Council of State of October 6, 1983, On the Creation of a Workers' Self-Management Commission," *Rzeczpospolita*, Oct. 8-9, 1983. Such powers of distribution were accorded the trade unions in 1963 and rescinded in 1965. It should be stressed that, by the end of 1985, only one employee council had been abolished. I. Dryll, "Toward Normalcy," *Życie Gospodarcze* (Warsaw), Mar. 23, 1986.

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Stanisław Kania, former First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party and currently Chairman of the Workers' Self-Management Commission.

—Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos.

Self-management rights were internally differentiated to a considerable degree. As mentioned above, 1,371 out of the total 6,580 enterprises did not have the key right to appoint their own directors. (This number was considerably larger than the 200 or so that had been envisaged by Solidarity negotiators when the legislation was drawn up in 1981.) Furthermore, enterprises exempted from the self-management laws[29] (for example, banks, railroads, post offices, the Polish airline "LOT," and industrial enterprises partially or totally involved in defense projects or those operating fully or partly abroad[30]) fell into four categories: those with no self-management rights, those with some specific rights; those with broader-ranging rights; and those with nearly full rights. The status of their self-management rights depended on specific laws and agreements negotiated between the government and the individual enterprises. For example, after a spectacular confrontation with the government over the issue of directorial appointments just prior to the 9th Extraordinary Congress of the PUWP in July 1981, the "LOT" airline had won the right to appoint its own directors.[31]

Of course, the power of self-management bodies to appoint directors was more often than not ignored by superior organs, with the overt support of the judiciary on appeal, as in the case of the 2,000 directorial appointments made during martial law without the required competition (*konkurs*). That this was done primarily during the period of martial law and immediately afterwards, when self-management was either suspended or had not been fully initiated, was another example of the cynical exploitation of the martial-law umbrella to sack pro-Solidarity management. Competitive selection of directors was actually rooted in the law on enterprises, which unlike self-management per se, had not been suspended during martial law, but this point was ignored by the regime despite its ostensible watchword of "legality (*praworządność*)."[32]

Subsequent laws on "mixed enterprises"[33] and on partnerships with foreign capital[34] severely circumscribed the rights of self-management vis-à-vis the management, placing power in the hands of "partners" or the supervisory council, on which the employee council *may* have one representative. Since the laws are specifically applicable to cooperative ventures with CEMA countries, the legislation rules out the possibility of any unwanted self-management interference, as joint ventures are bound to adopt the industrial relations system of the country in which they are located. Some commentators have guardedly pointed to the embarrassing possibility of no employee representation in an enterprise formed by a partnership between two socialist countries both of which are ostensibly committed to self-management. In characteristically disingenuous fashion, authorities have sought to explain the absence of an employee voice in such partnerships by appealing to

[29]"Decree of September 25, 1981, on State Enterprises," *Dziennik Ustaw*, No. 24, 1981, Item 122, Arts. 5 and 6.

[30]The qualification that enterprises operating fully or partly abroad were exempted from self-managing laws became important again with the advent of joint enterprises with Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) partners, the USSR in particular, as well as with the burgeoning cooperation agreements leading to joint ventures with Soviet enterprises in the wake of the so-called Year 2000 accord, signed in 1984. See, "Long-Term Program for the Development of Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation between the USSR and Poland up to the Year 2000," signed by Konstantin Chernenko and Wojciech Jaruzelski on May 4, 1984, in *Pravda* (Moscow) and *Izvestiya* (Moscow), May 7, 1984, translated in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH), June 6, 1984, pp. 14-16.

[31]M. Błazejczyk, *Samorząd załogi przedsiębiorstwa* (Self-Management of Enterprise Personnel), Warsaw, Instytut Wydawniczy Związków Zawodowych, 1985, p. 37.

[32]Z. Niedbała,"Choosing Candidates for the Position of Director On the Basis of Competition," *Państwo i Prawo* (Warsaw), No. 6, 1986, pp. 87–88.

[33]"Decree of July 10, 1985, on Mixed Enterprises," *Dziennik Ustaw*, No. 32, 1985, Item 142, Art. 16 (3) and Section 4.

[34]"Decree of April 23, 1986, on Partnerships With Foreign Capital," ibid., No. 17, 1986, Item 88. For a discussion of the problems involved, see A. Burzyński, "Decree on Partnerships With Foreign Capital—the Basic Premises of the Regulations," *Przegląd Ustawodawstwa Gospodarczego* (Warsaw), November 1986.

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the Polish trade code of 1934, which was formulated in and pertained to totally different economic and political circumstances![35]

The most telling evidence, however, of the circumspection with which the authorities have had to treat self-management was the ultimately abortive attempt of the Planning Commission and Council of Ministers in November 1986 to introduce a packet of 17 changes to 11 laws without prior discussion—as an allegedly necessary precondition for the fulfillment of the 1986–1990 five-year plan. Opponents of this legislative package were particularly concerned by its ad hoc changes in the laws on self-management, enterprises, and local government. In particular, the authority it proposed to give management to override decisions of the employee council if these threatened the bankruptcy of the enterprise was rightly seen as being too open to abuse and as giving too broad a scope to the already ingrained presumption of "infallibility" on the part of managers and ministries.[36] Similarly, the attempt to strengthen the position of the enterprise directors (in this package and in the proposed law on the status of directors) was seen as a de facto return of power to the central ministries.[37] Management authority, the opponents claimed, should be underwritten by the genuine independence of self-management bodies, not by regulations.

The suspect intentions of the Planning Commission, the bête noire of the reformers, were most evident in the matter of granting ministries the power to divide and merge state enterprises, even if this meant overriding self-management prerogatives. Given the tendency to create larger, monopolistic entities, controlled from the center, opponents of the legislation outside the Sejm were justified in viewing this as a defensive stratagem on the part of the directive-distributive apparatus, by now supremely adept at manipulating the rhetoric of reform for its own ends.

Fierce opposition to tinkering with the "sacred" texts of self-management was expressed at the sixth meeting of the All-Polish Council of Representatives of Employees' Self-Management at the end of October 1986. This reaction surprised everyone and impelled Kania to invoke the Soviet self-management experience as a guarantee of the permanence of self-management in Poland in order to allay suspicions about the regime's intentions of abolishing this form of worker representation.[38] Demands for a second, "self-management" chamber in the Sejm and the provincial people's councils, as well as for an opportunity for regular consultations above the factory level, indicated that if, as was generally accepted, only some 15 percent of the self-management apparatus was genuinely active, even this was enough to bring the bureaucracy to heel.

Interestingly, the representatives at the October 1986 meeting were the third cohort of self-management activists elected since 1981 and generally were thought not to be the firebrands their predecessors had been. Of these, 37 to 55 percent (depending on their position in the self-management hierarchy) are PUWP members. Arguably, a new form of self-management interest articulation, rooted only partly in Solidarity, is taking shape. It indicates that, while other means for circumventing self-management prerogatives exist, such as the creation of larger, multi-enterprise units that have no guaranteed worker representation and power—for example, the "gwarectwo" in mining[39] or the "kombinat" in the steel, electronic, and machine industries[40]—any overt tampering with the fundamental legacy of the 1980–81 economic reform is likely to meet with opposition, be it institutional or more directly confrontational.

Employee councils are well aware of the limitations placed upon them by the center (the ministries, the Planning Commission, etc.), and they keep a watchful eye for any outward signs of new "internal" reforms that might lead to further limitations. Recently, attempts to equate the Soviet-style work collectives or brigades (actively promoted by Soviet workers' delegations visiting Poland)[41] with the principle of enterprise self-management have been curtly dismissed by economists, managers, and self-management activists alike. Independent work groups are clearly not equated with autonomous enterprises. The attempt by the regime to push self-management downward into the work brigades or upward into the interfactory organizations

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[35]Krystyna Pawlowicz, "Joint Polish-Soviet Ventures," *Życie Gospodarcze*, May 17, 1987.

[36]M. Kowalska, "The Instruments Should Be Modified, Not the Decrees," ibid., Nov. 30, 1986.

[37]J. Muziel, "Between Japan and Bangladesh," *Zarządzenie* (Warsaw), December 1986. For a detailed critique, see M. Dąbrowski, "Is There a Reversal?" *Tygodnik Robotniczy* (Warsaw), Oct. 28, 1986.

[38]*Trybuna Ludu*, Oct. 31-Nov. 2, 1986.

[39]C. Piotrowski, "Question for the Minister," *Rzeczpospolita*, Aug. 6, 1984.

[40]An important external referent for the creation of multi-enterprise structures can be seen in the cooperation agreements signed between Soviet associations and their equivalents in Poland. For example, the Polish coal-mining machine enterprises (*gwarectwa*) Polmag and Emag signed an agreement with their Soviet counterparts Soyuzuglemash and Soyuzugleavtomat on March 27, 1987. According to the reforms, such entities should not be normally set up, since they create monopolies and are not responsive to the market. See *Trybuna Ludu*, Mar. 28-29, 1987.

[41]"The Brigades Promote Economic Acceleration," ibid., Nov. 28, 1986, gives an account of just such a fraternal visit. See also "For or Against Self-Management?" *Tygodnik Robotniczy*, Feb. 15, 1987.

Enterprises that signed direct cooperation agreements with the USSR included clauses in these agreements about sharing the experience of Soviet work brigades. This was included in addition to exchanges of cadres, sharing of holiday facilities, cultural interchange, and other broad-ranging exercises in "getting to know" one another. J. Pawlowski, "The Brigade Systems of Work and Wages," *Rzeczpospolita*, Oct. 8, 1984.

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—and thereby emasculate it—is an indication of self-management's inconvenience to politician, planner, and policeman alike. The fact that the most outspoken activists find themselves either removed through such roundabout means as the *attestacja* (the organizational review under way in Poland since 1986), or victimized after leaving the protection of an elected post and returning to the workplace, has now been brought out into the open.[42]

Given the development of an overlap between self-management's *decision-making* rights and its statutory obligations to *consult* with the unions,[43] trade-union-versus-self-management conflicts within the workplace were inevitable. If, as can be argued, underlying this clash was an increasing polarization between ex-Solidarity activists in self-management and branch and autonomous unionists in the new trade unions, it was perhaps to be expected. However, the clash could also be viewed as the result of a government strategy of "divide-and-rule." In fact, over the last few years, the regime has clearly employed a strategy of playing these two forms of employee representation off against each other. Whereas, for example, trade unions have been actively encouraged to create macro-level interfactory organizations, attempts by self-management to promote "horizontalism" and foster cooperation (as permitted by Article 35 of the self-management law) by engaging in common undertakings have been obstructed by the authorities, obstructions that have been appealed all the way to the Supreme Court.[44]

Whether this type of collectivism smacks too much of the "Network" (*Sieć*) system for promoting radical self-management found during the Solidarity period[45] or whether self-management is simply perceived by the authorities as more susceptible than the trade unions to oppositional infiltration is not important. What is critical is that both the government and the opposition see self-management as the guarantor of economic reform, and inasmuch as the post-martial law regime is publicly committed to economic reform, it will have to pay at least lip service to and deal with employee self-management. This means that, for now, the conflict between trade unions and self-management organs will continue in the workplace.

Union Setbacks

Despite supposed government support, the "official" trade unions soon began to suffer a series of setbacks. First was the announcement by the Polish government of its *intention* to leave the ILO after the latter aired statements critical of the Polish government and established a commission of inquiry to examine Poland's abuse of rights that are protected under ILO conventions.[46]

Moreover, although by the end of 1984 the unions —which by then were formally under the guiding hand of the OPZZ—had entered the "neo-corporatist" stage of negotiations with the government over a variety of major issues, they were unfortunately not ones where immediate successes were probable or even possible. They included: projected price rises; the new "collective contracts" effecting the "privileges" of groups of worker such as miners, steel workers, and bakers; pension provisions; the definition of the "social minimum" or the acceptable level of poverty; and, of course, housing.

Most notably, despite a face-saving post hoc meeting with union leaders,[47] the government went ahead with broad-ranging price rises in March 1985, after making only minor concessions on the details. The unions had sought a totally new model of price rises, one that examined whether the bureaucratic and other costs of failed economic reform were simply being funneled into higher prices for food, housing, and the like. It was perhaps as much the manner in which the price rises were announced—just a few days after the union position had been made known—as the minuscule degree of the concessions, which appeared somewhat greater at first glance, that upset the new unions.[48] In any case, neither side won, since this blow to the trade unions' prestige had to hurt what was popularly perceived to be their "patron," i.e., the government.

[42] I. Dryll, "Petitioners or Partners," *Życie Gospodarcze*, June 14, 1987.

[43] For a list of these, see B. Ziemianin, "Self- Management, the Director, Trade Unions," in ibid., Dec. 11, 1983. Arts. 28, 34, and 36 of the self-management law in particular required a meeting of the Council of State Commission on Self-Management and the Social Consultative Commission on January 11, 1984. See *Rzeczpospolita*, Feb. 6, 1984.

In 1984, 30 conflicts were resolved by the courts. However, by their second tenure of office, 30-45 percent of those elected to employee councils were trade unionists. See T. Grabczyńska, "A Natural Partnership," *Trybuna Ludu*, May 22, 1985.

[44] "How Much Self-Management?" *Tygodnik Powszechny*, Nov. 9, 1986.

[45] Reports that the OPZZ or All-Polish Confederation of Trade Unions was encountering difficulties with the self-management of 17 large factories immediately brings to mind the "Network" of 17 large factories. Ibid., Aug. 11, 1985. On the projected meeting at Torun's Elana in 1984 as well as of the projected meetings for self-management within the confines of the newly formed associations (which are seen as eminently anti-reform bodies), see *Polska 5 lat po sierpniu* (Poland Five Years After August), London, Aneks, 1986, p. 148.

More recently, a factory celebrating a jubilee was forbidden to invite employee council representatives from cooperating enterprises—a signal of bureaucratic paranoia? See W. Sokolewicz, "Where Two People Are Fighting," *Tygodnik Kulturalny* (Warsaw), Mar. 8, 1987.

[46] *Rzeczpospolita*, Nov. 20, 1984.

[47] *Trybuna Ludu*, Mar. 6, 1985.

[48] Calculated as a savings of 60 billion zlotys by society. See P. Chocholak, "The Other Side of the Coin," *Wybrzeże* (Gdańsk), Apr. 14, 1985.

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The unions sought to raise their stature by "nominating" candidates for election to the Sejm. Since the unions did not have the right to initiate legislation directly, it was felt that a higher profile in the parliament might effectively advance union proposals.[49] The election of 56 deputies recommended by the trade unions, who were organized by the PUWP group in the 460-member Sejm, was not very promising, as would soon become clear.

After three years of expanding their activity and building their prestige, the unions were dealt a serious blow on July 25, 1985, with the passage of an amendment to the 1982 trade union law. The unions had sought concrete, binding decision-making powers, as opposed to consultative rights, over the allocation of housing and the social fund, which had traditionally rested with the management. Further, they had sought definitive powers to control and inspect work and safety conditions. Finally, they had sought paid leave for their activists, on a par with pre-1981 legislation, that is, one functionary paid out of enterprise funds for every 200 employees. In fact, however, they were granted only the latter, along with modestly stronger powers of consultation on other issues.

The unions continued to fight rises in prices and to defend living standards. In anticipation of the Second Assembly of the National Trade Union Confederation, they viewed the current stage as one of consolidation. Union organizers were torn between the desire to press for integration and unified structures and anxiety lest this effort undermine their major source of credibility by interfering with "the natural process of growth, according to the wish of the membership." The enormous bulk of employees still outside of the membership were euphemistically referred to as being in the "wait-and-see-what-they-can-do-for-us" stage. In fact, a lack of faith in government actions and in the ability of the unions to defend employees, a generalized social and political ennui, distaste for the unions' origins as creatures of the regime, and a strong but not determining dose of support for the opposition explained better the widespread reluctance to join the unions.[50]

Meanwhile, the not-so-hidden hand of the central ministries maneuvered to retain control over wages, profit levels, investment, and social funds. This was most evident in the ongoing saga of the "collective contracts" (*układy zbiorowe*). An important component of wage determination, these contracts (77 in total, with many lower-level agreements) in effect ranked metal workers, miners, builders, energy workers, teachers, and other groups by branch or sector, providing each with certain "privileges" (for example, health service employees and their families did not have to stand in the interminable queues outside pharmacies). That they were branch-based was immediately picked upon as being "anti-reform" (since the reform envisaged the disappearance or serious curtailment of the powers of branch ministries) and "anti-productivity," since wages would not be determined by results in an enterprise but by a central agreement. Others saw in them a reassertion of the branch-union tendency within the union movement. For its part, the OPZZ presented the issue of the "contracts," as one of struggle with a recalcitrant bureaucracy, in particular that of the overblown Ministry of Labor, Wages, and Social Affairs, which despite constraints established in legislation passed in 1984, was not prepared to give up its detailed interference in factory-by-factory wage determination.[51]

There can be little doubt that, from their very inception, the nascent unions saw those contracts as a crucial opportunity to assert trade union rights sensu strictu and to overcome in the process the fragmented nature of the union structure, while providing a bargaining platform free of self-management. Bowing to reform dogma (since, as was pointed out, existing wage policy in Poland had little if anything to do with productivity), the unions had proposed a broad-based branch charter of basic pay and work conditions, to be accompanied by negotiated contracts in individual workplaces.[52]

Mobilizing their parliamentary representatives for the first time, the unions reacted fiercely to the projected legislation submitted for Sejm discussion at the end of April 1986. Unfortunately, the fight was not an equal one. Throughout the "negotiations" over the legislation, an impartial observer could not help but feel that the unions —engaging their by now favorite opponent, the economic bureaucracy—were fighting a losing battle. As the fate of another piece of legislation to which the unions had pinned their prestige—the organization and financing of social security—indicated, the government could push through basically unchanged government legislative projects, despite earlier rejections, by rushing them to parliament just prior to its convening.[53] In

[49]K. Kucharski, "The Role of Trade Unions in Proposing Deputies to Parliament in The Polish People's Republic, 1943-1985," *Związkowy Biuletyn Prawno-Organizacyjny* (Warsaw), June 1985. Sejm regulations allow legislation to be initiated either through the commissions or by a group of at least 15 members. The unions, through the WPZZ, had nominated 150 candidates to election committees prior to their acceptance onto the ballot sheet, of whom 128 were entered. See A. Bilska, "The Role of Trade Unions in Formulating Laws," *Trybuna Ludu*, Aug. 30, 1985.

[50]*Polityka* (Warsaw), Nov. 29, 1986.

[51]A. Miodowcz, "Without Insulting Majesty but Firmly Standing One's Ground," *Sprawy i Ludzie* (Wrocław), Mar. 20, 1986. L. Podkaminer, "Dangerous Unions?" *Związkowiec*, July 6, 1986.

[52]T. Grabczyńska, "Collective Work Contracts?" *Trybuna Ludu*, May 24-25, 1986.

[53]A. Jarosiński, "Partnership or Tug of War," *Metalowiec*, May 11, 1986.

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Alfred Miodowicz, Chairman of the National Confederation of Trade Unions, gives the opening address at the November 1986 trade union congress in Warsaw; at left rear, Polish leader Wojciech Jaruzelski.

—Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos.

such cases, the "consultation" process amounted to negotiations within the Sejm commissions, over which the ubiquitous Ministry of Labor, Wages, and Social Affairs had greater informal infuence than the unions.

Not surprisingly, the law on collective agreements and contracts was passed by the Sejm. Its ratification came just before the high point of the unions' year, their Second Assembly (redesignated a "congress"), at the end of November. The legislation provided for the existence of two-tier contracts, and granted considerable prerogatives to the Ministry of Labor, Wages, and Social Affairs and to supra-enterprise bodies. It also directed that all agreements be bounded by the "plan" limits —which anticipated no growth in living standards— thus nullifying any short-term hoped-for gains. Finally, and most cynically, it suspended Chapter 5 of the trade union law—that is, *the right to strike*—during negotiations or disputes over such agreements (Article 241/7, para. 7).[54] Six months later, key instruments allowing for the implementing of the law had still not seen the light of day.[55]

Some delegates to the union congress clearly viewed the legislation as a major defeat for the unions. Conceivably, almost everything having to do with working conditions could now be covered by a national, branch, or occupational agreement, or alternatively by a general workplace contract, while the unions had been deprived of their one decisive means of influence—the right to strike. Subsequent changes in the national socioeconomic plan were to require appropriate changes in the agreements, thus undermining even the residual

[54]"Decree of November 24, 1986, on the Revision of the Labor Code," *Dziennik Ustaw*, No. 201, 1986.

[55]J. Miemiac, "What's Up With the Collective Contracts?" *Trybuna Robotnicza*, (Katowice) Apr. 24, 1987.

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force of the right to strike.

Elsewhere, the unions were made to accept still more humiliating defeats. Since 1983 and the enactment of legislation marking the transition from martial law, the work week in the original 1,371 enterprises of key economic importance as well as in defense-related industries had been raised unilaterally from 40 to 46 hours. At the end of 1985, when this legislation expired, an order of the Council of Ministers (February 21, 1986) extended it until 1990 and increased the number of enterprises subject to this law to approximately 2,000.[56] Once again, the unions, seeking to enhance their role, had joined the fray, pointing out quite rightly that at least four employee-hours per week were lost through standstills, which were beyond workers' control. Thus, legislation extending the working day was once again used to shield the indolence and organizational incompetence of managers and the economic administration.[57]

The government ignored the unions' protests, and strike threats (euphemistically referred to as section 5 rights) were made. For its part, the Ministry of Labor, Wages, and Social Affairs retorted that some miners already worked 150 and more hours of overtime per month, that overtime work was often sought after by the employees themselves, and, that the country would lose 32 million tons of coal if the measure was not applied. Finally, it stated that the unions could participate in discussions on the distribution of work time, but not on its duration, which was a matter for state decision.[58] It is, nevertheless, difficult to see how the inclusion of 213 factories in light industry, half of the total, in the list of enterprises *potentially* compelled by their managers to work a 46-hour week, was economically justified and not merely an extension of the ethos of militarized labor.[59]

Free Saturdays, a 37.5-hour week for miners, and other gains scored by Solidarity, were being contemptuously overturned or deferred, and all the new unions could do was draw attention to the reneging—a limited service to its members that did little to bolster the unions' image. The election of Alfred Miodowicz, the OPZZ chairman, to the PUWP Politburo at the party's 10th Congress in June 1986 may have marked the end of a process whereby a Politburo incumbent was imposed upon the unions, but it did little to convince the membership of the commitment of the unions or the PUWP to the cause of working people. In the program for the November congress, the trade unions could only refer to the need "to analyze and control the factors leading to the extension of the 8-hour day" and suggest that the decision to extend the working day should be made only with their agreement, and only in specific cases.[60] While the trade unions had perhaps proven to be more independent in word and even intention than originally expected, the regime had taught them at every turn that independence without power was meaningless.

Conclusion

Observing the quixotic attempts of the Polish unions to satisfy their stated ideal of "defending workers' interests," it is difficult not to conclude that they serve a purpose for the regime. Their routine defeats highlight and publicize in a most overt manner the scale of the problems that are encountered in daily life. Thus, the regime cannot be accused of being blind to the living conditions of its population, even while it continues to pursue its own priorities. A perceived congruence of crisis-evaluation on the part of state and society is one way of deferring the conflict which could emerge from a perception of divergence. However, using the new unions as a lightning rod can in the long term be counterproductive for the government, since this is still essentially a grass-roots union movement with poorly formed vertical connections.[61] The government of Jaruzelski should not be surprised if, as in 1970 and 1980, shop floor leaders once again succumb to grass-roots pressure rather than to the discipline of their superiors.

There is, however, the alternative of tolerating pro-Solidarity unions and engaging them in tension-management. Although Jaruzelski has rejected the reestablishment of Solidarity, this has not foreclosed the issue of trade union pluralism. Both the 1982[62] and 1985[63] trade union legislation left open (indefinitely in the latter case) the question of having more than one trade union operating within any given workplace. As a consequence, pressure continues to be exerted upon the newly created Constitutional Tribunal, using the conventions of the International Labour Organization, to which Poland has recently restated its commitment, to allow pro-Solidarity unions to be set up.[64] Should an extreme course of economic reforms (with an almost immediate withdrawal of

[56]W. Dziadek, "Struggle Over Working Hours," *Związkowy Biuletyn Prawno-Organizacyjny*, No. 4, 1986.

[57]Ibid.

[58]M. Henzler, "Compulsorily, Voluntarily," *Polityka*, Apr. 12, 1986.

[59]*Dziennik Łódzki* (Łódz), Apr. 3, 1986.

[60]"Projected Program For Polish Trade Unions Drawn Up at the 2nd Convention of the OPZZ," *Związkowiec*, Oct. 19, 1986, Section I, para. 3.

[61]The confrontation in March 1987 over price increases shows how much difficulty the OPZZ has had in controlling opposition to these increases (and now the ceilings set on wage rates). "If we do not start to defend employees effectively, they will start to do it themselves," was the argument made. See M. Henzler, "Three Rounds," *Polityka*, Apr. 4, 1987.

[62]Loc. cit., Item 162, para. 3(1).

[63]Loc. cit.

[64]*Uncensored Poland*, London, Information Centre for Polish Affairs, June 23, 1987, pp. 32–39.

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state subsidies) be embarked upon, such unions—whose membership would probably far exceed that of the present unions—might be encouraged to form and take some of the sting out of the ensuing backlash. This would be all the more feasible as the regime could continue to occupy the moral high ground of supporting economic reform, leaving to these unions the more precarious terrain of defending workers' and employees' short-term, sectional interests (as they would no doubt be presented).

An important intangible in this scenario is the role of employee self-management. Self-management—as opposed to the trade unions—was intended to give employees influence in guiding the *direction* of reform, guaranteeing its non-bureaucratic nature, rather than simply reacting in a defensive manner. However, while the regime ordains new forms of economic ownership, such as commercial (local government) property, joint ventures, and trade associations—all in the spirit of economic reform—the place of self-management in these new entities is at best unclear and at worst nonexistent.[65] The same holds true for such new government initiated organizational structures as "concerns" (*konserny*) and "mixed" enterprises.

Still, there can be little doubt that employee self-management continues to enjoy a higher level of prestige and credibility among workers than any other work-based institution. This is a result not so much of substantive areas of concern or "representative" structure (since shop-floor or departmental, as opposed to factory level, self-management was severely limited after the imposition of martial law), as of self-management's traditional association with worker democracy,[66] and the stigma still attached to the PUWP, the official unions, and other compromised organizations. Self-management provides an important anchor point for workers faced with a multitude of organizations all claiming in some way to be the guardians of their interests. Furthermore, it appears to provide a potential guarantee that whatever system of management and ownership may emerge with the onset of the current stage of reform, worker interests will be respected within it.[67]

Thus, although the Jaruzelski regime is far from comfortable with the development of self-management and has sought to limit its role, the fact that self-management has become synonymous with economic reform ensures that it will continue to be a key actor in the drama of reform and return to "normalcy" unfolding in Poland.

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[65]E. Kostro, "The Second Stage of Self-Management," *Zarządzenie*, No. 8, 1987.

[66]J. Gardawski, "The Workers' Point of View," *Życie Warszawy*, Nov. 14, 1986, is just one example of the rankings war being waged by the regime through the agency of the increasingly influential Center for the Study of Social Opinion (CBOS), the Academy of Social Sciences at the Central Committee of the PUWP, and the like. See "Trade Unions in the Opinion of the Working Class in Large Industrial Concerns," *Związkowiec*, Jan. 27, 1985.

[67] What these interests are is not often immediately apparent, however. Whereas under the cut-and-dried system of central distribution and state ownership, self-management was a force for reform and enterprise autonomy, over the last two years, as the crises of raw materials provision, foreign currency, and access to scarce supplies have deepened, self-management has engaged in defensive, self-limiting, and seemingly anti-reform activities, adeptly playing the game of subsidy, privilege, and special pleading fostered by what is now a hybrid system of economic direction rooted in manipulation and discretion. See I. Dryll, " The Game Within and Without," *Życie Gospodarcze*, Apr. 27, 1986.

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Notes

Glasnost': Roots and Practice

Natalie Gross

MIKHAIL GORBACHEV'S policy of *glasnost'* has generated debate in the Western media and among scholars concerning the scope and significance of this "open" information policy. Regardless of their own political predispositions, most Western analysts and scholars have discussed *glasnost'* on the basis of the limited evidence found in official Soviet press reports. This article will look at Gorbachev's *glasnost'* in a broader context by tracing the origins of *glasnost'* to 19th-century Russia and then reviewing the use of open criticism in the early post-revolutionary period of the Soviet Union. The article will also examine Gorbachev's *glasnost'* policy and its application by Soviet civilian and military media in order to assess the current scope and limits of openness in Soviet society.

Origins of *Glasnost'*

The concept of *glasnost'* became known in Russia during the last decade of Tsar Nicholas I's reign (1825-55), when debates were held on the projected emancipation of the serfs and what came to be known as the Great Reforms.[1] Introduced by "enlightened bureaucrats" within the central government, *glasnost'* at the time meant an exchange of opinions within the bureaucracy about the country's much needed social and economic transformation (*preobrazovaniye*).[2]

Nineteenth-century champions of *glasnost'* viewed debates within the government as an effective tool for correcting failures of bureaucratic institutions and thwarting corrupt practices among officials.[3] The debates were strictly confined to domestic issues: the abolition of serfdom, the judicial process, the administration of the Naval Ministry.[4] Proponents among government officials of public openness emphasized that more extensive statistical reporting in the press would aid the central government in its decision-making.

This *glasnost'* policy was as much constrained by bureaucratic institutions and conservative officials as it was by the autocratic form of the government. The "enlightened bureaucrats" did not seek to engage broader segments of the educated public in political debates—

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[1] I am indebted to Dr. Jacob Kipp of the Soviet Army Studies Office, US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, for drawing my attention to the origins of *glasnost'* in imperial Russia.

[2] The discussion is based on a study by W. Bruce Lincoln, *In the Vanguard of Reform*, DeKalb, IL, North Illinois University Press, 1983, pp. 102-204.

[3] This approach can be found, for instance, in the views of a liberal Russian censor Alexander Nikitenko. See *Diary of a Russian Censor: Aleksandr Nikitenko*, ed. and trans. by Helen Jacobson, Amherst, MA, University of Massachusetts Press, 1975.

[4] Interestingly, one such discussion was conducted in the Naval Ministry under the patronage of Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolayevich. In this case, however, the Duke hoped that an artificially induced debate (*iskusstvennaya glasnost'*) among naval officers concerning a projected new naval regulation would promote seeming conflict of opinion and create the impression that the new legislation to be passed reflected public opinion rather than decisions approved by the central government. For a detailed discussion see Jacob W. Kipp and Maya A. Kipp, "The Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich: The Making of a Tsarist Reformer, 1837-1853," in *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, No. 34, 1986, pp. 3-18.

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unless their proposals encountered opposition from other influential bureaucratic groups.

During the reign of Alexander II (1855-81), however, several liberal-minded officials attempted to extend *glasnost'* to a genuinely open political debate in order to co-opt groups of radical intelligentsia and to check the growth of the revolutionary movement in Russia. Despite their efforts, the notion of *glasnost'* which came to prevail remained a limited one because it stressed that public opinion had invariably to express public support for the state and its policies. Arguing that public criticism was contrary to the Russian principle of autocracy, Alexander II reimposed stricter censorship in order to curtail criticisms of the state policies in the press.[5]

Soviet Tradition of *Glasnost'*

A concept of *glasnost'* also existed during the early Soviet period. The term is first mentioned in Vladimir Ilyich Lenin's works on the economic and political organization of the socialist state during 1918–19. In these works, Lenin advocated the open and public criticism of economic inefficiency and of the cumbersome state bureaucracy:

Everything that takes place at a socialist enterprise should be made public (predavat' glasnosti). *The shortcomings in the economic activity of each and every commune should be disclosed to the public. We need public criticism which will expose the evils of our economy, strike a responsive chord with the public and help us cure social problems.*[6]

Like the "enlightened bureaucrats" of the 19th century, Lenin conceived of *glasnost'* as leadership-initiated and leadership-regulated criticism designed, in his view, to reverse undesirable socio-economic trends, accelerate economic development, and boost labor productivity. In the political realm, he saw the function of *glasnost'* as a means to castigate bureaucratic malpractice and stimulate public participation in political life, that is to say, to strengthen the regime's legitimacy.[7] In Lenin's view, "the state is strong when the masses know everything, render their opinion on every issue, and consciously respond to every policy."[8]

It should be noted that Lenin's view of *glasnost'* differed fundamentally from the Western concept of the free flow of information. *Glasnost'* was intended to promote the best interests of the regime which set the parameters within which divergent opinions could be voiced. Open public debates in the press were largely restricted to sanctioned policy issues. Predictably, Lenin believed that the media should not inform the general public about sensitive foreign policy issues such as foreign credits and Western technology transfers to Russia.[9] Extending the dialectical process to media policy, he called for a "balanced" news coverage, that is, for positive accounts of the USSR's successes to outnumber critical assessments of its shortcomings and failures.[10]

It was symptomatic of Lenin's views on *glasnost'* that the Bolsheviks had reestablished pre-publication censorship, declared printing to be a state monopoly, and closed down newspapers owned by non-Bolshevik political parties. The October 1917 Decree on the Press and related legislative acts banned dissemination of criticism of the new regime.[11] Furthermore, to silence the regime's critics, Lenin had instituted Military Revolutionary Tribunals operating under the state security organs. To Lenin's thinking, such repressive measures against free political thought were not inconsistent with the policy of *glasnost'* which allowed for a relatively free debate among the various factions of the party on controversial policy issues.

In arguments similar in structure and style to those of Lenin (one may also add, of Gorbachev), Stalin, too, expressed support for the principle of *glasnost'*:

In order to move forward and improve relations between the people and the leaders we should keep the valve of self-criticism open. We should give the Soviet people an opportunity to criticize their leaders for their mistakes so that the leaders do not put on airs and the masses do not distance themselves from their leaders.[12]

Stalin wrote these words after the Shakhty affair (1928), which marked the beginning of the leader's campaign

[5]For censorship practices of the period, see Charles Rudd, *Fighting Words: Imperial Censorship and the Russian Press, 1804-1906*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1982.

[6]Vladimir Lenin, *Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy* (Complete Collected Works), Moscow, Politizdat, 1969, Vol. 36, pp. 147-50.

[7]Ibid., Vol. 45, pp. 389-406.

[8]Ibid., Vol. 35, p. 21. Interestingly, Gorbachev has on numerous occasions quoted such statements from Lenin's works, undoubtedly in order to provide an authoritative stamp of approval to the *glasnost'* policy and to thwart attacks by its opponents. See, e.g., Gorbachev's speeches at the 27th Party Congress and January 1987 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in *Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 26, 1986, and Jan. 28, 1987.

[9]Lenin, op. cit., Vol. 45, p. 195.

[10]Ibid.

[11]*Dekrety Sovetskoy Vlasti* (Decrees of the Soviet Authorities), Moscow, Politizdat, 1957, pp. 24-25.

[12]Yosif Stalin, *Sochineniya* (Works), Moscow, Politizdat, 1952, pp. 31-32.

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against so-called class enemies of the state.[13] By that time, Stalin had defeated his opposition and had in effect silenced open debate in the Soviet Union, even while he reiterated Lenin's views on the importance of *glasnost'* for social progress. His endorsement of public criticism enabled him to stage and manipulate media campaigns against his opponents. Moreover, an occasional airing of unauthorized political views in the press or the publication of unorthodox literary writings often was the cue for one of Stalin's orchestrated public campaigns against dissenting voices, and a prelude to a subsequent massive purge of these people.[14] It is worth noting that in his writings on the media Stalin expressed disapproval of Western-style investigative reporting, and that he specifically opposed any press criticism of mid-level enterprise managers and party apparatchiks—who constituted the core of Stalin's support during the years of his struggle for absolute power.

Clearly, like the leadership of imperial Russia, the leaders of the early Soviet state viewed *glasnost'* as a tool of policy. *Glasnost'* served not only as a vehicle for reforming the bureaucracy, but as a pretext for eliminating political opponents and consolidating power.

Gorbachev's Concept of *Glasnost'*

The concept of *glasnost'* changed in the post-Stalin period, but more in terms of emphasis than essence. During the Khrushchev era, the media was directed to criticize Stalinism and its political supporters. The publication of unorthodox literary writings and discussion of sensitive political issues brought allies for Nikita Khrushchev, especially from among the intelligentsia, against the Stalinist rank and file in the party bureaucracy. However, this relatively liberal information policy did not allow the printing of explicit criticism of the Soviet political system or of Khrushchev's policies (labeled "hare-brained" schemes after his ouster in 1964). Nor did this policy preclude an anti-Western propaganda campaign which proceeded in high gear and became especially intense during the political crises in Hungary (1956), West Berlin (1961), and Cuba (1962).

In the early 1970's, when Gorbachev was rapidly advancing to the higher rungs of the party bureaucracy, Leonid Brezhnev explained his approach to public criticism in the following terms: "Communists should not be apprehensive of serious and business-like criticism and self-criticism on the grounds that it might be used by our enemies."[15] By that time, Brezhnev had curtailed public criticism of Stalinism and had restricted artistic freedoms, although he also had expanded policy debates among experts and elites on selected issues.

By the mid-1970's, however, a new argument for *glasnost'* was presented by Professor Zasurskiy, the dean of the Moscow University School of Journalism and an influential representative of the Soviet mass media. Zasurkiy argued that *glasnost'* was imperative for the country's technological development, especially in the areas of electronic media and computer and information sciences. He furthermore maintained that a freer exchange of information would help overcome the trends towards inertia and stagnation in Soviet society: "*Glasnost'* is an effective method of intensifying ideological and political processes."[16]

Mikhail Gorbachev seems to have been impressed with this rational, technocratic approach to *glasnost'*. He has encouraged criticism of management and personnel at industrial enterprises for failure to meet production norms and to develop new technologies. He has argued that, by stimulating competition between enterprises and creating the incentives for employees to change their attitudes towards work, *glasnost'* improves sluggish labor productivity. The General Secretary has also called for holding discussions at party, Komsomol, trade union, and enterprise meetings in order to stimulate mass participation in decision-making on local issues.[17] Citizen participation in low-level policy-making, Gorbachev evidently believes, will restore the public's eroded trust in the communist leadership and its ideology. As the Soviet leader pointed out during the January 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum:

It is necessary that accountability go hand in hand with a lively and principled discussion, criticism and self-criticism, business-like suggestions . . . . Then we will satisfy Lenin's requirement that the work of elected officials and organizations be open to everyone . . . . Then there would be no reasons for complaints and appeals to high-level authorities.[18]

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[13]In March 1928 the Soviet state prosecutor announced that a group of noncommunist engineers in the Shakhty region of the Donets Basin were to be tried for allegedly deliberate sabotage of the mining industry and for conspiracy with foreign powers. This trial became the first in a series of show trials and signaled a new tough policy on dealing with class enemies. Stalin's campaign against the kulaks followed shortly thereafter. See Sheila Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution, 1917-1932*, Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 112; and Leonard Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, New York, Random House, 1960, p. 363.

[14]E.g., the publication of literary pieces labeled seditious in the journals *Zvezda* and *Leningrad* in the mid-1940's occasioned a purge of Andrey Zhdanov's Leningrad party organization.

[15]Leonid Brezhnev, *Leninskim Kursom* (On A Leninist Course), Moscow, Politizdat, 1972, p. 45.

[16]Y. Zasurskiy, Ed., *Zhurnalistika v Politicheskoy Strukture Obshchestva* (Journalism in the Political Structure of Society), Moscow, Politizdat, 1974, pp. 81-82.

[17]Mikhail Gorbachev, "On *Perestroyka* and the Party's Cadre Policy," *Pravda*, Jan. 28, 1987.

[18]Ibid.

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Gorbachev needs *glasnost'* to accelerate the country's technological development, which lags behind the technologically advanced West. In Gorbachev's political parlance, *glasnost'* should trigger *perestroyka* (restructuring), a synonym for Lenin's "socialist construction" (*stroitel'stvo*), or 19th-century "transformation" (*preobrazovaniye*). Viktor Afanas'yev, the editor-in-chief of *Pravda,* emphasized this role of *glasnost'* in a speech to a Press Day meeting on May 5, 1987:

It is the duty of all Soviet journalists to translate the policy of restructuring into reality. For us journalists there is no nobler mission, nothing we treasure more, than to impart Leninist principles to the masses and to be in the front ranks of the fighters for communism.[19]

Although Gorbachev's policy has not changed the fundamental principle of party control over the mass media, it has partially unveiled the cloak of secrecy that shrouded political and social events in the Soviet Union. The General Secretary has encouraged public criticism of the party apparatus, the state bureaucracy, and individual officials up through the republic level. In practice, this means that major institutional actors, i.e., the party, the Komsomol, the ministries, the military, the KGB, and the judiciary, which were immune to criticism during the Brezhnev period, now regularly come under fire in the Soviet press.

Not unlike Stalin in the late 1920's or Khrushchev in the late 1950's, Gorbachev has been using these press campaigns to remove his opponents from positions of power.[20] Today, articles criticizing the lack of *glasnost'* in a particular area usually hint at the need for personnel changes in an oblast or republic. Of course, corruption in the higher echelons of power has been no secret to the Soviet public in recent decades, yet its portrayal in the media challenges the credibility of the ruling elite in a traditionally authoritarian society.

Other manifestations of *glasnost'* include more complete reportage on accidents and disasters, as well as a more realistic coverage of the country's social problems. Yet, Soviet handling of the accident at the Chernobyl' nuclear plant has demonstrated the limits of *glasnost'* in reporting disasters: while some information on the accident has been released in response to pressure from the West, domestic audiences have been consistently denied specific information related to their health and the safety of their environment.[21]

On the other hand, the Soviet press has reported nationality conflicts, drug abuse, juvenile delinquency, the poor quality of medical care, problems of poverty and vagrancy, draft-dodging demonstrations and strikes and other controversial issues—that is, problems associated with social justice that as a rule had been previously mentioned in the Soviet press only with reference to Western capitalist societies. Moreover, Soviet authorities have also started to release more quantitative data on negative social trends, including alcoholism, drug abuse, infant mortality, infectious diseases, and male life expectancy. Conceivably, even a partial release of selective statistical data serves to provide lower-level planning agencies with the information necessary for decision-making. As one Soviet military writer has observed, "we need information not for the sake of information, but as a basis for decision-making."[22]

Since the June 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum the Soviet press has been gradually expanding its coverage of politically sensitive issues. It has alluded to anti-Semitism and has discussed such topics as the misuse of psychiatry to suppress non-political criticism and the existence of restrictions on foreign travel to and from Eastern Europe. The media has also published conflicting and often revisionist interpretations of Russia's revolutionary and early post-revolutionary experience.[23] The revolutionary leaders of the "Lenin Guard," who were previously referred to as notorious "enemies of the people," have now been restored to good standing and special tribute has been paid to Nikolay Bukharin whose theory of "market socialism" is consistent with some aspects of Gorbachev's economic reform.[24]

Soviet writers have also scrutinized Stalin's policy of collectivization, condemned the purges, and criticized Stalin's legacy in contemporary Soviet political life.

[19]"Powerful Instrument of *Perestroyka*," ibid., May 6, 1987.

[20]E.g., news of the illegal arrest in Ukraine of Soviet journalist Viktor Borisovich Berkhin in reprisal for his criticism was followed by a letter of apology written by the Ukrainian Communist Party's First Secretary Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi in the party newspaper. It can be argued that the publicity accorded the case by the media served to compromise Shcherbytskyi about whom rumors that Gorbachev wants to remove him have long circulated. See *Pravda,* Feb. 15, 1987.

[21]For a well-documented discussion of Soviet media behavior during the Chernobyl' accident, see Ellen Jones and Benjamin Woodbury, "Chernobyl' and *Glasnost'*," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1986, pp. 28-39.

[22]N. Kiziun, "Operational Quality and Reliability of Party Information," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil* (Moscow), No. 23, 1986, p. 13. Interestingly, a demand for more extensive reporting of statistical data in the media is consistent with earlier notions of *glasnost'* advocated by Russian reformers in the 1850's and resurrected by Lenin in 1918-19.

[23]See for instance, "Two Letters," *Literatunaya Gazeta* (Moscow) June 17, 1987, and E. Maksimova, I. Martkovich, "Defenseless," *Izvestiya,* July 11, 1987. For contrasting views on Stalin and Soviet history see, for instance, O. Martynenko, "Preserving Butter in Lanterns," *Moskovskiye Novosti,* Oct. 4, 1987; V. Tkachenko, "We Have Only One Homeland," *Pravda,* Aug. 21, 1987; and an interview with Colonel General D. Volkogonov on Moscow television, Oct. 23, 1987 in *FBIS-SOV,* Oct. 23, 1987, p. 40.

[24]For an interesting article on Bukharin by one of Gorbachev's well-known supporters see F. Burlatskiy, "A Political Testament," *Literaturnaya Gazeta,* July 22, 1987.

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Their discussions have supported the idea of a legitimate intraparty opposition existing in a one-party socialist state and espousing an alternative strategy of social development, i.e., a less centralized economy and more relaxed political and social controls. The Gorbachev leadership, however, appears to have assumed the role of a mediator in such discussions, balancing the conflicting views and interests of major elites and social groups. This middle-of-the-road line was strikingly evident in Gorbachev's speech commemorating the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution.[25] Although the General Secretary criticized the mass terror during the purges and recognized Bukharin's role in the USSR's economic development, he praised Stalin's contribution to Soviet World War II victories and approved of his policy of forced collectivization. Such a policy line is likely to have disappointed groups on both sides of the political spectrum: for some the General Secretary is going too far, while for others he is not going far enough in transforming the Soviet Union into a more open society.

However, in some respects, *glasnost'* has met the demands of intellectual elites for the right to learn the truth about their own society from official sources of information instead of dissident literature (*samizdat*) and foreign radio broadcasts. Furthermore, literary elites have been granted considerable freedom in discussing politically sensitive issues in their works. This more liberal cultural policy was designed to co-opt the more creative elements of the intelligentsia—who enjoy high prestige and moral authority in Soviet society—to support the new leader and to promote his reforms. Apparently, it was also intended to check the growth of the dissident movement and prevent the further emigration of the country's intelligentsia to the West. In this respect Gorbachev seems to have also learned from the Russian historical experience of co-opting the intellectual elite to serve the regime's political, economic, and military priorities.

Available evidence indicates that *glasnost'* has been intended, first and foremost, for domestic consumption. Yet, it can be argued that it has the potential to yield foreign policy gains as well. The new image of openness serves to restore Soviet international prestige, which was eroded in the post-détente years as a result of a continuing military buildup and the invasion of Afghanistan. By winning favor with Western public opinion, the new leadership hopes to gain access to Western technology and to smooth the arms control negotiating process. The insistence and intensity with which Soviet representatives have been trying to convince Western politicians that *glasnost'* portends a meaningful reform of the Soviet Union suggests that this policy is being used for a variety of public relations purposes. Prominent Soviet cultural figures who enjoy the reputation of "closet liberals" in the West have published articles in the Western press crediting Gorbachev's policy for the renaissance of culture and art in the Soviet Union.[26] In a departure from past practices, Soviet officials in the press section of the Foreign Ministry in Moscow have willingly set up interviews with Soviet officials for Western correspondents, while at the same time continuing to deny them the right to travel freely to most Soviet cities.[27] Finally, Soviet journalists, especially those representing more "liberal" newspapers and journals associated with *glasnost'* (e.g., Yegor Yakovlev, chief editor of *Moskovskiye Novosti*) have held press conferences abroad in which they discussed, and the press reported, the changes which have occurred in the Soviet political scene as a result of *glasnost'*.[28]

The Limits on *Glasnost'*

A major constraint on Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost'* is the party's control over the Soviet media. It severely reduces the media's ability to apply an open information policy and reduces *glasnost'* to a party tool designed to reflect and implement the party leadership's political goals. As Gorbachev himself stated before a domestic audience:

The main task of the press is to help the nation understand and assimilate the ideas of restructuring, to mobilize the masses to struggle for successful implementation of party plans . . . . We need . . . glasnost', *criticism and self-criticism in order to implement major changes in all spheres of social life . . . but criticism should reflect the interests of the party.*[29]

In keeping with Gorbachev's directives, the reports written from the journalists' congress held in Moscow in March 1987 explicitly confirmed the need for local-level party committees to intercede in the daily operation of the press: "the party committees should direct the press to focus on the main avenues of restructuring."[30]

[25] *Pravda*, Nov. 2, 1987.

[26] See, e.g., Andrey Voznesenskiy's article in *The New York Times*, Mar. 16, 1987; and Yevgeniy Yevtushenko's article in *Time* (New York), Feb. 9, 1987, pp. 32-33.

[27] David Satter, "The Foreign Correspondent in Moscow," *Encounter* (London), May 1987, pp. 58-63.

[28] See for example, "Their Interest in Our *Glasnost'*," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), May 15, 1987.

[29] "Conviction—A Bulwark of *Perestroyka*," *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), Feb. 14, 1987.

[30] "District Newspapers," *Pravda*, Mar. 28, 1987.

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Gorbachev has clearly defined the limits of permissible criticism. During a meeting with mass media representatives in February and July 1987, Gorbachev reaffirmed that a major revision of the Soviet Union's historical experience and revolutionary ideology will not be permitted.[31] Warning against excessive criticism of the local level party committees and against personal attacks on party officials, he called on the media to portray the country's current problems in a generally positive light:

Glasnost' *and democracy do not mean that everything is permitted.* Glasnost' *is called upon to strengthen socialism and the spirit of our people, to strengthen morality . . . .* Glasnost' *also means criticism of shortcomings but it does not mean the undermining of socialism and our socialist values.*[32]

A perusal of the Soviet press shows that no explicit criticism of the General Secretary, his policies, or his political allies has appeared in print. No overtly dissenting views and opinions of Gorbachev's opponents have been made public. Yet, according to a recent Yugoslav visitor to Moscow, at least one brochure critical of Gorbachev's policy exists and is now being circulated through *samizdat*.[33] Even the political debate that had apparently taken place during the January CPSU Central Committee Plenum has not been reported fully in the Soviet press.[34] The text of Academician Andrey Sakharov's arms control proposals made in February 1987 at the much-publicized Moscow Conference for a Nuclear-Free World and Survival of Mankind also has yet to be released.[35] Finally, the Soviet press continues to deny its citizens specific information pertaining to USSR foreign policy initiatives, military doctrine, and military and technological capabilities. The completeness of reporting in this area has not improved: the figures related to the defense budget, allocations for defense programs, volume of international trade, technology transfers or arms sales to the Third World have not been divulged.

Although the Soviet press now occasionally publishes the opinions of Soviet émigrés living abroad, it does so mostly in cases where the views are critical of the West or supportive of Gorbachev's political initiatives. Recently, however, a Soviet newspaper, *Moskovskiye Novosti*, published a letter by 10 leading émigré dissidents voicing skepticism about Gorbachev's reforms and proposing major revisions in Soviet ideology and international behavior. The letter had previously received much attention in the Western press, which may explain why the Soviet media felt compelled to print it. Instead of inviting a free discussion of the points raised in the letter, the editor of that newspaper condemned the émigré demands as "counterrevolutionary," and warned the authors of the letter that their criticisms will bar them from returning to the Soviet Union.[36]

While censoring anti-Semitism, the press has failed to mention existing policies and practices of discrimination against Jews in areas of education, employment, and professional and political career advancements. Similarly, discussions of psychiatric abuse have not included reference to past and probably current cases of psychiatric victimization of political dissidents.

The effect of *glasnost'* on the media's treatment of the West in general and the United States in particular has been marginal. The *glasnost'* policy has gone hand in hand with an anti-Western propaganda campaign which subsides on a regular basis prior to or during superpower summit meetings, only to be revived a few weeks later. This pattern of media behavior on foreign policy issues is consistent with Gorbachev's specification at the 27th Party Congress in February 1986 that the media continue its psychological war against the United States.[37] The guidelines issued to Soviet journalists on the coverage of foreign policy issues for domestic audiences leave little doubt that the traditional propaganda vis-à-vis the West remains in place. To quote the chairman of the Journalists' Union:

The press, radio, and television are called upon to disclose the reactionary nature of modern capitalism. It remains our duty to criticize convincingly bourgeois ideology, disclose reactionary imperialist policies and enemy lies about socialism. We should remember that our ideological adversaries today act against socialism more insidiously, with more sophistication, and in a more aggressive, coordinated manner. That is why our ideological weaponry should be accurate, stinging and capable of repelling any attack.[38]

Consistent with this policy statement has been a plethora of Soviet articles accusing the United States of

[31]See texts of Gorbachev's speeches during meetings with mass media representatives in *Izvestiya*, Feb. 15, 1987; and *Pravda*, July 15, 1987. See also the text of his speech in Leningrad in *Pravda*, Oct. 14, 1987.

[32]Mikhail Gorbachev, "Strenghtening *Perestroyka* Through Real Deeds," *Pravda*, July 15, 1987.

[33]Radio Free Europe, *Yugoslav Situation Report* (Munich), No. 3, May 8, 1987.

[34]The list of speakers at the Plenum was published in *Pravda*, Jan. 28, 1987.

[35]Andrey Sakharov's speech was published in *Time*, Mar. 16, 1987, pp. 40-43.

[36]*Moskovskiye Novosti*, Mar. 29, 1987.

[37]*Pravda*, Feb. 26, 1986.

[38]"On the Surge of *Perestroyka*," *Pravda*, Mar. 15, 1987.

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human rights violations, of an unprecedented military buildup, and of an expansionist foreign policy.[39] *Glasnost'* notwithstanding, Soviet authorities have warned the public that unauthorized circulation and viewing of Western video films containing violence, pornography, or anti-Soviet propaganda will continue to be punished as criminal offenses.[40] On the other hand, a drift away from traditional Soviet presentations of a polarized Western society can be observed in some media accounts which depict not only the workers pitted against capitalists but also a prosperous middle-class resistant to the idea of social revolution.[41]

Gorbachev's interest in using Western liberal public opinion to support his foreign policy initiatives has led the Soviet media to pay increasing attention to Western middle-of-the-road parties and movements. Yet, although the Soviet media now sometimes reports views of Western politicians and commentators which significantly diverge from the official Soviet position—a clear departure from previous practices—in most cases these discussions are followed by counter-arguments presented by a Soviet writer.[42] Therefore, by the admission of Alexandr Bovin, a well-know *Izvestiya* reporter, Soviet journalists writing on foreign policy issues have not been the beneficiaries of Gorbachev's *glasnost'* policy. Unlike their colleagues writing on domestic politics, Soviet foreign news reporters are required to follow closely the party line.[43]

In the area of domestic policies serious discussions are largely limited to the central press and Moscow-based public organizations.[44] The central press is replete with articles illustrating the limited effectiveness and even lack of *glasnost'* in provincial towns and rural locations.[45] For instance, a group of workers from Pskov oblast complained to *Pravda* that discussions held at their party meetings were not being reflected in the final written reports. *Pravda* also criticized newspapers in the Saratov oblast for not having informed their readers that the five-year plan was not fulfilled.[46]

Resistance to the *glasnost'* policy indicates that Gorbachev has not as yet succeeded in exercising full control over the provincial party organizations. In many instances, this resistance comes from provincial party leaders whom he himself has brought to power. Gorbachev has mentioned, and the press has documented, numerous cases of reprisal whereby party members criticizing management during party meetings were removed from their jobs or forced to leave the area.[47] For example, the secretary of the party organization in a power station located in the city of Ufa was removed from his party post for criticizing the corruption of the enterprise management.[48] Such examples of reprisal do not encourage the local leadership and the population at large to exercise public criticism.

Opposition to *glasnost'* also exists among high-level bureaucrats for whom public criticism of their actions is a threat to their status, career advancement, and privileges. Remarkably, the new press centers created at the ministerial level and specifically designed to promote *glasnost'* also represent obstacles to Gorbachev's policy. According to Soviet reports, the press centers not only block the release of unfavorable information but also commission laudatory articles about themselves in the central press.[49] Clearly, by providing some freedom to criticize opponents, *glasnost'* has exacerbated institutional conflict in Soviet society.

Soviet political culture itself, with its deeply ingrained intolerance for differences of opinion, constitutes another constraint on *glasnost'*. In the absence of appropriate legislation, policy statements, or even specific guidelines on freedom of information, Soviet citizens are confused about the limits of permitted criticism and are understandably reluctant to support Gorbachev's policy. Mindful of Stalin's purges and the more recent dissident trials, the Soviet public recognizes the uncertainties associated with *glasnost'*. Continuing reprisal for public criticism in the provinces reinforces a deep-seated suspicion that participation in public discussions may later, if not immediately, have serious and unforeseen repercussions for people's careers and future lives.

The fragmentary evidence available in the official Soviet press supports the argument that many Soviet citizens are skeptical about the success of Gorbachev's policy. Some citizens have labeled it "banned."[50] Other

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[39]For recent examples see *Pravda*, Mar. 3 and 16, and Apr. 3 and 4, 1987.

[40]*Zhurnalist* (Moscow), No. 12, December 1986, pp. 58-59; and *Pravda*, Mar. 1, 1987.

[41]For a good discussion of changes in Soviet media coverage of international issues, see Ellen Mickiewicz, *Making Media Work: Soviet Society and Communication*, forthcoming M. E. Sharpe.

[42]For the reporting of Western views of the Strategic Defense Initiative see, e.g., "From Different Points of View," *Pravda*, Feb. 28, 1987.

[43]"On the Surge of *Perestroyka*."

[44]The trend towards a freer political discussion in the central press, on the one hand, yet a more repressive information policy in the provinces, on the other, represents a significant departure from recent experience. During the Brezhnev period, for example, more unorthodox views and writings were as a rule published in the provinces, and left untouched by the central press.

[45]See, e.g., "After Certification," *Pravda*, Jan. 18, 1986; "The Danger of the Old Railroad," ibid., Sept. 1, 1986; and "When the Discussion is Serious," ibid., Oct. 26, 1986.

[46]"Is It Easy for a Newspaper to Be Probing?" *Pravda*, Mar. 13, 1987; and "From a Skeptic's Point of View," ibid., Mar. 18, 1987.

[47]Ibid., Mar. 18, 1987.

[48]"*Glasnost'* Without Reservations," ibid., June 6, 1987.

[49]"Conveyors of Proof," ibid., Feb. 27, 1987; and "Orienting the Press Toward Delicate Issues," *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Mar. 11, 1987.

[50]*Pravda*, Nov. 24, 1986; and Mar. 18 and 29, 1987.

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citizens have expressed doubt that their letters to newspaper editors would be published. At least one editor of political science literature has noted that the *glasnost'* policy has not changed the content and quality of works currently submitted for publication.[51] Recently, Peter Chernetskiy, a collective farm chairman who has suffered reprisal for criticizing the organization of fishing industries in the Far East, readily identified popular sentiment about Gorbachev's policy in the following terms:

One should not criticize. You pay a high price for this afterwards . . . . Democratization, glasnost', *are, for the time being, words, but reality is different.*[52]

An elderly reader of *Izvestiya,* flatly refuting Marxist belief in the locomotive of history, has summed up popular doubts about the ability of the communist system to change in this way:

It's fashionable now to talk, write and do television broadcasts about restructuring. In general, it's almost all the same things about which you used to write: let's go, let's go, speed it up, speed it up. In my lifetime M. S. Gorbachev is, I think, the seventh leader. Typically, correspondents make a business-like adjustment to every one of them. Under Stalin it was five-year plans, domestic and foreign enemies, but prices fell. Under Khrushchev it was corn, peas, chemistry, and price increases. Under Brezhnev it was the virgin lands, Malaya Zemlya, Orders of Victory, marshal stars, pace-setting and decisive years, price increases, etc., etc. Tomorrow we will be singing to any kind of music . . . .[53]

Soviet youth has apparently expressed even less enthusiasm for *glasnost'* than most other segments of the population, and its apathy represents another immediate obstacle to *glasnost'*. The partial data available from surveys of youth taken in fifty industrial enterprises in the city of Donetsk shows that the majority of young people there are not familiar with Gorbachev's new policies and have only a vague idea about their role in "restructuring."[54] These responses reflect the process of estrangement of Soviet youth which took root in Soviet society in the 1970's. As Western research on Soviet youth has demonstrated, in rejecting official collectivist values, young Soviets have retreated from involvement in public life and turned to the family, hobbies, and participation in unofficial associations for personal satisfaction.[55] These long-term trends in the behavior of youth account for their reluctant support of Gorbachev's *glasnost'* policy, which ultimately emphasizes mobilization of society for the "public good." Apathy and distrust of social ideals, including *glasnost'*, seem to set the young generation of the 1980's apart from their fathers, whose political values—shaped during the Khrushchev "thaw" period—were based on a belief in the possibility of reforming the Soviet political system. This probably explains why the vocal supporters of Gorbachev's reform have been middle-aged intellectuals (Tatyana Zaslavskaya, Abel' Aganbegyan, Yevgeniy Yevtushenko) rather than their younger counterparts.

In conclusion, one can argue that a demand for unrestricted freedom of public opinion or political discussion has never been strongly promoted in Soviet society. Many proposals made by Soviet dissidents on information policy envisage some restrictions on the free flow of information either on moral or political grounds. Surveys of Soviet émigrés consistently demonstrate that former Soviet citizens perceive freedoms enjoyed by Western media as excessive, if not pernicious. In their view, full reporting of social disturbances, of conflicts within the government or of criticism of the top political leadership jeopardize the stability of a strong state.[56]

Still, we can discern some signs of pressure by Soviet citizens to widen the limits of artificially controlled *glasnost'*. A well-known poet and a popular theater director both have insisted that society needs genuine public openness and a right to criticize every government organization and its management.[57] A group of Russian nationalists from the unofficial association *Pamyat'* (Memory) have held a demonstration in Moscow demanding official recognition of their organization and government protection of Russian historical monuments.[58] In Latvia and Moldavia, nationalist youth groups held demonstrations to protest the Soviet treatment of the local population during the Soviet occupation of the Western provinces in the prewar period.[59] An official authorization to hold discussions on selected politically sensitive issues has challenged some young

[51]"Movers," ibid., Mar. 10, 1987.
[52]"Being Chastized for Criticism," *Izvestiya*, Apr. 8, 1987.
[53]"You and We," ibid., Mar. 14, 1987.
[54]"Speak with the Youth," *Pravda*, Apr. 27, 1987.

[55]See a detailed discussion in Vladimir Shlapentokh, "Soviet Youth under Gorbachev: Pioneer in the Privatization of Society," paper presented at the Airlie House Workshop, "Soviet Society under Gorbachev," Oct. 14-16, 1986.
[56]Stephen White, "Continuity and Change in Soviet Political Culture: An Emigré Study," *Comparative Political Studies* (Beverly Hills, CA), No. 11, 1978, pp. 381-95.
[57]*Literaturnaya Gazeta,* Apr. 8, 1987; and *Sovremennaya Dramaturgiya* (Moscow), No. 3, March 1986, pp. 223-25.
[58]"Where Memory Leads," *Izvestiya,* June 3, 1987.
[59]"More Democracy Means More Socialism," *Sovetskaya Latviya* (Riga), June 18, 1987; and "From Slogans and Words to Real Deeds," *Sovetskaya Moldaviya* (Kishinev), May 31, 1987 trans. in *Current Digest of Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH), Vol. 39, No. 27, Aug. 5, 1987.

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people to expand the limits of permitted debate and to demand wider participation in decision-making. There have been several examples of this. During political discussions in Donetsk, young men and women posed probing questions even though they were promptly labeled "dissidents" by local ideological workers. (Perhaps that is why half of the oblast's professional ideology officials have reportedly refused to work with young audiences.[60]) In a discussion in Leningrad, a young man suggested adopting a Western-style competitive system for top leadership positions and advocated full rights for citizens to criticize the central authorities and their policies.[61] When city authorities in the same town, disregarding a public outcry, decided to raze a historic building, hundreds of young people held a demonstration in the vain hope of reversing the decision.[62]

These instances of conflict seem to indicate that *glasnost'* provokes some people to ask disturbing questions about the underlying causes of the corruption and failure of socialist society. Since the process of intellectual introspection and social analysis cannot be easily controlled, *glasnost'* might, in the long term, radicalize groups of well-educated and socially active young people. This raises the possibility that some members of the younger generation may find themselves at odds with those who support a restricted *glasnost'* policy.

It appears that, despite the leadership's efforts to confine public debates within sanctioned limits, *glasnost'* cannot be kept under full control. The Soviet press today portrays Soviet society as riven with institutional rivalries, and group and personal conflict. In the absence of a consensus on *glasnost'* among either the major bureaucracies or the population at large, this policy may yet prove destabilizing for Soviet society and thus result in political and ideological losses rather than the expected gains for the Gorbachev leadership. However, to Gorbachev's way of thinking, the long-term benefits of *glasnost'*—a modernized economy, a revitalized society, and restored international prestige—outweigh the risks of internal instability and social turmoil.

Glasnost' in the Armed Forces

An interesting case study of how state institutions tailor the *glasnost'* policy to suit their own interests is provided by the Soviet military. An examination of the military press indicates that its reporting on social and political issues has not been changed markedly since Brezhnev's time and that its coverage of Gorbachev's domestic reforms and foreign policy initiatives has been at best selective. For example, the military press has not printed the text of the economic reform which allows for limited private initiative in the service sector, and the General Secretary's speech at the January 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum has been published only in an abridged, sanitized version. Moreover, the military censor omitted those passages from the proceedings of the Congress of Journalists that strongly criticized bureaucratic resistance to the *glasnost'* policy. Unlike the civilian history journals which now regularly discuss the loss of life during the Stalin purges and its detrimental effect on Soviet military performance in the initial phase of the war, the Military History Journal has consistently failed to mention the cause of death of prominent military commanders in the 1930's.[63]

At the time of the summit meetings between Gorbachev and President Reagan in October 1986, the Soviet military press chose to emphasize the US military buildup, and the dangers of the Strategic Defense Initiative. The high point of its anti-American campaign was marked by the publication of an article vividly describing the plunder and sadistic atrocities allegedly inflicted by the American expeditionary force on the Soviet civilian population during the Allied intervention of 1918.[64] It is interesting to note that, consistent with enforcing a negative view of the West, Soviet political officers have been instructed to recommend that military officers instill their men with hatred of the enemy. For example, hatred of the Germans is to be stimulated by recounting vividly Nazi atrocities committed during World War II.[65]

Glasnost' has, however, had some effect on the military press. Discussions critical of bureaucratic mismanagement and corruption in the military establishment have been published, as has censure of shortcomings in training and discipline in individual military units. Interestingly, during the *glasnost'* campaign of the past two years, senior military officers and the Ministry of Defense as an institution have been subjected to serious public criticism for inefficiency and misappropriation of funds in both the civilian and military press.[66] The military press has selectively disclosed information on so-

[60]"Speak with the Youth."
[61]*Moskovskiye Novosti*, Feb. 1, 1987.
[62]*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Mar. 25, 1987.

[63]See *Voyennyy Vestnik* (Moscow), No. 2, February 1987, p. 15, for the biography of a civil war commander Gaya Gay; and *Voyenno-istoricheskiy Zhurnal* (Moscow), No. 2, February 1987, pp. 49-50, for the biographies of commanders Yosif Nemerzeli, Fedor Raskol'nikov, and Yosif Rozenblyum. For a call in the civilian press to tell the truth about Stalin and the purges see, e.g., *Sovetskaya Kul'tura* (Moscow), Mar. 21, 1987, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH), Apr. 22, 1987, pp. 1-3.
[64]"Intervention," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Feb. 14, 1987.
[65]V.K. Luzherenko, "Ways of Improving Party Political Work in the Attack," *Voyenno-istoricheskiy Zhurnal*, No. 3, March 1987, pp. 62-68.
[66]"Think and Work in the New Manner," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Mar. 22, 1986; and "Stains on One's Honor," *Pravda*, Mar. 21, 1987.

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cial problems in the Armed forces: alcoholism (but not drug abuse), nationality conflicts, draft-dodging (with references to service in Afghanistan), selection of unqualified candidates for officer and noncomissioned officer (NCO) schools, and flagrant violations of army discipline both in the ranks and among officers.

The coverage of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, which has been gradually expanding since 1984-85 independent of *glasnost'*, seems to reflect the general "preemptive" approach of Gorbachev's media policy. The more candid and truthful reports about the war as well as discussions of the problems of Afghanistan veterans, which have become more frequent during the *glasnost'* campaign, are designed, on the one hand, to prevent Soviet audiences from turning to alternative Western sources of information, and, on the other hand, to check rumors based on first-hand accounts of veterans returning from the battle zones. In other words, the coverage of Afghanistan under *glasnost'* has taken into account the potential for independent verification which has increased in proportion to the growing number of returning soldiers.

As the death toll in Afghanistan has mounted, the Soviet press has become more explicit in dealing with the problem of casualties as well as more skillful in exploiting it for inculcating patriotic, nationalistic, and martial values. By giving a general human treatment to the heroic deeds of Soviet soldiers with an emphasis on friendship, courage, and virility, the media has eulogized a new post-war generation of popular heroes—an approach that plays an important educational and ideological role.[67] Recent accounts of mujahedin raids across the border into Soviet territory released in connection with *glasnost'* have emphasized both the significance and the defensive nature of the war to the ordinary citizen.[68]

An interesting aspect of Afghanistan reporting has been the acknowledgment—beginning in 1985—of the reluctance among some conscripts to risk their lives in combat, as well as the disclosure of methods used by parents to keep their children from being drafted.[69] A bolder departure from the old propaganda line can, perhaps, be seen in a frank admission by a returning serviceman that the mujahedin, who constitute a considerable part of the country's population, had not been recipients of foreign military aid prior to the Soviet military intervention.[70]

While the cryptic language of these reports indicates considerable differences of opinion about the war effort, the constraints of the *glasnost'* policy have not allowed for a straightforward discussion of Soviet policy in Afghanistan in the media. The lack of an open policy debate in the Soviet Union about the costs and benefits of a low-intensity conflict is in sharp contrast to the galvanizing of public opinion that took place in the United States during the Vietnam era and in Israel during the war in Lebanon.

Another aspect of *glasnost'* in the military press has been the new candor in assessing Soviet military performance during World War II. Though criticism of selected aspects of Soviet operations (e.g., the organization of logistics and medical service, the initial period of war) appeared in the military press during the late 1970's-early 1980's,[71] the recent discussions scrutinize Soviet military failures during all phases of the war. A noted military historian writing in a civilian journal has severely criticized Stalin for military incompetence in planning many World War II battles, including the Battle of Stalingrad, and called for the publication of historical documents and scholarly works dealing with the controversy over General Andrey Vlasov's encircled army and the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war.[72] The *Military Historical Journal* has provided a critical and detailed treatment of the use of the operational maneuver of anti-aircraft artillery and an in-depth analysis of Soviet failures during offensive operations in Ukraine in 1944.[73]

Since the Soviets view military history as a model for refining their military doctrine and operations for a future war, their military science is likely to benefit from *glasnost'*. In the view of Soviet military historians, the research and teaching of controversial issues in Soviet military academies will have a favorable impact on the training of future commanders and defense planners.[74]

Soviet political officers have also redefined the scope of *glasnost'* to meet the requirements of the armed forces, while avoiding risks to combat readiness or sol-

[67]For recent treatments of Afghanistan heroes see "The Time of Testing," ibid., Apr. 4, 1987; and *Izvestiya*, Apr. 16, 1987.

[68]*Pravda*, Apr. 19, 1987, reported in *Soviet Analyst* (Richmond, England), May 20, 1987.

[69]"A Manly Deed," *Pravda*, May 18, 1987.

[70]Radio Moscow broadcast cited in *Soviet Analyst*, May 20, 1987, and in "More Selective *Glasnost'* About Afghanistan," *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL 167/87, Apr. 28, 1987.

[71]For examples of criticism of the organization and performance of military medical service see *Voyenno-meditsinskiy Zhurnal* (Moscow), No. 5, May 1980, pp. 69-73, and No. 5, May 1984, pp. 61-64.

[72]*Argumenty i Fakty* (Moscow), Mar. 14-20, 1987, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Apr. 22, 1987, pp. 5-7.

[73]V. Subbotin, "Carrying Out an Operational Maneuver of Anti-aircraft Artillery in the Course of Frontal Attack Operations," *Voyenno-istoricheskiy Zhurnal*, No. 4, April 1987, pp. 30-36; and S. Mikhalev, "From the Experience in Attack Operations in the Right-Bank Ukraine at the Outset of 1944," ibid., No. 3, March 1987, pp. 19-27.

[74]See, e.g., *Voyenno-istoricheskiy Zhurnal*, No. 1, January 1987, pp. 3-12.

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diers' morale. Thus, for example, *glasnost'* is used to promote discussions in military units on topics ranging from awards and admonitions to shortcomings in training and exercises. By castigating corruption, alcoholism and related social maladies, greater openness will also assist in correcting some of the army's present discipline and morale problems. Furthermore, commanders are now requested to solicit recommendations from junior personnel on issues related to education and training.[75] According to the Chief of the Political Directorate of the Air Force, Colonel General of Aviation Leonid Batekhin, public openness should be used to discuss possible improvements in training standards, namely, to introduce tighter combat readiness standards.[76] This new emphasis on training (*obucheniye*) over indoctrination (*vospitaniye*) clearly indicates Soviet military commanders are using *glasnost'* in order to improve both training methodologies and the quality of Soviet manpower, especially its junior command.

Another aspect of *glasnost'* in the military has been encouragement by officers of grass-roots initiative in suggesting improvements in military hardware and training procedures—changes designed to make the military system more cost-effective. For instance, within the framework of *glasnost'*, Soviet logistics experts are encouraged to improve efficiency in the areas of resource allocation and cargo transportation, and more extensive use of computer technology.[77] Admiral Aleksey Sorokin, First Deputy Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, recognizes the role of public debate in facilitating the decision-making process, namely, in making the military bureaucracy more responsive to inputs from below.[78] In addition, he has emphasized the need to keep the soldier informed about command decision-making—a prerequisite for developing low-level initiative in peace and wartime.

The extent of *glasnost'* enjoyed today by a professional soldier in the Soviet Army depends on rank and party membership. The Chief of the Political Directorate of the Ural Military District has warned military personnel that criticism of commanders and their decisions would not be tolerated, but party members among soldiers and junior officers can use authorized party channels to criticize their superiors.[79]

The new policy has nevertheless produced tensions in units where low-ranking military personnel have petitioned senior military authorities to investigate misconduct by their commanders. Military personnel initiating such investigations reportedly suffer from reprisals. For instance, a navy captain stationed at the Leningrad Naval Base was reprimanded for informing senior military authorities about the unauthorized employment of enlisted men in an illegal souvenir workshop on post as well as in menial jobs in the commander's home.[80] For fear of reprisal the majority of enlisted men and NCO's are said to be reluctant to engage in critical discussions. As the First Deputy Minister of Defense, Army General Pyotr Lushev admitted, "since criticism is not respected in all military units, criticism from below is expressed in the form of timid suggestions, with caution."[81]

Judging by indications in the Soviet media, the military establishment nevertheless finds Gorbachev's policy disquieting. Deletions in party documents, the restrictive use of the term *glasnost'*, and the lack of substantive social criticism in the military press point to mounting dissatisfaction with Gorbachev's policies among senior officers. Inasmuch as the Soviet military leadership perceives its role as an educator of civilian youth and a guardian of ideological and martial values in civilian society, it views Gorbachev's more open information and cultural policies as detrimental to its institutional interests.

The Soviet military fears that even a limited *glasnost'* policy might in the long term soften stringent Soviet ideological assumptions about the continuing conflict between the socialist and capitalist systems. Lieutenant General Dmitriy Volkogonov, Deputy Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy and a prominent military expert on psychological warfare, has recently warned military personnel that the regime's traditional view of the West's military threat remains valid. General Volkogonov has also reaffirmed continued Soviet support for revolution in the Third World—a possible allusion to the military's steadfast commitment to maintaining a strategic and military foothold in Afghanistan:

There is no and will be no parity with our class enemy as far as the human factor is concerned. As always before, the Marxists do not condemn war in general. This would amount to . . . pacifism. Our support will always be with those nations who conduct a just struggle for social and national liberation, against imperialist domination and aggressions.[82]

[75]M. Popkov, "Party Democracy and Party Discipline," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil* (Moscow), No. 16, 1986, pp. 18-26.

[76]L. Batekhin, "A Time for New Approaches," ibid., No. 21, 1986, pp. 17-24.

[77]*Tyl i Snabzheniye* (Moscow), No. 11, 1986, pp. 17-21.

[78]A. Sorokin, "The Individual at the Center of Party Work," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, No. 22, 1986, pp. 9-18.

[79]O. Zinchenko, "Criticism and Self-Criticism," ibid., No., 18, 1986, pp. 52-59.

[80]"A Shortage of *Glasnost'*," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Mar. 17, 1987.

[81]P. Lushev, "The Great Responsibility of Cadres," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, No. 5, 1987, p. 17.

[82]D. Volkogonov, "The Human Factor," ibid., No. 2, 1987, pp. 14-15.

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Along the same lines, a military representative at the journalists' congress accused the civilian press of ignoring the military threat from the United States:

Imperialism is preparing for war. None would deny that. Unfortunately, these issues are often not covered by our civilian newspapers.[83]

Such alarmist statements portray genuine concern by the Soviet military about the ramifications of Gorbachev's *glasnost'* policy for the fighting spirit of the army.

As can be seen from this analysis, the military has redefined Gorbachev's concept to suit its interests by channeling discussions and criticism in ways which might potentially enhance combat readiness and overall military effectiveness. At the same time the new policy has increased apprehensions about the potentially negative effects of public criticism on the army's political and ideological reliability, morale, as well as the status of the military profession in Soviet society.

[83]"On the Surge of *Perestroyka*."

Conclusion

Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost'* has not brought about a break with the Russian-Soviet political tradition of state control over public criticism and political debate. Indeed, the old Soviet view of public criticism as a skillfully manipulated political tool still prevails. In the area of foreign policy, *glasnost'* has not heralded a marked Soviet departure from an essentially anti-Western, and particularly anti-American, stance. In light of this, *glasnost'* cannot be seen as a consistent, long-term commitment to a free exchange of information nor as a guarantee of Soviet compliance with the Helsinki Accords in areas of human rights and information (the so-called "third basket"). It should also be kept in mind that the *glasnost'* policy does not so far enjoy a consensus in Soviet institutions, and can therefore be reversed .

It should be stressed, however, that *glasnost'* does benefit the West. It provides more extensive and reliable information about Soviet society . Furthermore, constraints notwithstanding, *glasnost'* allows more freedom of expression and promotes critical thinking in that society. On these counts, *glasnost'* is a step forward.

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Perestroyka and Soviet Agriculture

Roy D. Laird

GRAIN PRODUCTION in the Soviet Union in 1986 and 1987 was higher than it had been in recent years. How much of the increase can be attributed to Gorbachev's agricultural program, discussed here, and how much of it to better weather conditions, is far from clear. Understandably, Gorbachev is inclined to credit the improvement to his policies. Thus, in his major speech on *perestroyka* (restructuring) to the June 1987 Central Committee plenum, he spoke of a "revitalization of life in the countryside."[1] Nevertheless, lagging food output and low levels of farm labor productivity remain the major Soviet domestic problem area. In a speech delivered in Murmansk on October 1, 1987, Gorbachev gave one measure of the gross inefficiency of Soviet agriculture—a problem that, he observed, "concerns all society and every family":

The price the state pays the . . . farms for what they produce . . . for livestock output, is one and one-half to two times higher than the price at which it sells the stock to the population. . . . subsidies last year amounted to 57 billion rubles.[2]

Gorbachev's calls for *glasnost'* (openness) have apparently prompted the resumed publication of key statistics on Soviet agriculture that had not been provided in recent years. For example, in 1986, the official statistical yearbook resumed publishing statistics on annual grain output.[3] These data (see Table 1) reveal a bleak trend in the production of key agricultural commodities over the span of the three most recent five-year planning periods (1971–75, 1976–80, and 1981–85). Specifically, when the record of the 1981–85 period is compared with that of 1971–75, we find that grain production was down in per capita terms (10 percent) and even in absolute terms; the grain import balance had soared dramatically; production of potatoes had declined sharply, although output of other vegetables had increased;[4] and production of meat per capita had only increased by a modest 6 percent—and that due largely to the massive increase in grain imports, without which Soviet meat production per capita would doubtless have declined.

Even with the improvements noted in 1986 and 1987, results are still far from reaching the oft-stated production targets for grain (one metric ton per capita) and meat (some 80 kilograms per capita)—levels that are comparable to those currently achieved in the West. The availability of food, especially of livestock products, remains far below consumer demand, and there are reports that meat shortages still abound. Moreover, not all of the commodities tallied in Table 1 are actually consumed by the Soviet population. For example, some of the produce is wasted (20–30 percent according to Gorbachev);[5] some is processed for other purposes (e.g., the manufacture of alcohol); and much of it is used for animal feed.

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[1] *Pravda* (Moscow), June 26, 1987.
[2] Ibid. Oct. 2, 1987.
[3] *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1985 g.* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1985), Moscow, Finansy i statistika, 1986, pp. 180–81.
[4] In their search for a better diet, many Soviet citizens may be cutting back on their consumption of starch.
[5] *Pravda*, June 26, 1987.

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Table 1: Soviet Food Production, 1971–87

Years	Grain output	Grain import balance[1]	Potatoes	Vegetables	Meat
		(million metric tons, annual averages)			
1971–75	181.6	9.3	89.8	23.0	14.0
1976–80	205.0	20.3	82.6	26.3	14.8
1981–85	180.3	40.8	78.4	29.2	16.2
1986–87	210.0	28.0	83.0	30.0	18.0
		(kilograms per capita)[2]			
1971–75	730.4	37.3	361.2	92.5	56.3
1976–80	786.0	77.8	316.7	100.8	56.7
1981–85	664.5	150.2	288.9	107.6	59.7
1986–87	750.0	100.0	296.0	107.0	64.0

[1]Imports minus exports.

[2]The per capita figures were calculated on the basis of commodity output and the import balance during the year divided by official population statistics for January 1 of the given year.

SOURCES: for Soviet data on 1971–85, see *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1985 g.* (The National Economy of the USSR, 1985), Moscow, Finansy i statistika, 1986, pp. 180–81; for Soviet data on 1986, see *SSSR v tsifrakh v 1986* (The USSR in Figures in 1986), Moscow, Finansy i statistika, 1987, pp. 114–15; for estimates of 1987 Soviet grain crop, see USDA, *USSR Grain Situation and Outlook*, Foreign Agriculture Circular, October 1987; for production of other commodities in 1987, author's preliminary projections; on the grain trade, see estimates published in various issues of *USSR Grain Situation and Outlook*.

What Has Been Done?

Ever since Stalin collectivized agriculture, Soviet leaders have pursued an unending series of policy changes in search of a "socialist" solution to the population's demand for improvement in the quality of the diet. A measure of the seriousness with which the Soviet leadership has regarded the agricultural problem is the fact that, prior to being elevated to their exalted positions, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev each had established a reputation as a successful party leader in the agricultural realm. Despite all this attention, no Soviet leader has fundamentally resolved the agricultural problem.

The first major post-collectivization innovation can be credited to Nikita Khrushchev while he was still Stalin's key agricultural man on the Politburo. Believing that bigger is better, Khrushchev initiated the amalgamation of the collective and state farms (*kolkhozy* and *sovkhozy*), unintentionally transforming them into the huge rural bureaucracies that they are today. He presided over plowing up the huge New Lands area and both increased and stabilized the prices paid to the farms for the bulk of their output under compulsory state procurement.

In 1958, Khrushchev dismantled the Machine-Tractor Stations (MTS), which under Stalin had been an essential instrumentality for controlling the countryside. However small a step, the abolition of the MTS was a move toward badly needed on-the-farm decision-making. Political control on Khrushchev's huge amalgamated farms was maintained by party units that were also supposed to provide on-the-farm responsiveness to outside commands.

A few years later, Khrushchev tried to go even further in the direction of allowing the farms to make their own decisions by removing "more than half" of the rayon (district or county-level) party first secretaries in the Russian and Ukrainian republics. However, as documented by former Soviet journalist Alexander Yanov, the local prefects did not take their dismissal sitting down. As one rayon first secretary said, "No Tsar ever gave up his power voluntarily, and I don't intend to give mine up without a fight."[6] The high and low bureaucrats in the Soviet patron-client system joined hands to resist Khrushchev's agricultural reforms, a resistance that contributed to his ouster in 1964.

On the farms, Khrushchev's food policies at first seemed successful. He announced a record grain harvest in 1958 and proclaimed the grain problem solved. However, in 1963, the Soviet Union experienced a major crop failure. Unlike any previous Soviet or tsarist leader, Khrushchev in 1964 initiated massive grain imports to avoid a famine.[7] In the same year, he was replaced by Leonid Brezhnev as party leader.

[6]Quoted in Alexander Yanov, *The Drama of the 1960's: A Lost Reform*, Berkeley, CA, University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1984, p. 73.

[7]Some of Khrushchev's bitterest criticism of Stalin was reserved for the late dictator's refusal to take the necessary steps to avoid the Ukrainian famine of 1946–47, when Khrushchev was first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party. See *Khrushchev Remembers*, trans. and ed. by Strobe Talbott, Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1970, Chap. 9, "Famine in the Ukraine," pp. 227–44.

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Among Brezhnev's major actions was an attempt to stabilize the area of land under cultivation while increasing summer fallow and inaugurating a major land-amelioration campaign in the Non–Black-Earth zone. In 1982, recognizing the seriousness of consumer dissatisfaction with food supplies, he began massive imports of grain, much of these feed grains for livestock. Most important, on the production side, he presided over huge increases in agricultural investment.[8] Yet, he also moved to appease the rural prefects that Khrushchev had failed to tame, by abandoning Khrushchev's party reorganization schemes. Thus, the initiative-stifling bureaucratic control over the farms did not diminish.

However inadequate over the long run, the Khrushchev and early Brezhnev agricultural policies did result in production increases. But, toward the end of the Brezhnev period, the point of diminishing returns was passed, and stagnation set in. Neither Yuriy Andropov nor Konstantin Chernenko, who succeeded Brezhnev in rapid order between 1982 and 1985, had time to initiate any important schemes they may have had in mind. A Food Program had been introduced by Brezhnev at the May 1982 Central Committee Plenum, with the claim that it would increase local incentives and solve the production problem.[9] In 1983, procurement prices were increased; this brought a temporary increase in farm incomes, but did not have any significant impact on agricultural productivity. Moreover, as discussed below, the increases in peasant incomes were not accompanied by other changes that were needed if productivity was to be increased. In October 1984, Chernenko announced yet another Brezhnevian scheme to expand the area of irrigated and drained land, by an estimated 50 percent.[10]

Gorbachev's Approach

Clearly, Gorbachev's agricultural expertise (he has degrees in law and agronomy and, from 1979, had been the Central Committee secretary responsible for agriculture) and the success of the collective contract scheme in Stavropol' Kray, where he had served as party first secretary, were important factors in his selection as the new general secretary. Already in 1983, when he was a candidate member of the Politburo, Gorbachev advocated and gained that body's endorsement of the collective contract (*kollektivnyy podryad*) for nationwide adoption.

Since becoming general secretary, Gorbachev has called for a major restructuring (*perestroyka*) of the Soviet economy:

We need in-depth, truly revolutionary transformations to get our economy out of the pre-crisis situation it is in . . . . the management system has clashed more and more with the conditions and requirements of economic development . . . . The old economic mechanism . . . has been stimulating growth less and less, and braking [it] more and more.[11]

With respect to agriculture, he has stressed a combination of greater worker output and *intensifikatsiya* ("intensification"—i.e., increasing the yield per hectare). He has rejected the time-worn solution of throwing more rubles at agriculture, if for no other reason than that the rubles are no longer available. The General Secretary has emphasized that the path to meeting the grain production goal includes cutting back on losses during harvesting, storage, transportation, and processing, and he has called for more efficient use of advanced technology. On the incentive side, he has advocated allowing the farms to use freely all produce harvested above largely stabilized state-purchase quotas. However, to date, such flexibility has applied only to fruits and vegetables, the great bulk of which are produced by individual farmers on their private plots.[12]

Most of all, however, Gorbachev has pushed for reorganizing farm work on the basis of collective contracts. In this approach, genuine financial autonomy and the dependence of an enterprise's income on its final results is to become the norm for all production units in the agro-industrial complex, first and foremost, for *kolkhozy* and *sovkhozy*. If fully realized, the scheme would be by far the most revolutionary of the Gorbachev changes. Indeed, if carried to its logical end, it would mean the end of collectivized farming in the USSR.

The essence of the new system is the breaking-up of the large (100 or more members) permanent work bri-

[8]For a summary review of most of the changes Brezhnev made in agriculture, see this author's introduction to Ronald A. Francisco, Betty A. Laird, and Roy D. Laird, Eds., *Agricultural Policies in the USSR and Eastern Europe*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1980, pp. 1 and 2.

[9]The Food Program is a combination of administrative and investment measures aimed at improving the quantity and quality of food production in the USSR. See Roy D. Laird and Betty A. Laird, *A Soviet Lexicon: Important Concepts, Terms, and Phrases*, Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1988, p. 60. The program, announced at the May 1982 party plenum, was more a recognition that the previous food policies had failed and were causing serious popular disaffection than it was a correction of those past failures. See Anton F. Malish, "The Food Program: A New Policy or More Rhetoric?" in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *The Soviet Economy in the 1980's: Problems and Prospects*, Part II, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1983.

[10]See Chernenko's speech to the plenum of the party Central Committee in October 1984, *Pravda*, Oct. 24, 1984.

[11]*Pravda*, June 26, 1987.

[12]Ibid.

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gades on the state and collective farms and reassigning the responsibility for the work to so-called links (*zvenya*)—small teams of a half dozen or so workers who manage part of the livestock herd and/or cultivate a portion of the land. The means of production, including land, are allocated to these units for the period of the contract. Where the arrangement is fully implemented, team members are responsible for managing their own work, including their use of such resources as machines and fertilizer, and hence their income at the end of the year is linked directly not only to output but also to efficiency of production.[13]

The press and Gorbachev's speeches have repeatedly praised the increased productivity and efficiency of the teams, especially where they have been organized on a family basis. For example, in his June 25, 1987, Central Committee speech, Gorbachev cited the outstanding success of two brothers in Novosibirsk Oblast who said "they were attracted not only by high wages but, to no less a degree, by independence, by realization of their human significance, and by pride that they are doing really useful work."[14]

Elsewhere in the same speech, Gorbachev hinted at a more revolutionary aspect of the collective contract system when he stated that "all reserves must be used. It is necessary to return once again to the question of the role of the individual small holding."[15] In fact, one can gather from the Soviet press that there is a strong tendency for the family teams to meld together that portion of the collective and state farm operation that they are now responsible for with their own private-plot and personal livestock operations.[16]

In a January 1987 speech, Viktor Nikonov, currently the CPSU Central Committee secretary responsible for agriculture, reported that some 11 million farm workers, three-fourths of the plowed land, and 60 percent of collective- and state-farm livestock were under collective contract schemes in 1986. Given the Soviet penchant for overstating fulfillment of campaigns, one can speculate that many of the contract arrangements exist only on paper. Moreover, even Nikonov acknowledged that each season a good number of the contract groups are abandoned.[17]

The Fundamental Economic Problem

Gorbachev and his colleagues have repeatedly pinpointed the fundamental economic problem in Soviet agriculture: a lack of initiative and diligence among the rural workers. What is needed more than anything else is a new mind-set among the farmers, a dedication to hard work. However, the solution is not a simple matter of increasing incomes (which the experiments with the collective contract do seem to achieve). Indeed, as is implicit in what was said above, under Brezhnev, peasant incomes increased, but productivity did not keep pace. If material incentives are to have an impact on productivity, the individual worker must see a connection between hard work and material improvement in his life.

Most farm workers in the Soviet economy do not make this perceptual link for two important reasons. First, rewards have long been tied to the efforts of a large group, namely, the 100 or more members of the traditional farm brigades; consequently, extra individual effort has had little impact on the amount an individual peasant earns. Second, and most important, even where the collective contract scheme has reduced the number of workers in a production group to a few persons, increased wages do not guarantee the availability of consumer goods and services.

The experience of one "wealthy" Siberian state farm underscores the problem. On the farm in question, a contract team of machine operators was formed, and wages soon doubled. However, after a couple of years, the team disbanded. The reason? There was nothing in the shops to spend their new earnings on. The journalist covering the story concluded: Why work harder to earn more money if the things you want are not available?[18]

Gorbachev is acutely aware of the problem. In a July 1986 speech, he noted that although "earnings in Komsomol-on-Amur [where he was speaking] are high, the reasonable requirements of the people cannot be satisfied, because there is not enough to spend the money on." The General Secretary added: "One does not need to be a great expert on political economy to see and understand the situation."[19]

Looking at Western experience with the market place, where supply and prices are regulated by demand rather than by state plans, and at the successes achieved in Hungarian and Chinese agriculture by unleashing free-enterprise forces, many Western observers of the USSR have suggested that the Soviet Union must move toward a market economy if the agricultural production

[13]Gorbachev's report to the 27th CPSU Congress on February 27, 1986, *Pravda*, Feb. 28, 1986.

[14]Ibid., June 26, 1987.

[15]Ibid.

[16]*Sel'skaya Zhizn'* (Moscow), Oct. 25, 1986.

[17]Ibid., Jan. 25, 1987.

[18]*Izvestiya* (Moscow), Mar. 28, 1983.

[19]Reported in *Pravda*, July 21, 1986. No wonder that Soviet workers and peasants have some of the highest personal savings in the world. Indeed, according to one account, such savings increased "nearly ten times" from 1965 to 1982. See Donald D. Barry and Carol Barner-Barry, *Contemporary Soviet Politics*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall, 1987, pp 196–97.

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problem is to be solved.[20] In agriculture, as elsewhere in the Soviet economy, what seems called for is, in effect, decollectivization.

The Politics of Decollectivization

Gorbachev has not given any public indication of a willingness to sacrifice the sacrosanct principles of Soviet socialism or to move overtly from administrative regulation to a market system. Thus, in July 1986, he stated:

The CPSU and the nation as a whole unanimously believe that the answers to the questions posed by life should be sought not outside socialism, but within the framework of our system by revealing the potential of the planned economy, socialist democracy, culture, and the human factor, by relying on the initiative of the masses.[21]

His assertion that change cannot be sought "outside socialism" reflects his recognition that politics both determine and limit any innovations that might be realized in the economic realm. Yet, his own quest for reform has fostered a revived discussion of the favorable elements in Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP) and even the political resurrection of NEP supporter Nikolay Bukharin.

The NEP was an abrupt about-face in the countryside, initiated by Lenin in 1921 to deal with the disastrous economic situation at the end of the Civil War and, especially, the serious fall in agricultural output largely due to the forced requisitioning of food that had devastated peasant incentives to produce. Under NEP, farmers were no longer pressured to collectivize their farms. They were left alone to farm as they pleased. Most important, a free market for agricultural commodities was allowed to thrive. In sum, both political and economic control over the countryside was greatly reduced. As a result, in a few years, grain output returned to pre–World War I levels. Subsequently, peasants often referred to the NEP period (1921–28) as "the golden years of Soviet rule."[22]

Writing about the collective contract scheme in 1983, a Soviet journalist spelled out the ultimate NEP-like logic of the measure when he wrote:

Each hectare will get a proprietor, and signposts will appear across our land: "S. S. Zhelebrovskiy's Land," "V. I. Bolotov's Land," "V. Ye. Rashchupkon's Land," and "A. F. Uvarov's Land."[23]

Such a perspective obviously has ramifications far beyond the boundaries of the farms. After Khrushchev's amalgamations, every farm had a party unit and a party chairman that assured outside control over the peasants and their output, under the direction of the district party secretaries. But private family farms cannot support party units. Furthermore, if farm operations are to be efficient and productive they cannot be controlled or managed by outside district party and state bureaucrats, which remains the case today. In sum, socialism, Soviet style, is not compatible with family farming.

Yet, as Khrushchev learned, the district and region party prefects do not want to lose their power over the countryside. No wonder then that, in view of the inevitable opposition of the entrenched party bureaucracy, Gorbachev laces his speeches on agricultural reform with obfuscation and contradiction. For example, in his major speech on *perestroyka* in June 1987, Gorbachev called for decentralization of decision-making, expansion of the application of the collective contract scheme, and loosing of the initiative of the family farmers, with the clear implication that the district party prefects must be weeded out of agriculture. As he said early in the speech,

[It] is the command-and-administer forms of managing society that are braking our movement.

Yet, toward the end of this long speech, he stated:

Comrades, it is now especially necessary to increase party influence in all aspects of our work . . . .[24]

How is one to interpret this remarkable inconsistency in the General Secretary's utterances? Might he be genuinely prepared to decollectivize the countryside if that is what is required to solve the agricultural problem? It is at least conceivable that his obfuscation is deliberate, designed to avert the sort of oppositional combination of district prefects and Politburo patrons that toppled Khrushchev. Gorbachev knows that although his Politburo colleagues were responsible for his elevation to the top Soviet party post, they are not ready to dismantle the planning system and, especially, the hierarchy of party controls that is their power base. Whatever

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[20] In 1980, Seweryn Bialer wrote: "a large group of Soviet economists and virtually all Western specialists would agree that small-scale tinkering can no longer suffice and that the question 'What is to be done?' concerns the change from guidance based on *administrative orders* to that based on *economic parameters*." See Bialer, *Stalin's Successors: Leadership Stability and Change in the Soviet Union*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1980, p. 303.

[21] *Pravda*, July 21, 1986.

[22] See Chap. 4, "The Peasant Brest-Litovsk, 1921–1928" in Roy D. Laird, *Collective Farming in Russia*, Lawrence, KA, University of Kansas, 1958, pp. 40–51.

[23] *Izvestiya*, Mar. 28, 1983.

[24] *Pravda*, June 26, 1987.

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changes Gorbachev may have in mind, he currently appears to lack the "votes," Soviet-style, to advance the sort of major reforms in agriculture or elsewhere that would go beyond "tinkering" with the system.[25]

And in the future? There is an occasional "gem" in Gorbachev's speeches. In September 1986, he stated:

[W]hen at sharp turning points in history, people—even those committed to our cause—did not immediately conceptualize the new conditions, the new tasks, and the need for new approaches. Such was the case in the NEP period when Lenin had to exert a great effort to prove both the need for a new economic policy and the fact that it was not a return to capitalism, but a means of going over to socialist construction.[26]

Gorbachev does seem to be exerting considerable "effort" on behalf of reform, stumping across the Soviet Union á la Khrushchev in quest of political support,[27] and it may be that when the time is politically right, he will initiate major economic reform in the agricultural realm, as well as elsewhere in the Soviet economy. The post-Stalin leadership discovered that Lenin was really for "peaceful coexistence" and that there can be such a thing as "Leninist" profit; in what other meaningful direction can Gorbachev go but to discover "Leninist" free prices, a "Leninist" market place, and "Leninist" private farms?

Next to Lenin, Gorbachev appears to be the most pragmatic leader the Soviet Union has had. More than any of his predecessors, he has been able to see clearly what must be done. However, the first law of political leadership in any system is survival in office. Thus, if necessary, he is prepared to stop short of calling for fundamental change, however badly needed for economic reasons, that would result in his ouster from power, as happened with Khrushchev in 1964. If, and for reasons discussed here, it is a big "if," there is to be a battle over the future course of Soviet agriculture, it is yet to be fully joined.

[25]See Roy D. Laird, *The Politburo: Demographic Trends, Gorbachev, and the Future,* Boulder, CO, Westview, 1986. The ouster in the late autumn of 1987 of Politburo member Boris Yel'tsin, one of Gorbachev's most vocal supporters, is indicative of the resistance to *perestroyka*.

[26]*Pravda,* Sept. 20, 1986.

[27]It is "not by accident" that the speech reported in September 1986 was delivered to a group of party activists in Krasnodar Kray, perhaps the richest agricultural district in the USSR. Whether or not Gorbachev has succeeded in this quest for support may become clearer at the June 1988 party conference.

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NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to The Editors,
Problems of Communism,
US Information Agency, 301 4th Street, SW, Washington, DC 20547, USA.

SOVIET MILITARY ON LOCAL WARS

TO THE EDITORS: I think that Mark N. Katz in his review article "Soviet Third World Policy" (*Problems of Communism*, July-August 1986 has misread the intent of Soviet military interest in local wars. Although the Soviet military probably is "very much concerned with the question of defending socialism in the Third World" (p. 89), that concern is not what stands out in Soviet writings on local wars. Rather, the Soviets examine local wars to discover new tactics, operational art, and strategy for possible utilization by their own forces.

Soviet military writers have been studying local wars in a general, non-polemical fashion since the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. Before then, discussions of local wars had a highly political content, which was not terribly useful for military analysis. The Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 have been of particular interest to the Soviets, since both sides were armed with modern weapons and used quite different tactics. The steady stream of writings about "the lessons learned" from local wars that appeared throughout the 1970's grew to a flood of articles in the late 1970's and early 1980's as the Soviet armed forces underwent major reorganization.

In fact, so much was written on local wars in the Soviet military press (not only in *Voyenno-istoricheskiy Zhurnal* [VIZh], but also in journals like *Morskoy Sbornik*, *Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtika*, *Voyenniy Vestnik*, and *Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*) that a general, I. E. Shavrov, assembled a collective volume entitled *"Lokal'nyye voyny: Istoriya i sovremennost'* (Local Wars: History and the Contemporaneity), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1981. Two years later, the Soviets institutionalized their coverage of local wars by devoting a specially labeled section in *VIZh* to the topic.

Although the stated Soviet view is that local wars are the proving grounds for imperialism's new weapons and tactics, they clearly serve that purpose for the Soviets. However, practically none of the Soviet articles focus on places like Angola, El Salvador, or Ethiopia, where allied forces are engaged in local conflicts. Instead, they focus primarily on the Middle East, the Falklands, and Vietnam. There are occasional articles on the Korean war, but this is of less interest for the Soviets, since the weapons used and the lessons to be learned seem less relevant for current tactics than, for example, the conflict in Vietnam.

With regard to the latter, the Soviets seem to care less about their allies than about how the United States fought the war, how it resupplied its troops, and how it arranged bombings and altered its air tactics after experiencing North Vietnam's air defense system. There is in many of these articles a grudging admiration for American organization in the war, for the way the American military adapted tactics developed for high-intensity conflict in Europe to a new type of war, for American use of helicopters and aircraft carriers, and for other innovations.

The Soviets write on local wars in military journals not (as Katz suggests, p. 89) to argue that interventions against insurgents "can succeed," but to understand what the battlefield would look like for the USSR in a high-intensity war. After all, the Soviets have not fought a war against a well-equipped and well-trained force equal to them since World War II. Therefore, the Soviets have looked to what could be learned about attrition rates, equipment usage, and tactics from detailed examinations of the Arab-Israeli wars, of American aircraft losses to sophisticated air defenses in Vietnam, and so on.

Local wars have reinforced the Soviet views on surprise, and have taught them much about electronic warfare, the use of remotely piloted vehicles, and many other aspects of modern warfare. To use a familiar Soviet expression, it is "no accident" that statements like "the experience of local wars demonstrates . . ." occur throughout the new edition of Reznichenko's *Taktika* (Tactics, 1984). Soviet writings on local wars should be examined very carefully, not for what they say about the Soviet military's hopes for Third World intervention, but for the ways the Soviets are looking at new tactics and strategies, which the Soviets themselves may introduce into their armed forces.

Joel Shapiro
Alexandria, VA

MR. KATZ RESPONDS: Mr. Shapiro makes several interesting points in his letter. I do not think, however, that our interpretations are mutually exclusive. The Soviets undoubtedly examine Western experience in local wars to discover new tactics for possible use by their own or allied armed forces. One such possible use is in the Third World.

In *The Third World in Soviet Military Thought* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), I analyzed Soviet military writing about the American experience in local wars, especially the war in Vietnam. During the mid- to late 1970's, most of this lit-

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erature discussed why the United States lost the war. Strikingly, since the early 1980's, most Soviet literature examining local wars has discussed how Western tactics have succeeded—including some employed by Americans in Vietnam.

I have not seen any detailed discussion in Soviet military literature of military actions undertaken by the USSR or its socialist allies after World War II (which continues to be discussed in great detail). This does not mean that the Soviets are uninterested in local wars, but that it is taboo to discuss openly and in detail the strengths and weaknesses of Soviet and allied operations in them. I argue that the discussion of Western operations in local wars is a discussion in Aesopian language—of their own problems.

This interpretation of the Soviet military literature gains greater credence if one considers that the Soviets and their allies are now in the same position in Afghanistan, Angola, and Kampuchea as the United States was in Vietnam—interveners in local wars trying to protect weak client regimes. Examining American and Western experiences in similar situations could have direct relevance to enhancing their own counter-insurgency efforts.

In addition, in an era when the top Soviet party and military leaders are giving less emphasis in their statements to Third World contingencies than did their counterparts a decade ago, it is not surprising that those who see the Third World as a high priority region would not state this in direct contradiction to their superiors, but would instead express it indirectly. This literature, then, may be part of a debate about involvement in the Third World with those favoring it emphasizing that if the West can undertake the difficult task of counter-insurgency successfully, so can the USSR and its allies.

Shapiro is undoubtedly correct in saying that the Soviets examine Western experience in local wars in order to better understand and prepare for high-intensity conventional conflict. However, considering that the USSR and its allies are involved in several protracted low-intensity conflicts that they have so far been unable to win, it would be a mistake to regard Soviet analysis of Western operations in similar situations as having no relevance to socialist counter-insurgency efforts in the Third World.

MARK N. KATZ
Washington, DC

Corrections

The photo on page 37 of the May-June 1987 issue of *Problems of Communism* was of Chinese Vice President Ulanhu, and not of Peng Chen.

* * *

In the photo on page 24 of the July-August 1987 issue, identifications of Nikita Khrushchev and Georgiy Malenkov were inadvertently switched.

* * *

In John P. Burns' article "China's *Nomenklatura* System," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1987, there were two author's corrections that failed to be reflected in the printed text. On page 37, the sentence beginning at the bottom of column 1 should read: "Finally, the Central Committee reaffirmed its control of the party core groups (*dangzu*) of central ministries, commissions, and bureaus." On page 50, the last sentence in the last full paragraph should read: "If all party core groups are eliminated, the party Central Committee's *nomenklatura* could be reduced by up to 500 positions.

CAMBODIAN MADNESS

TO THE EDITORS: May I correct a series of misconceptions in Robert S. Ross's essay "Indochina's Continuing Tragedy," in the November-December 1986 issue of *Problems of Communism*, which reviewed five books, including my history of the Cambodian revolution, *When the War Was Over*.

They begin with his statement (p. 88) that in the post-war period, "Phnom Penh polemics clearly identified Vietnam, not the United States, as the primary threat to Cambodian independence." This leads him to ask why Cambodia waited two years, until 1977, to fight Vietnam. He says, correctly, that I do not answer this question convincingly in my book. This is because I disagree both with his assumption and with the theories that flow from it.

In public statements of the early period, the Cambodian leadership rarely named a foreign enemy, but when they did, it was usually the United States—never Vietnam. The Khmer Rouge had just defeated an American client state in a war that featured devastating bombings by the United States.

Yes, after the war, the Cambodians fought border skirmishes with Vietnam, but they also fought similar skirmishes with Thailand. These battles were not an end in themselves, but part of the Cambodians' singular preoccupation with quickly implementing their own radical revolution. To that end, they sealed off and "protected" their national boundaries and warned against "all foreign intervention," which Ross interprets as a polemic against Vietnam exclusively.

The Cambodian communists were xenophobes who viewed all foreign nations, even China, as real or potential enemies. This is one manifestation of the madness that informed all aspects of their revolution—especially their 1977 decision to attack Vietnam.

Cambodia's communists set about creating a revolutionary paradise overnight, and as their inhuman experiment inevitably failed, they searched for scapegoats—"secret enemies" of the revolution—to blame. They killed the elite of the old society, members of minorities, the Buddhist clergy, their own comrades in the party—whoever could be accused of undermining their "perfect" revolution. As the search for scapegoats disintegrated into a bloody holocaust, the leadership decided that Vietnam was behind their problems, that Vietnam had set up

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a vast network of secret agents to sabotage Cambodia's success, and hence that only war with Vietnam could ensure that Cambodia's revolution would triumph. They were mad.

War with Vietnam grew out of the revolution; it was not a precondition of the revolution, as Ross believes. He finds it "more plausible" that some Khmer Rouge wanted war with Vietnam from the beginning, that they executed party rivals and engineered "shifts in Politburo alignments" in order to promulgate the war (p. 88).

However, there was no Politburo heading the Cambodian party; organizational matters had not evolved to that stage. Second, prison documents clearly show that party figures executed in the mad exercise to find scapegoats were accused of acting as agents of the Central Intelligence Agency, or of the KGB, and not just of Vietnam. There was no simple division along pro- or anti-Vietnam lines.

Ross concludes that I fail to explain the madness behind the Cambodian revolution because my method is historical; he argues (p. 89) that the courses of the Cambodian and Chinese revolutions differed despite a "very similar revolutionary history . . . ." We disagree profoundly. My book is a testimony to why I believe Cambodia's revolutionary past is unique and at the heart of the madness.

Finally, as a courtesy, could Ross please list the "factual errors" he believes he found in my book.

ELIZABETH BECKER
Paris, France

SOUTHEAST ASIA DISPUTE

TO THE EDITORS: The collection of articles in the November-December 1986 issue of *Problems of Communism* concerning the Indo-China thicket provides good material for reviewing historical and active factors. However, an important point was neglected. Shortly before the communist victory in South Vietnam, China seized certain islands from the Republic of Vietnam (the Thieu administration). Both China and Vietnam had claimed the islands, but one the Republic of Vietnam had occupied them. Hanoi would have expected to inherit those same islands as it did other territories administered by South Vietnam. China's precipitate operation could only have been read in North Vietnam as an act of hostility, with consequent implications for the future.

FRANK W. SCOTTON
Counselor for Public Affairs
US Embassy
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COMECON LINKS

TO THE EDITORS: Michael Checinski's "Warsaw Pact/CEMA Military-Economic Trends" (*Problems of Communism*, March-April 1987) is extensively documented, but omits what I believe to be the first published reference to the joint Warsaw Pact/CEMA committee.

In my book *Comecon: Integration Problems of the Planned Economies* (Oxford University Press, 1st ed., 1965, and 2nd ed., 1967), I listed as created in Melnik (Czechoslovakia) in December 1957 an "Economic Comission of WTO . . . [which] may form a Defence Industry Commission of Comecon, the activities of which are not reported" (2nd ed., p. 283, with further discussion in the text at p. 82).

Four of Mr. Checinski's bibliographic references are from the 1970's, and the rest are from the 1980's. I can hence claim some lead in the ventilation of this little-publicized issue.

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